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ABSTRACT

This monograph reports an exploratory study of legislative behavior in the field of education. The study sampled a large number of legislators' rollcall votes involving educational policy under various conditions of partisanship. The specific objectives of the study were to (1) determine the changes that occur in patterns of rollcall voting on education measures when the intensity of partisanship increases, (2) compare the patterns of voting on education measures in the lower and upper houses of a legislature that undergo a transition in level of partisanship, and (3) determine the programmatic and interest group effects of changes in the level of partisanship. The study was made of the California State Legislature between 1955 and 1966. During this time, the legislative body reflected the behaviors characteristic of three distinguishable political periods: transitional politics (1955-1958) during which nonpartisan factionalism prevailed, moderate partisanship (1959-1962), and intense partisanship (1963-1966). (Pages 46-153 may reproduce poorly.) (Author/JL)

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A STUDY OF THE BASES OF LEGISLATIVE DECISIONS ON EDUCATIONAL POLICY

Harold J. Dyck

The Regents of the
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PREFACE

This volume reports an exploratory study in legislative behavior on education. The study is an attempt to explicate empirically the legislative response to education issues under various levels of partisanship. As with many empirical studies, it raises more questions than it answers. Hopefully, others will seek further evidence for certain speculations which arise from the analyses presented here.

A large number of people made very substantial contributions to the preparation of this report. I would like to thank especially Mr. Lester Dunn for his persistence in coordinating a team of clerks and research assistants in the collection and analysis of the data reported here. I would also like to thank the late Dr. Tryon and his team of very capable assistants for advice and instruction in cluster analysis techniques. Dean Theodore L. Reller was particularly helpful throughout this study in facilitating its progress.

I would also like to thank the many legislators and legislative advocates in California who very generously contributed their insights and knowledge of the legislative system making possible a more complete interpretation of the findings in this study.

H.J.D.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

PARTISANSHIP IN EDUCATION

This monograph reports an exploratory study of legislative behavior in the field of education. This study is concerned with legislators' roll-call voting behavior on education measures under various conditions of partisanship. Chapter I presents the problem, describes the data and methods of analysis which were used, and gives a brief description of the research case -- the California State Legislature between the years 1955 and 1966.

In order to give context to a statement of the objectives which govern this study, the case against partisanship in the determination of education policy will be reviewed and evaluated on the basis of what we know about party behavior in legislative contexts.

The Case Against a Partisan Determination of Education Policy

Nonpartisanship in educational policy-making is a deeply entrenched practice in most American states. The principle of nonpartisanship in education has been advocated by American educators for well over a century. This principle has been substantiated both in practice and theory, and has survived many onslaughts in American education history. Nonpartisanship in education is part and parcel of a larger ideology which has developed over the last century, namely, the anti-political ideology. This ideology was given support by the actions of Horace Mann, by the importation of Hegelian thought into American education, by the practical realities which necessitated the removal of educational policy-making at the local level from multi-purpose governments, and by the more recent articulation of the concept of professionalism in education.

A nonpartisan approach to educational policy-making is frequently justified on several grounds. First, it is sometimes argued that political parties are irrelevant to the interests of the educational system. Dean Cubberly used to say that there is no Republican or Democratic way to build a bridge, nor is there a Republican or Democratic way to teach a Greek. What he was trying to point out was that educational policy problems transcend political party concerns. Furthermore, those who argue that parties are irrelevant to educational problems point out that parties have no special machinery to deal with educational matters. They have no means by which to create experts in the field of education. If and when parties do get involved with education, their motives for doing so must be held suspect for their interests go beyond interests in "good" education. This type of argument against a partisan involvement and approach to education policy might be labelled "the argument from irrelevance."

A second type of argument is sometimes proposed against partisanship in the determination of education policy which reverses certain assumptions of the first argument. It is sometimes argued that political parties would tailor educational systems according to their own ideology. This prospect would have frightening consequences. For example, if the Republican party were an ideologically oriented party it would, if it gained political power, shape the educational system in such a way that its ideology would be promoted in the classrooms. Education would, in this case, be doctrinal and laden with propaganda. This type of argument might be labelled "the argument from ideological dominance."

A third argument follows from the second. If political parties were deeply involved with education they would, upon obtaining power in government, shape educational finance and curriculum policies, as well as the administrative structures, according to their objectives *at the time*. If another party gained power and proceeded to do likewise, great discontinuities in the educational system would occur. Sound education would not be possible unless there were stability and continuity in the school system. Those who propose this argument against a partisan approach to education policy assume, contrary to those who propose the second argument, that parties are, for the most part, not ideologically inclined. They are, instead oriented toward expedient actions and immediate gratification. This argument might be labelled "the argument from short-term expediency."

A fourth argument against partisanship in education is a tactical argument. It is applied to the strategies of the major conglomerates of educational interest groups. It is very frequently proposed, especially by legislative advocates representing major educational interest groups, that alignment with one party or another is a very dangerous political tactic for those who articulate the interests of education. For example, if a given educationally interested organization aligns itself with a given party in power, that organization will become ineffective when another party gains power. In other words, for education to maintain a powerful voice in political systems where educational policy is decided, its spokesmen must remain neutral in their relationships to the parties. It is assumed by those who argue from political strategy considerations that political parties, in their own way, are punitive towards certain major interests in the society. This argument might be labelled "the argument from retribution."

Several aspects of these arguments countering partisanship in education are noteworthy. *First*, the concept of partisanship as it pertains to these several arguments is rarely explicated or stipulated. What does the word "partisanship" mean in the context of these several arguments? Certainly, there is no attempt to deny in these arguments the importance of party machinery in the recruitment and election of legislators. But what partisanship is and what its role should be in the organization of legislative bodies and in the process of legislation remains equivocal. *Second*, there seems to be an assumption running through the arguments listed above that the educational system, as well as the groups which are designed to articulate the "public interest" with respect to education, are very delicate and sensitive, if not politically powerless, instrumentalities. It is assumed that the school system, for example, could not withstand the discontinuities which supposedly would occur should education become a major focal point for political party involvement in policy. It is assumed that the educational system could not provide the fundamental continuity and stability to withstand the supposed vicissitudes which are the predicted consequences of partisanship in education policy-making. Third, it should be noted that the last type of argument is not directly relevant to the issue. If it is adjudged to be wise for an education interest group to assume a nonpartisan posture in dealing with education policy makers, nothing about the wisdom of parties assuming independent roles on education issues has been implied.

The arguments against partisanship in education have not grown into a systematic or well-developed normative theory, but they do strike at the heart of one of the most salient controversies in American politics, namely, the issue of party responsibility.

Many political scientists and politicians have argued that a partisan approach to policy generally results in a more effective, a more responsible, and a more representative party system. The 1950 report of the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association makes the following observations:

> An effective party system requires, first, that the parties are able to bring forth programs to which they commit themselves and, second, that the parties possess sufficient internal cohesion to carry out these programs.
>
> The fundamental requirement (in developing accountable parties) is a two-party system in which the opposition party acts as the critic of the party in power, developing, defining, and presenting the policy alternatives which are necessary for a true choice in reaching public decision.
>
> A stronger party system is less likely to give cause for the deterioration and confusion of purposes which sometimes passes for compromise but is really an unjustifiable surrender to narrow interests. Compromise among interests is compatible with the aims of a free society only when the terms of reference reflect an openly acknowledged concept of the public interest. There is every reason to insist that the parties be held accountable to the public for the compromises they accept.[1]

The point of view expressed by the Committee is diametrically opposed to the arguments against a partisan approach to education policy. The Committee views the party as the mechanism for bringing programs to fruition. It sees the minority party as a true opposition party which serves as a critic of the majority party and as a means by which policy alternatives are developed.

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[1] Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, published as a supplement to The American Political Science Review, XLIV (September, 1950), pages 17, 18, and 20, respectively.

Stephen K. Bailey, in his analysis of American National Parties, contends that there is a diffusion of party power in American politics and that this diffusion has very serious and multiple consequences. He claims that the diffusion of political party power leads to a "government by fits and starts;" a form of public policy which lacks "rationality and consistency;" a series of compromises which tend "to fall with considerable regularity on the side of the minority rather than the majority interests;" and finally, it leads to a dissipation and discouragement of "desperately needed criticism of both domestic and foreign policy."2

The arguments which support a more responsible political party system leave a number of important questions unanswered. How much party responsibility do we currently have in the several fields of public policy? It is assumed that we have very little party responsibility but the evidence on this question is not in. Indeed, there is very little research to back up the arguments of those who propose a more responsible political party system and those, particularly those in education, who would like policy issues (especially in education) to override party considerations.

The debate between those who propose a more responsible political party system and those in education who would like education to be a policy field set apart from partisan interests and concerns has proceeded on the basis of very inadequate knowledge about the nature of American political parties and the way they behave in legislative arenas.

The Characteristics Of Partisan and Nonpartisan Legislatures

Since World War II a great spate of books and articles have been concerned with partisanship in legislative systems. Fundamentally, these studies have explored two questions: (1) Under what conditions does legislative partisanship occur? (2) What are the consequences of partisanship in legislative bodies for other units in the political system? There are a number of studies which use party affiliation as a predictor of legislative voting behavior; none deal exclusively with education.

In an attempt to synthesize the findings about party, Malcolm Jewell summarizes some of the findings with respect to conditions under which partisanship occurs:

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2. Stephen K. Bailey, The Condition of our National Political Parties, (New York, Fund for the Republic, 1959), pp. 4-5.

> Of the many contrasts among state legislatures, perhaps the greatest are in the patterns of roll-call voting. In a few states party alignments, though evident on only a fraction of roll-calls, appear to be the most significant factors. On the other hand, in some states party alignments are seldom or never significant in voting. Party voting is most likely in states where each of the parties is relatively homogenous and policy-oriented, where there is a political bipolarization along urban-rural lines. This tends to occur in the most industrial states. It may also be significant, at least temporarily, where the second party is rebuilding and challenging the majority party. In two-party states where the parties do not stand for anything, the parties are likely to vote as blocs only on issues affecting their narrow interests. If there is no pattern of party voting, a wide variety of factional, regional, or urban-rural patterns may appear. These are unlikely to last long or to encompass many issues; they appear and disappear with changing issues, circumstances, and personalities on the political scene. Without party voting, there is little pattern to the roll-calls.[3]

In another recent study, Frank Sorauf found that in Pennsylvania, partisanship in the legislature was reinforced by constituency characteristics. Democrats dominated the urban areas while the Republicans maintained a rural base of influence.[4] It appears that in states such as New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania, fairly well disciplined and cohesive parties develop in the legislatures largely because of constituency based differences between the parties. These states are populous, highly industrialized, urbanized, and diversified.

However, even in these states the ideal type of partisan model is hardly approximated. There is a great deal of party unity, but it fluctuates from issue to issue. Party lines are clearly drawn on certain kinds of policy and organizational questions but not on others. Parties in these states attempt to be relatively flexible on policies so that they can accommodate major shifts in the distribution of public opinion. Furthermore, party conflict in these states is usually on liberal-conservative issues.

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3. Malcolm Jewell, the State Legislature. Politics and Practice, (New York: Random House, 1962) p. 75.

4. Frank J. Scrauf, Party and Representation: Legislative Politics in Pennsylvania, (New York: Atherton Press, 1963) p. 41.

It is quite evident from available research that party interests cut through a variety of public policy questions.[5] In a highly inter-party competitive legislative system, the welfare and survival of the party is a pervasive theme in the organization of the legislature, in legislative strategy, and in policy. Thus conflict is frequently intense on such matters as electoral law, internal organizational procedural questions, appointments, and patronage. Particularly bitter inter-party conflicts occur on the reapportionment of electoral districts. To what extent partisan conflicts on these rather narrow though important issues spill over on substantive policy matters is difficult to determine.

Social and economic diversity, however, are not the only factors which contribute toward the development of partisanship in legislatures. William Buchanan found that a partisan sprit developed in the California State Legislature as a result of two major factors. First, the Democrats gained the majority in both houses and won the governorship in the elections of 1958. Their new position of dominance in state government and an ideologically-based program of legislation increased the degree of party cohesiveness. Second, he found that individual leadership personalities, especially those with intense loyalties to party organization outside the Legislature, contributed a great deal to the development of partisanship in California.[6]

There have been a number of studies, including Buchanan's, which have focused on nonpartisan legislatures and legislatures dominated by a single party. Buchanan found that during the nonpartisan era of California legislative politics, the Legislature functioned as well as any competitive or partisan legislature. He concludes that there are "...no internal legislative operations which only a party can perform." More importantly, he concludes that "nonpartisan system fails to link the Legislature to other elements of the political system (e.g., the Governor, local politics)."[7] Instead, a nonpartisan legislature seemed to be particularly susceptible to the lobbyists. Buchanan seems to suggest that party cohesiveness is a countervailing factor which protects the legislative system from undue pressure group influences. He also concludes that the nonpartisan system is very poorly adapted to communication with its constituency. It is inscrutable and incomprehensible to the public at large and, consequently, information blockages develop.

Nonpartisan legislatures as well as those legislatures dominated by a single party develop intra-party or inter-party factions. This was the case in California during its nonpartisan era; it was also found to be the case in Florida. In a study of the Florida Senate, Parsons found:

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[5] See Duncan MacRae, Jr., "The Role of the State Legislature in Massachusetts," American Sociological Review, xix (April, 1954), pp. 185-94.

[6] William Buchanan, Legislative Partisanship: The Deviant Case of California, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963).

[7] Ibid., p. 150.

> ...that there is a pattern of conflict within the one-party dominance of the Florida Senate, displayed on such issues as the control of its presidency and committees and in its divisions on controversial roll-call votes, that approximates the operations of a two-party system; and that this pattern occurs along a line of opposition between constituencies of continued Democratic dominance in the face of social change and emergent Republicanism, and Democratic constituencies that lack any strong semblance of either.[8]

In nonpartisan or one-party legislatures, therefore, it would appear that factions, especially if based on constituency differences, perform some of the competitive functions which parties serve in full-fledged two-party legislatures.

These brief references to studies of partisan and nonpartisan legislatures seem to suggest another reason why educationists may be opposed to partisanship in educational policy making. If it is the case that partisan legislatures are somewhat more impervious to interest group pressures and that nonpartisanship legislatures provide greater access to special interests, then self-interest on the part of education groups is served by a nonpartisan approach to educational policy. The effect of partisanship is that the legislature may very well become relatively autonomous in its search for educational policy alternatives and in its final decisions on policy.

Objectives of the Study

This study is concerned with the consequences of nonpartisanship and partisanship for educational policy. Specifically, the objectives of this study are as follows:

1. To determine the changes which occur in patterns of roll-call voting on education measures when the intensity of partisanship increases;

2. To compare the patterns of voting on education measures in the lower and upper houses of a legislature which undergo a transition in the level of partisanship; and

3. To determine programmatic and interest group effects of changes in the level of partisanship.

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[8] Malcolm B. Parsons, "Quasi-Partisan conflict in a one-party Legislation System--The Florida Senate," American Political Science Review LVI (1962), p. 605.

The objective of this study, then, is to explicate empirically the meaning of legislative partisanship for educational policy. In order to do this completely, of course, many other aspects in addition to roll-call voting would need to be examined and studied. These would include, for example, patterns of legislators' involvement in education, relationships between interest groups and political parties, and the legislative strategies of political parties with respect to education policy.

The setting of the study is the California State Legislature between the years 1955 and 1966. It was during this time that the Legislature made a transition from factionalism to partisanship. There were three distinguishable periods of development during this time -- a period of transitional politics during which nonpartisan factionalism prevailed in the Legislature and the education interest groups dominated educational decision-making (1955-1958), a period of moderate partisanship when major reforms in education were enacted and the major interest groups had their political power very considerably diminished (1959-1962), and a period of intense partisanship during which the major interest groups accommodated their programs and strategies to the partisan approach to educational policy-making (1963-1966). The first period produced educational policy which was largely advantageous to the rural areas of California; the second period, the period of educational reform, was one in which the Legislature, to a very large extent, attempted to accommodate suburban and middle-class educational interests; and the partisan era was one in which the Legislature heeded the lower-class urban educational crisis.

This study is largely exploratory in nature. Although no attempt is made to test hypotheses, a serious effort is made to develop a perspective on partisanship in education.

DATA AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS

Roll-call studies can be grouped basically into two categories: studies which analyze single roll-calls; and studies which analyze large numbers of roll-calls. This study falls into the latter category. This second category can in turn be divided between those studies of legislative voting which deal with a total population of roll-call votes; and those studies which are based on samples of roll-call votes. This study is concerned with a sample of legislative voting, i.e., those roll-calls which were taken on education measures.

The first task in the selection of roll-calls was to identify education bills. The task was to select from a population of roll-calls those which related to education policy. Policy-related selection criteria, however, are extremely difficult to operationalize. One might, for example, define the concept of education, and then proceed to use the criteria which define "education" as identifying characteristics. That is to say, one might apply the definitional criteria in this case to the content of legislation and make a judgment as to whether or not the criteria are met in the content of a given piece of proposed legislation. However, this procedure has great hazards for the simple reason that it involves such a high degree of subjectivity. Using such a "rational" procedure could result in one or two types of errors. The judge may include in the category of issues relating to education measures which legislators voting on the issue see as involving something other than education. Or the judge may exclude from the category of education bills, bills which do in fact belong to that category.

To prevent subjectivity in the determination of whether or not a given bill is an education bill, the folloiwng objective procedures were used. In this study an education bill is defined as meeting at least one of the following criteria:

1. the measure proposed chages in the Education Code; or
2. the measure was referred to either the Assembly or Senate Education Committee; or
3. the measure was listed by one or more of the major education interest groups as being relevant to education.

To identify education bills which met the third criterion a thorough search of interest group literature was made to identify what measures they considered to be relevant to education. Each of the major interest groups -- the California Teachers Association, the California School Boards Association, the California Federation of Teachers, the California Association of School Administrators, the California State Department of Education, and the California Parent-Teachers Association -- produce materials during and after each legislative session which list, and in many cases summarize, the various measures which they consider relevant to their interests. This is done in the form of legislative bulletins, newsletters, summaries of legislative action, and other forms of formal communication with their respective constituencies. These sources became relevant in identifying certain of the education bills.

The reasons why the third criterion was necessary in the identification of education measures, is the relatively narrow scope permitted by the first two criteria. Not all measures which affect education or its administration affect the Education Code. A number of consitutional amendments, fiscal measures, and measures which change electoral procedures do not change the Education Code. Certain of the measures which do not change the Education Code are referred to one or another of the education committees in the Legislature. However, even on the second criterion a number of vital education measures would be eliminated. Certain constitutional amendments affecting education or relevant to education are not referred to either of the education committees. The same is true for a number of measures which deal with public policy in areas which intersect education and other policy domains such as welfare or health. Thus, the third criterion was essential for extending the selection of measures identifiable as education measures.

The results of the search for education measures are given in Tables 1.1 and 1.2. The burden of education legislation did not increase steadily during the period 1955-1966. The number of education measures introduced during the 1957-58 term was extraordinarily high. It was not until the 1963-64 term that the total number of education measures again exceeded 900. In Table 1.2 we note a steady proportional increase in the number of measures introduced. Education legislation increased from 9.8% of all

TABLE 1.1

NUMBER OF EDUCATION MEASURES, BY HOUSE AND TERM, 1955-56

House	1955-56	1957-58	1959-60	1961-62	1963-64	1965-66
Assembly	404	570	431	517	607	787
Senate	240	332	228	262	311	304
Total	644	902	659	779	918	1,091

TABLE 1.2

EDUCATION MEASURES AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL NUMBER OF BILLS INTRODUCED, BY TERM, 1955-66

House	1955-56	1957-58	1959-60	1961-62	1963-64	1965-66
Assembly	9.5%	11.7%	12.8%	14.3%	16.2%	20.5%
Total bills	(4,273)	(4,862)	(3,365)	(3,604)	(3,742)	(3,848)
Senate	10.3%	10.7%	12.7%	14.2%	16.4%	17.2%
Total bills	(2,332)	(3,100)	(1,795)	(1,846)	(1,898)	(1,766)
All Education	9.8%	11.3%	12.8%	14.3%	16.3%	19.4%
Total bills	(6,605)	(7,962)	(5,160)	(5,450)	(5,640)	(5,614)

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bills introduced in 1955-56 to 19.4% in 1965-66. The proportional increase was steady. This increase obtains for both Assembly and Senate initiated education legislation.

Having identified education measures introduced in each house, we then traced the legislative history of each of the identified bills. For each bill which was considered and voted on, on one or both of the floors of the legislature, the roll-calls were recorded if they met with each of two conditions. First, at least 75% of the members of the house in which the vote was taken registered a roll-call vote on the measure. Second, the roll-call was recorded if at least 10% of the participating voters registered a vote contrary to the majority. The results of this selection procedure are given in Table 1.3.

The number of selected roll-calls on education measures increased rather dramatically during the period under consideration. In the Assembly there were only 22 selected roll-calls for 1955-56, but by 1965-66 there were 89. In the Assembly the number of selected roll-calls increased steadily during this period, though the increase in the Senate was quite irregular. It should also be noted that the number of roll-calls selected is considerably less for the Senate than for the Assembly. The difference is particularly marked in 1961-62.

The selected roll-calls were submitted to a cluster analysis. This analysis technique will now be explained briefly.

Once the roll-calls had been selected, recorded, and prepared for analysis, it was necessary to reduce the large number of variables (roll-calls) to a smaller number of composite variables which sampled the domain of forces which determined individual differences in roll-call voting behavior. In the language of cluster analysis, there were two tasks involved here: (1) to select the mutually collinear sets of roll-calls sufficient to reproduce all or nearly all of the intercorrelations among the roll-calls and all or nearly all of their communalities. The task, in short, was to group those roll-calls which could be objectively demonstrated to be similar into a composite or cluster. The roll-calls which define or sample a given domain of variance in roll-call voting should be different from the definers of other composites or clusters. That is to say, the clusters would have the properties of "within-group similarity, between-group difference."

The completely objective feature that describes the similarity of the definers of a composite or cluster, and consequently, helps to differentiate it from other clusters or composites, is the property of collinearity. When two variables are collinear they may be said to be "congruent," to have the same shape of correlation profiles across other correlations in the matrix.[9] The variables in a given composite or cluster reveal within-group similarity from the fact that they have similar correlation profile

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[9] See Robert C. Tryon, Theory of the BC TRY System: Statistical Theory, (mimeographed) pp. 62-64.

TABLE 1.3

NUMBER OF SELECTED ROLL CALLS ON EDUCATION MEASURES, BY HOUSE AND TERM, 1955-66

House	1955-56	1957-58	1959-60	1961-62	1963-64	1965-66
Assembly	22	38	67	72	78	89
Senate	16	17	40	23	32	85

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lines. (The measure for collinearity used here is the index of proportionality, P^2).

Each collinear set of roll-calls may be viewed as a composite of variables (tests) which sample a cluster domain or dimension. In this study the cluster domain or dimension may be a domain of influence, leadership, ideology, or attitude. Test samples, it should be emphasized, are drawn from large domains; thus, any composite score of a subject on a subject on a finite sample is not necessarily the exact score he would have if it were based on a more extensive set of equally acceptable test samples (roll-calls) drawn from a domain. In other words, there are limitations of domain sampling which need to be assessed. The sampling error of cluster composites must be determined. This type of domain sampling error is estimated by the value of the correlation coefficient of the observed scores with domain scores earned by the subjects on an indefinitely large battery of tests, all equally representative of the domain. Such a correlation coefficient is called the domain validity coefficient of the observed score. The expression "validity" carries its usual meaning, namely, the degree to which individual differences in fallible scores reflect individual differences in "true" scores -- in this case hypothetical scores made by the subjects on an indefinitely large battery of tests drawn from the given domain.

The validity coefficient for the given cluster of roll-calls can only be estimated since it is impossible to expose legislators to an indefinitely large battery of measures for roll-call responses. The estimates can be developed from available knowledge of the intercorrelations between the observed variables which define a given cluster. The estimation formula is as follows: See page   No assumptions are involved in this formulation -- only the definition of the score of a domain being composited from scores on many variables collinear with the existing set. The relative contribution of each definer of a cluster to the validity coefficient of a composite score is indicated by the size of the definer's communality.

Another index of how much composite or cluster is subject to error because of limitations of text sampling is its reliability coefficient. The reliability coefficient of a cluster score, or of any composite, is defined here as its correlation with a second composite consisting of definers "strictly comparable" to the existing first set. When the strictly comparable set is defined as being collinear with the observed definers, the correlation is called an "internal consistency" reliability coefficient. These values are simply the squares of the validity coefficients. The internal consistency coefficient is a lower-bound of the reliability coefficient of a composite. If a hypothetical and strictly comparable set of cluster definers are collinear with the existing definers and are considered repeated measures of the existing definers, then the estimated correlation between the observed composite and the parallel hypothetical composite will necessarily be higher than the internal consistency reliability. This higher coefficient is termed the parallel form reliability coefficient, or the "stratified reliability" of a composite. It this study, in order to assess the internal structure of the discovered clusters of roll-calls only internal consistency reliability coefficients are used. They are referred to as "alpha reliabilities."

$$r_{C_{is}\,C_i} = \sqrt{\frac{\Sigma hi^2 + 2\Sigma rii}{Si + 2\Sigma rii}}$$

where:

$C_{is} = a + b + \ldots S_i$ (Raw composite cluster score)

where a, b, . . . S_i are the defining variables of C_{is} in standard score form,

and,

$C_i = \Sigma a + \Sigma b + \ldots \Sigma_{si}$ (Domain score)

$= C_a + C_b + \ldots C_s$

where $\Sigma a = a + a^1 + a^{11} + \ldots a\propto = C_a$

(a, e^1, etc., are exactly collinear variably)

and, $\Sigma h_i^2 = h_a^2 + h_b^2 + \ldots h_s{}^2{}_i$ = Sum of diagonal elements

and,

Σr_{ii} = Sum over the correlation matrix of definers, excluding diagonals.

The selection of mutually collinear sets of roll-calls begins with the correlation matrix of the variables (roll-calls) with the communalities (the communality of a variable is defined as the amount of its variance predictable by N-1 variables in the selected pool of items) in the principal diagonal cells. In this study, the correlations were based on matching Ns, i.e., on those votes registered by legislators who participated in both of any pair of roll-calls. This procedure was used in order to overcome the effects of missing data or non-votes (due to absences or abstentions). Starting with this matched N correlation matrix of roll-calls, the first set of mutually collinear variables is determined and, by a special form of partial correlation, scores on this first cluster dimension or composite are partialled out of each of the correlations in the matrix. The resulting matrix is called the "first factor residual matrix." The second dimension is defined by a newly-weighted composite of the variables, scores on which are partialled out of the first residual matrix, the result of which forms a second residual matrix. This procedure is continued until a final residual matrix is formed of entries that are classed as "trivial."

A trivial matrix of residuals is one in which the values are so small as to be considered inconsequential for the development of additional dimensions or clusters. One can make a judgment on how many dimensions to retain by scanning the matrix of residuals. An indication of how many dimensions to retain is a proportion of the communalities predictable from scores on the dimensions. Since the communalities located on the diagonals of the correlation matrix represent the amount of common variance among the variables, the cluster analyst should keep his eye on what is happening to them during the factoring process. As factoring or clustering proceeds, the portion of the variables' communalities that is accounted for by the dimension is computed. When a salient amount, say around 95%, is accounted for, it is usually not fruitful to continue factoring because any additional single dimensions would account for less than about 5% of the communalities of the variables. Such a dimension would have very narrow generality. The program used in this study is designed to factor 97.5% of the sum of all estimated communalities. However, the exhaustion of this high percentage of communalities was, for the most part, impossible in this study.

Each of the twelve sets of selected roll-calls (six sets of Senate roll-calls, six sets of Assembly roll-calls) were submitted to a variable cluster analysis. The first attempt at clustering was always "blind" or strictly empirical. No attempt was made to establish a priori the definers for any cluster domains. The results of empirical clustering procedures were then examined carefully and evaluated on the following criteria:

1. Inner structure of clusters: an examination of the domain validities and alpha reliabilities of the sets of composites or clusters which were revealed in the empirical process;

2. Structural generality: to determine how important each cluster was and how general its variation was across the variables in the study;

3. Structural relationships of the clusters: an examination of how independent or interdependent the clusters were; and

4. Sufficiency of the solution: an examination of the proportion of communalities and correlation matrix exhausted by the empirical solution.

Once these empirical results had been evaluated an attempt was made to improve upon the solution. The purpose was to improve the inner structure of the empirical clusters, to make them more independent unless there was good reason for not doing so, to improve the sufficiency of the solution, and to enhance the interpretability of the clusters. This entailed some manipulation of the definers of the various clusters, either by deleting some definers located empirically or adding some which had been missed in the empirical process.

In almost all cases some improvement was made in the cluster solution, by means of pre-setting the defining variables of the various dimensions. However, the dimensions uncovered in the empirical or blind clustering process were always retained. The results of the pre-setting procedures are reported in this study.

A word needs to be said about the interpretation of the various dimensions of roll-call voting. The first source of data for the interpretation of a given dimension is the content of the education measures on which the roll-calls in a given voting composite were taken. At this stage of interpretation, an effort was made to find common substantive content in these measures. When this analysis failed to produce an interpretation of the cluster dimension, three other sets of data were examined. It should be added that the analysis of the content of measures in a given cluster very rarely produced an adequate interpretation of the voting dimension.

The three additional sets of data which were examined in interpreting voting dimensions were as follows: (1) the characteristics particularly the party affiliation, of legislators who authored the measures in a given cluster; (2) the positions taken by the major education interest groups on the measures in a given cluster; and (3) the distribution of the roll-calls forming a given composite or cluster domain. The data on the characteristics of legislators required for this analysis were taken largely from the Legislative Handbooks for the various sessions. The data on interest group positions were gathered from the files of the legislative advocates and from published sources such as newsletters.

After the cluster solutions and the dimensions had been evaluated, and the various clusters interpreted, comparisons were made of the results for the various terms. First, comparisons were made of the results of cluster analysis of roll-call votes of a given house within a given period. For example, the results of Assembly voting on education in 1955-56 were compared with the results of Assembly voting on education in 1957-58. These two terms were characterized as a period of low partisanship. The second kind of comparison was of the Senate with the Assembly for a given period, such as a period of low partisanship or high partisanship. The third comparison was of the results of the roll-call analyses for two different periods, such as a period of low partisanship with a period of high partisanship. Lastly, the Senate and the Assembly results were compared for the entire period, 1955-66.

Organization of the Report

The results of this study are reported in Chapters II, III, and IV. Chapter II reports the roll-call analyses for both houses during the period of low partisanship and high factionalism. Chapter III reports the results for both houses during the period of moderate partisanship; and Chapter IV reports the results for both houses during a period of high partisanship. Each Chapter contains six sub-chapters. The first section is an introduction with attempts to sketch the developments of the period in both houses. The second and the third sections report the results of the cluster analysis of roll-call voting in the Assembly; the fourth and fifth sections report similar results for the Senate. The last section attempts to summarize the results obtained for both houses during the period. Chapter V summarizes the results of the whole study and suggests certain interpretations of the data.

THE CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATURE: 1955-1966

In order to make this study intelligible and to justify the procedures adopted in the collection and analysis of data, it is necessary to describe the formal structure and procedures of the California State Legislature, as well as certain critical developments in the history of Legislative politics during the period 1955-1966. This section is divided into four parts: (1) a description of legislative procedures; (2) a sketch of changes in legislative structure; (3) an analysis of changes in the characteristics of legislators during this time; and (4) a description of major events in legislative history during 1955-1966 which produced discontinuities marking the end or beginning of a "period."

Legislative Procedures

In American bi-cameral legislatures the obstacle course for proposed legislation is essentially the same. The measure must be introduced by a member of the legislature; it must survive the scrutiny of committees in the house of origin; it must be approved by the majority of the house in which it was introduced; it is subject ot review and scrutiny in a committee of the second house; it must be approved by the majority in the second house, and it must be signed by the Governor or President to become effective law. Amendments which are made in the second house must, of course, receive the approval of the majority in the originating house. If the two houses disagree a bill goes to conference committee and the two houses must then agree to the conference committee report. This basically is the procedure in the development of legislation. However each legislature develops its own peculiar rules and customs which have a direct bearing on the kinds of transactions which take place in the course of legislation.

In California, a member of the Legislature is free to introduce as

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many bills on as many different subjects as he wishes. There are only two restrictions; first, a bill must, on introduction, be processed through the Legislative Council's office to ensure appropriate drafting, and second, it must be introduced on or before the 110th calendar day of the general session.

Proposals for legislation are initiated in a number of clearly distinguishable arenas. First, a few bills are products of the individual legislator's thought, experience and study. Second, a fairly large proportion of the bills introduced are initiated by Departments of the State Government. Many of these pieces of legislation are of minor or technical significance. Occasionally, of course, bills initiated by departments of state government are of major significance. For example, the State Department of Education will frequently propose major changes in the school finance field. Third, many bills are initiated by interest groups. There are over 600 registered lobbyists at the state level in California, each of whom represent at least one and sometimes as many as twenty interest groups, corporations, and associations. Many interest groups, especially those interested in changing the status-quo in one way or another, develop their own legislative programs for each session of the legislature. Other interest groups, especially those interested in maintaining the status-quo, initiate virtually no legislation. Fourth, constituencies are a source of legislation. Most constituency bills are of minor importance for the state as a whole and therefore receive a minimum of attention in the legislature. Fifth, certain legislative proposals are generated in interim committee reports of the legislature. Bills which emerge in this way are typically on issues which are both very significant and very technical, for example, legislation governing taxes. Sixth, periodically citizens committees appointed by the Governor or the Legislature and joint legislative committees composed of legislators and administrative representatives generate legislative proposals for a specific problem area. Seventh, the staffs of the standing committees are an increasingly important source of legislative proposals. The last source of legislaton is the Governor's Office. The Governor and his staff develop a program of legislation, however loose it may be, which they attempt to shepherd through the legislative process.

Departments of state government, interest groups, and the Governor's staff take considerable care in the selection of legislators who carry their legislation. The Governor has his friends, interest groups have theirs, and state departments have their frequent contacts in the legislature. Some of the important considerations for a group or department in selecting an author for their proposed legislation are: his political skills, his relationships with other powerful legislators, his integrity, his loyalty to the idea, his role or area of expertise, and the consequences of carrying the measure for the legislator himself. The process of selecting an author by individuals and groups attempting to introduce legislation is a critical one because the author of a bill in the California State Legislature can do with his bill as he pleases. Once introduced a bill is essentially the property of the author. Furthermore, a deeply entrenched custom in the Legislature guarantees a member a hearing of his measure before a committee "upon request," subject only to congestion in the committees calendar.

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The author of a bill is responsible for determining when it should be heard and how it should be presented to the committee. If the bill he is carrying is for an interest group, he will frequently turn to the interest group for aid in marshalling witnesses and testimony in support of the measure. Furthermore, the author also has the privilege of amending the bill in committee and traditionally his amendments are approved without question.

Approximately 50% of the bills heard before committee are "held in committee" or assigned to "interim study." Of the 50% which receive a "do pass" approximately 80% are passed unanimously on the floor of the house. In the house a bill presented for final passage requires a "constitutional majority" -- a majority of the elected membership of each house. Furthermore, for a bill to be "taken up" on the floor of the house, the author of the measure must be present. Once a measure receives the "constitutional majority," it is then passed on to the second house for consideration.

There are some important differences in the voting procedures of the California State Senate and the Assembly. In the Senate, a voice vote is taken in the committees, and on the floor the role is called orally. On the Assembly side, the committees vote by a show of hands and on the floor use is made of the electric voting machine which record the votes. It is, therefore, possible for an Assemblyman to leave instructions with his desk mate to flick his switch on a given bill to register his vote; this is not possible in the Senate

Since 1959, both houses have had a consent calendar to expedite the processing of non-controversial legislation on the floor. A bill which has received no opposition may, if its author chooses, and with the unanimous approval of committee members, be reported out of committee with a "do pass, to the consent calendar." Any member of the committee may object and stifle the authors wishes in this respect. Once the bill is on the consent calendar it must remain there for two consecutive days during which time any member of the house may object to it and force the bill off the consent calendar. Consent calendar bills are then all approved by a single roll-call vote without debate.

Most bills require the support of only a majority of the elected membership for passage. However, the budget bills, any bills containing appropriations, constitutional amendments, and "urgency measures" which would take effect immediately upon the approval of the Governor, and some types of revenue measures require a two-thirds majority -- 54 votes in the Assembly and 27 votes in the Senate.

If a given bill is approved by one house and is amended in the other house, the bill must be returned to the house of origination for concurrercey with the amendments made to it in the other house. If the amendments are not concurred with the bill is assigned to a conference committee. A conference committee is made up of six members, three from each house. The Speaker appoints the three members in the Assembly while the Senate Rules Committee appoints the Senate members. It is customary for two members from each house appointed to the Committee to have voted with the majority of their house, and one must be appointed from the minority providing there were dissenting votes. The conference committee attempts to resolve the dispute between the two versions of the measure and when an agreement is reached the committee reports back to each house for concurrency with the committee report. Some major bills will return to conference committee two and three times. The bill is "dead" if the third confrerence report fails to gain the needed majorities.

Once a bill has been passed in both houses it proceeds to the Governor's desk for his approval. During the session of the Legislature, the Governor has ten days to either sign the bill, veto it or let it become law without signature. If the bill is vetoed by the Governor it is returned to the house of origin together with a statement of the Governor's reasons for his disapproval. The house can override the Governor's veto by a two-thirds vote of the total membership of the house. If the house of origin approves the measure by a two-thirds vote, it proceeds to the other house for a similar attempt. In recent history vetoed measures have rarely been overridden. During the period of this study, the pocket-veto was a practice which the Governor used after the Legislature adjourned. He had 30 days within which to act on all bills awaiting his signature. At the end of that 30 day period any bill which he had not signed was said to be "pocket vetoed." The Legislature could not act to override those pocket-vetoes.

The formal legislative procedure is controlled and animated by both formal and informal structures. We will now turn to a description of the formal structure of the Legislature in California.

Legislative Structure

The formal organization of the California State Legislature is similar to the organization one finds in most American state legislatures. The Senate has a membership of forty; the Assembly a membership of eighty. The senior officer in the Senate is the President pro-tempore, who presides in the absence of the President of the Senate, the Lieutenant Governor, and serves at the same time as the majority floor leader and chairman of the Senate Rules Committee. He is elected by the senators from among themselves. In the Assembly the presiding officer is the Speaker who is also elected by the Assembly membership. His major duties include the appointment of members to standing committees, the chairman and vice-chairman of those committees, and the administration of the Assembly. Unlike the Senate, the Assembly in California has both a majority and a minority floor leader, elected by the Republican and Democratic caucuses.

To process the thousands of bills introduced during each regular session of the Legislature, each house has a large number of standing committees. Each house has a committee on rules to serve as a procedural and housekeeping body. In the Senate four members are elected, two from each party, by the entire Senate. The President pro-tempore serves as chairman. In the Assembly three members from each party are elected upon the nomination of their respective caucuses. In the Assembly the Speaker appoints the members of the standing committees and in the Senate the Rules Committee appoints standing committee members and chairmen. The practice in both houses is to attempt to accommodate the individual legislator's preferred committee assignments. In contrast to the Assembly, the Senate recognizes seniority as an important criterion for accommodating committee preferences.

Each house has a considerable number of legislative staff. Each committee, typically, has at least one "Committee Consultant." In addition, the Speaker of the Assembly has a fairly sizeable staff to assist him on policy formulation, organizational problems, and, of course, political and strategic questions. In addition to legislative staff, the Legislature has the services of the Legislative Council Bureau, the staff of the Legislative Analyst and the Legislative Reference Service. The high quality of legislative staff in California is well known, though staff impact on legislation has recently been a cause of concern to some legislators.

The Changing Character of the California State Legislature

Certain very considerable changes took place in the character of the California State Legislature between 1955 and 1966 -- changes in party majority, in age structure, level of education, occupational distribution, amount of legislative and other political experience, level of inter-party competition in district elections and in the representative base. In this section these changes will be described briefly.

Turnover in the Legislature. In Table 1.4, data on the rate of turnover and reasons for turnover are presented. The Senate was, until 1966, very stable in its membership. There was a 25% turnover at the end of 1958 and a 27.5% turnover at the end of 1962. At the end of 1966, due to the first reapportionment of the Senate in many years, the turnover was 55%. In only nineteen Senate elections were incumbent senators defeated during this period. A total of 24 retired, and 8 died in office.

The Assembly, too, was surprisingly stable during this period. It was only as a result of the reapportionment of 1962 and the Republican sweep of most statewide offices in 1966 that a considerable turnover in the Assembly was experienced. Of those leaving the Assembly, the great majority retired. A total of 87 retirements took place between the years 1956 and 1966; 24 incumbent assemblymen were defeated, and 4 died in office.

Party Strength. In Table 1.5 the distribution of party membership by house is given. From 1959 to 1966 the Senate was dominated by the Democratic Party. During 1955-58 a transition took place in the Senate from a long-standing Republican dominance to a situation where the parties had equal memberships.

In the Assembly, the Democratic strength is not as great for the period 1959-66 as it was in the Senate. The majority held by the Democrats was, however, substantial. During 1955-58 the Republicans held the majority in the Assembly.

Demographic Characteristics. In Tables 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8 the distributions of age, education level and occupation are given for both houses, respectively. The Senate is characterized by a steady decline in the number of members 55 years and older (from 52.5% in 1955-56 to 37.5% in 1965-66). The middle age group in the Senate increased dramatically

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TABLE 1.4

LEGISLATIVE TURNOVER IN CALIFORNIA, BY HOUSE AND ELECTION YEAR, 1956-66

	Election Year											
	1956		1958		1960		1962		1964		1966	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Senate												
Death	5.0	2	5.0	2	0.0	0	5.0	2	2.5	1	2.5	1
Retired	5.0	2	10.0	4	5.0	2	17.5	7	7.5	3	30.0	12
Defeat	2.5	1	10.0	4	7.5	3	5.0	2	0.0	0	22.5	9
Continued	87.5	35	75.0	30	87.5	35	72.5	29	90.0	36	45.0	18
Assembly												
Death	2.5	2	0.0	0	1.3	1	1.3	1	0.0	0	0.0	0
Retired	12.7	10	13.8	11	11.3	9	38.8	31	3.8	3	28.8	23
Defeat	3.8	3	6.3	5	0.0	0	3.8	3	7.5	6	8.8	7
Continued	81.0	64	80.0	64	87.5	70	56.3	45	88.8	71	62.5	50

TABLE 1.5

PARTY AFFILIATION IN THE CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATURE, BY TERM AND HOUSE, 1955-1966

	1955-56		1957-58		1959-60		1961-62		1963-64		1965-66	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Senate												
Democrats	40.0	16	50.0	20	70.0	28	75.0	30	67.5	27	65.0	26
Republicans	60.0	24	50.0	20	30.0	12	25.0	10	32.5	13	35.0	14
Assembly												
Democrats	40.5	32	47.5	38	58.8	47	58.8	47	65.0	52	61.3	49
Republicans	59.5	47	52.5	42	41.3	33	41.3	33	35.0	28	39.8	31

TABLE 1.6

AGE DISTRIBUTIONS IN THE CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATURE, BY HOUSE AND TERM, 1955-1966

	1955-56		1957-58		1959-60		1961-62		1963-64		1965-66	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Senate												
Under 45 yrs.	25.0	10	22.5	9	25.0	10	12.5	5	12.5	5	20.0	8
45-54 yrs.	22.5	9	25.0	10	40.0	12	45.0	18	47.5	19	42.5	17
55+ years	52.5	21	52.5	21	45.0	18	42.5	17	40.0	16	37.5	15
Assembly												
Under 45 yrs.	30.4	24	35.0	28	33.8	27	36.3	29	47.5	38	43.8	35
45-54 yrs.	36.7	29	30.0	24	33.8	27	30.0	24	28.8	23	30.0	24
55+ years	32.9	26	35.0	28	32.5	26	33.8	27	23.8	19	26.3	21

TABLE 1.7

THE EDUCATION OF CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATORS, BY TERM AND HOUSE, 1955-1966

	1955-56		1957-58		1959-60		1961-62		1963-64		1965-66	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Senate												
High School	17.5	7	12.5	5	12.5	5	12.5	5	12.5	5	12.5	5
Some College	25.5	11	25.0	10	17.5	7	20.0	8	20.0	8	22.5	9
College Degree	17.5	7	20.0	8	20.0	8	20.0	8	20.0	8	15.0	6
Post Grad.	37.5	15	42.5	17	50.0	20	47.5	19	47.5	19	50.0	20
Assembly												
High School	16.5	13	13.8	11	10.0	8	7.5	6	5.0	4	6.3	5
Some College	32.9	26	27.5	22	27.5	22	26.3	21	23.8	19	18.8	15
College Degree	24.1	19	27.5	22	30.0	24	30.0	24	21.3	17	22.5	18
Post Grad.	26.6	21	31.3	25	32.5	26	36.3	29	50.0	40	52.5	42

TABLE 1.8

OCCUPATIONS OF CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATORS, BY HOUSE AND TERM, 1955-1966

	1955-56		1957-58		1959-60		1961-62		1963-64		1965-66	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Senate												
Law	32.5	13	40.0	16	42.5	17	40.0	16	40.0	16	37.5	15
Other Prof.	7.5	3	7.5	3	10.0	4	12.5	5	15.0	6	17.5	7
Business	47.5	19	40.0	16	32.5	13	37.5	15	30.0	12	32.5	13
Agriculture	12.5	5	12.5	5	15.0	6	10.0	4	15.0	6	12.5	5
Assembly												
Law	24.1	19	28.8	23	31.3	25	28.8	23	36.3	29	38.8	31
Other Prof.	16.5	13	13.8	11	17.5	14	21.3	17	21.3	17	22.5	18
Business	46.8	37	46.3	37	43.8	35	42.5	34	32.5	26	27.5	22
Agriculture	12.7	10	11.3	9	7.5	8	7.5	6	10.0	8	11.3	9

during this period while the younger age group changed, proportionately, somewhat erratically. During the Democratic era the number of Senators with post graduate degrees increased from the previous period and then levelled off. There was very little discontinuity in the distribution of senators by level of education during the period under study. In the occupational distribution of senators two shifts occurred: the percent of senators who came from professional occupations other than law increased from 7.5% to 17.5%; the percent of senators with business occupations decreased from 47.5% to 32.5%.

The changes in the demographic distributions in the Assembly were more dramatic than in the Senate. The proportion of assemblymen who were under 45 years of age increased from 30.4% in 1955-56 to 43.8% in 1965-66; the number of older assemblymen diminished from 32.9% to 26.3%. Accompanying the changes in the distribution of age in the Assembly was a shift in the distribution by level of education. The percent of assemblymen with post graduate degrees increased from 26.6% to 52.5% (a degree from a law school is considered as a post graduate degree in these statistics). As in the Senate, the proportion of assemblymen in business and mercantile occupations decreased from 46.8% in 1955-56 to 27.5% in 1965-66; whereas the proportion of attorneys increased from 24.1% to 38.8% during the same period.

The changes in the demographic characteristics of legislators in California during this period are dramatic. In general, the evidence in the foregoing tables indicates that during the time that the legislature was dominated by the Democratic party, its membership became younger, and increasing numbers of legislators came from professional occupations.

Political Experience. In Table 1.9 the number and percent of legislators in each house who had held local elective office prior to joining the State Legislature are presented. There is some variation from term to term in both the Senate and Assembly, but the variation in the percent of legislators who held local political office does not show any consistent trends nor any major discontinuities. The data presented in Table 1.10 suggests that the distribution of years of legislative service remained fairly constant in both houses during the period between 1955 and 1966. Perhaps the most noteworthy difference in the amount of legislative service is between the two houses. The Assembly consistently has a lower percentage of members with eleven or more years of experience in the Legislature. With the exception of 1959-62, the proportion of assemblymen with less than four years of legislative experience is dramatically higher than for the comparable group in the Senate. We would expect, on the basis of this evidence alone, that the Senate would be a more highly integrated body than the Assembly.

The Representational Base and Party Strength

The Senate did not undergo any reapportionment in the years between 1955 and 1966. It was finally forced to concur with the Supreme Court's ruling on reapportionment in 1966. The Senate had, for this whole period, seven representatives from Southern California and thirty-three from the northern part of the state. Fourteen northern senators came from costal counties; nineteen represented counties in the Central Valley.

TABLE 1.9

LOCAL ELECTED OFFICE EXPERIENCE OF CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATORS, BY HOUSE AND TERM, 1955-1966

	1955-56		1957-58		1959-60		1961-62		1963-64		1965-66	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Senate												
Some	50.0	20	50.0	20	40.0	16	35.0	14	50.0	20	52.5	21
None	50.0	20	50.0	20	60.0	24	65.0	26	50.0	20	47.5	19
Assembly												
Some	27.9	22	30.0	24	25.0	20	26.3	21	28.8	23	30.0	24
None	72.1	57	70.0	56	75.0	60	73.8	59	71.3	57	70.0	56

TABLE 1.10

SERVICE IN THE LEGISLATURE, BY HOUSE AND TERM, 1955-1966

	1955-56		1957-58		1959-60		1961-62		1963-64		1965-66	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Senate												
4 years or less	25.0	10	22.5	9	27.5	11	32.5	13	25.0	10	15.0	6
5-10 years	37.5	15	37.5	15	37.5	15	30.0	12	40.0	16	37.5	15
11+ years	37.5	15	40.0	16	35.0	14	37.5	15	35.0	14	47.5	19
Assembly												
4 years or less	41.8	33	36.3	29	33.8	27	30.0	24	50.0	40	50.0	40
5-10 years	34.2	27	38.8	31	42.3	33	41.3	33	32.5	26	27.5	22
11+ years	24.1	19	25.0	20	25.0	20	28.8	23	17.5	14	22.5	18

The Assembly was reapportioned before the election of 1962. The number of northern Assembly districts was reduced from 38 to 36; the number of southern Assembly districts was increased from 42 to 44.

The Senate was very evenly balanced in the number of representatives from the five social areas into which Senate districts were clustered. Eight senators represented urban counties, eight represented exurban counties, nine represented the agri-business counties, eight represented mountain counties, and seven represented the poor counties in which the economic base was diversified agriculture.[10]

In the Assembly the reapportionment of 1962 created some important changes in the extent to which various social areas were represented. Using object clustering techniques, Assembly districts were grouped into seven social areas -- three were distinctly urban, three suburban, and one rural. The number of urban districts was reduced by a total of nine -- two were upper middle class districts, three were middle class districts, and four were working class districts. The number of rural districts was decreased by two. The number of suburban districts was increased from 37 to 48. There were three new upper middle class suburban districts, and eight new suburban working class districts as a result of the Assembly reapportionment.[11]

Tables 1.11 and 1.12 show the percentage of Democratic and Republican incumbents from the various social areas in both the Senate and Assembly, respectively. In the Senate of 1955-56 the Democrats were weakest in the exurban and mountain counties. In the election of 1958 the Democrats had

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10. Data were collected on 45 variables which characterized the various Senate districts. These 45 social and economic variables were clustered using communality clustering analysis techniques. Five variable dimensions were discovered: urbanization, social class, assimilation, prolificity, and geographical mobility. Each Senate district was scored on each of the five dimensions using a factor scoring procedure. The Senate districts were then clustered on the basis of profile similarities across the five dimensions. The result was five groupings of Senate districts. See Appendix B for a full description of how these OTYPE were developed.

11. In clustering Assembly districts, the procedures used were similar to those used to cluster Senate districts. Forty-five social and economic variables were clustered but only four dimensions were discovered -- social class, urbanization, geographical mobility, and prolificity. There was no "assimilation" dimension as was the case in the analysis of Senate districts. Each Assembly district was scored on each of the four dimensions and the clustering of the districts proceeded on the basis of a profile similarity analysis.

TABLE 1.11

MEMBERSHIP IN THE SENATE, BY PARTY, SOTYPE AND TERM, 1955-1966

	Urban N = 8	Exurban N = 8	Agri-Business N = 9	Mixed Agriculture N = 8	Mountains N = 7
1955-56					
Democrats	50.0	37.5	44.4	50.0	28.6
Republicans	50.0	62.0	55.6	50.0	71.4
1957-58					
Democrats	50.0	50.0	55.6	42.9	50.0
Republicans	50.0	50.0	44.4	57.1	50.0
1959-60					
Democrats	62.5	75.0	66.7	57.1	75.0
Republicans	37.5	25.0	33.3	42.9	25.0
1961-62					
Democrats	62.5	75.0	77.8	71.4	87.5
Republicans	37.5	25.0	22.2	28.6	12.5
1963-64					
Democrats	71.4	44.4	77.8	71.4	75.0
Republicans	28.6	55.6	22.2	28.6	25.0
1965-66					
Democrats	62.5	50.0	77.8	57.1	75.0
Republicans	37.5	50.0	22.2	42.9	25.0

TABLE 1.12

MEMBERSHIP IN THE ASSEMBLY, BY PARTY, SOTYPE AND TERM, 1955-1966

	Urban			Suburban			
	Upper Middle Class	Middle Class	Working Class	Upper Middle Class	Lower Middle Class	Working Class	Rural
1955-56	N = 12	N = 6	N = 11	N = 6	N = 16	N = 15	N = 14
Democrats	25%	33%	73%	0%	25%	67%	36%
Republicans	75	67	27	100	75	33	64
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
1957-58	N = 12	N = 6	N = 11	N = 6	N = 16	N = 15	N = 14
Democrats	33%	17%	91%	0%	31%	67%	57%
Republicans	67	83	9	100	69	33	43
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
1959-60	N = 12	N = 6	N = 11	N = 6	N = 16	N = 15	N = 14
Democrats	42%	17%	100%	17%	38%	80%	79%
Republicans	58	83	0	83	63	13	29
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
1961-62	N = 12	N = 6	N = 11	N = 6	N = 16	N = 15	N = 14
Democrats	42%	17%	100%	17%	38%	87%	71%
Republicans	58	83	0	83	63	13	29
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
1963-64	N = 10	N = 3	N = 7	N = 9	N = 16	N = 23	N = 12
Democrats	50%	67%	100%	22%	31%	100%	67%
Republicans	50	33	0	78	69	0	33
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
1965-66	N = 10	N = 3	N = 7	N = 9	N = 16	N = 23	N = 12
Democrats	50%	67%	100%	22%	38%	96%	42%
Republicans	50	33	0	78	63	4	58
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

captured a majority of seats in each of the five social areas. The most dramatic swing was in the mountain counties, where the Democrats had approximately 29% of the seats in 1955-56 and 75% in 1959-60, and back to 44.4% by 1963-64. By inspection, it appears from an examination of the 1965-66 distribution of Democratic and Republican held counties that the Democrats were able to maintain a fairly firm grip on the agri-business and mountain counties. The Democratic majority in the urban counties declined from 71.4% in 1963-64, to 62.5% in 1965-66; in the exurban counties it declined from a high of 75% in 1959-62 to a low of 44.4% in 1963-64; and in the mixed agriculture counties the Democratic majorities declined from a high of 71.4% in 1961-64 to 57.1% in 1955-56.

In Table 1.12 some rather more startling relationships are revealed. Most noteworthy is the firm hold the Democratic Party had on both the urban and suburban working class Assembly districts. From 1959-60 to 1965-66 the Democrats controlled 100% of the urban working class Assembly districts. This control is almost as dramatic for the suburban working class Assembly districts. Second, it should be noted that the Democrats were never able, during the period 1955-66, to capture the majority of suburban upper middle class and lower middle class districts. In fact, the Democrats were never able to capture more than 22% of the suburban upper middle class districts, and never more than 38% of the suburban lower middle class districts. The Democratic Party had somewhat more success with the upper middle and middle class districts in the urban areas. Here they were able to capture 50% of the upper middle class urban districts and 67% of the urban middle class districts, but only after the reapportionment of 1962. Lastly, it is interesting to note in Table 1.12 that the Democrats held the majority of rural seats from 1957 to 1964. The most startling conclusion from Table 1.12 is that the major base of support for the Assembly Democrats came, during this period, from the working class districts. The major support for the Republicans in the Assembly came from the middle class areas. It is very probable that the increased intensity of partisanship in the Assembly during the period we are examining was reinforced by the social class differences in the base of support for the two parties.

We have examined the changing character of the California State Legislature during 1955-66. An attempt will now be made to divide this period of 12 years into three distinguishable sub-periods. The accomplishment of this task is critical for the time comparisons of the roll-call voting on education measures in both Houses made in this study.

The Politics of Transition and Partisanship

There are three distinguishable periods of development in California politics between 1955 and 1966. Each of these three periods lasted for four years; each is distinguished by a series of important events or actions which mark its beginning and end.

The period between the election of 1954 and the election of 1958 is characterized here as one of transitional politics. The election of 1954 returned Goodwin Knight to the Governor's office in Sacramento, and gave the Republicans fairly substantial majorities in both the Assembly and the Senate. In the Senate there was a formal change in leadership at the end of the 1956 budget session. The Republicans had organized the Senate

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until this time; now the Democrats took over though they had a membership of only 50% of the Senate. It was a period during which the "Republican strongmen" retired from the Senate. In the Assembly there was also a change in leadership. Luther Lincoln was elected Speaker on the basis of an inter-party coalition. His election, in a sense, was a continuation of the same leadership coalition that had dominated in the Assembly during the previous two terms.

According to William Buchanan's study of California politics, the period 1955-1958 was characterized by a low level of partisanship, but a very high degree of factionalism in both the Assembly and the Senate. The factions were based on a mixture of ideological and regional factors. According to Buchanan, factionalism allowed the major interest groups to maintain a fairly dominant position on a range of policy issues, including education. Certainly, the California Teachers' Association was in the heyday of its position of influence.

The second period, 1959 to 1962 was the first term for Edmund G. Brown as Governor. The Democrats had captured not only the governorship but the majority of both Houses in the Legislature in the 1958 election. The abolition of the practice of cross-filing gave the Democrats certain advantages at the polls. They proceeded to organize the Senate in the same way and with the same personnel as they had done in 1957. In the Assembly, however, the speakership was given to a Democrat, Ralph Brown. Although the turnover in the Senate was only 25% and in the Assembly 20% as a result of the 1958 election, the new members who were affiliated with the Democratic Party were much more intensely partisan than most of their predecessors. The result was a very different attitude toward parties and their functions in the legislative process. This was the period during which the long legacy of the Progressives was abandoned and partisanship was reintroduced into the California State Legislature.

This was also the period of major educational reform in California. The Legislature assumed a critical role in the process of educational reform. First, the Legislature became much more autonomous in its consideration of educational policy alternatives. The California Teachers' Association and its affiliates were thoroughly denounced and their influence in policy-making undermined. As will be explained later, the thrust for educational reform during this period was largely middle class. The major values which dominated the policy outcomes in education during this period were those held by members of the middle class.

The third period, 1963 to 1966, is characterized in this study as a period of intense partisanship. In 1962 the leadership in the Assembly changed hands once again. The Assembly was organized on strictly partisan lines. In the Senate, the small liberal coalition of 1955 and 1957 had gained both membership and seniority. Under the great pressure resulting from the call for urban educational reform, on the one hand, and for the reform of higher education, on the other hand, these liberal senators took their stand as forcefully as might be done in a system with strong party discipline.

The education interest groups attempted, during this period of intense partisanship, to make a political comeback. To a very limited extent they were successful in accommodating their programs and legislative strategies to the increased partisanship. What the main line education groups in California did not do, to their detriment, was to take firm positions on the importance and nature of urban educational reform. Consequently, they were very considerably thwarted in their efforts to gain policy advantages.

These descriptions of the three periods are brief. In the introductions to Chapters 2, 3, and 4 they will be elaborated very considerably. What is important is the change in nature of predominant legislative cleavages. There was a transition from regional-ideological factionalism to partisanship during this time. The effects of these changes in the dimensions of conflict on education will be shown in the results of the analyses undertaken in this study.

CHAPTER II

EDUCATION AND THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION

1955-1958

INTRODUCTION

In the history of California politics the period between 1954 and 1958 was, in all respects, a period of transitional politics. The one man who had so thoroughly dominated California politics for almost two decades, Earl Warren, had accepted position as Chief Justice on the Supreme Court of the United States in 1953. His Lieutenant Governor, Goodwin Knight, became Governor in 1953 and went on in 1954 to win the Gubernatorial election with a majority of 57% of the total vote cast. It was during his administration that the structure of the legislative system changed very considerably.

This short chapter will describe a little more fully than was possible in Chapter I the nature of transitional politics during this period, changes in party and faction, the travails of legislative leadership, the changing role of interest groups in the legislative process, and the nature of education issues faced by the Legislature. The description will be brief and general.

The Balance of Party Strength

One of the most significant legacies in California political history was coming to an end -- the cross-filing practices introduced by the Progressives in 1914. Up until 1954, it was possible for a candidate for state office to file for nomination in the primaries of each party without indicating his party affiliation. Thus, a given candidate could eliminate all opposition from the general election. 68% of all offices in California between 1940 and 1952 were won in the primary by cross-filing. In both 1944 and 1952, 90% of the State Senate elections were won in the primary. In 1944, 77.5% of the Assembly races were decided in the primary period. As a result of the vote on a proposition to modify cross-filing in 1952, party affiliation thereafter was required to appear on primary ballots. Cross-filing, however, was still permissable, until it was abolished in 1959. The effect of the 1952 reform was to diminish very dramatically the proportion of Assembly candidates who cross-filed successfully; the number of Senate candidates who cross-filed successfully remained relatively high.

There is a wide spread consensus among students in California politics that even the modest reform of 1952 had distinct advantages for the Democrats. This advantage was somewhat reflected in the elections in

1954 and 1956. The election of 1954 sent 48 Republicans to the Assembly and 32 Democrats, a reduction of six Republicans. It sent 24 Republicans and 16 Democrats to the Senate, a reduction of five Republicans. In the election of 1956, Republican strength in both houses was further reduced. The Senate now had 20 Republicans and 20 Democrats and the Assembly 42 Republicans and 38 Democrats.

The gains of the Democratic Party starting in 1954 were certainly not accounted for entirely by the modification of the cross-filing law in 1952. A second factor in these gains was the very effective work done by amateur political clubs on behalf of the Democratic Party. These clubs were formed in many areas of the state following the 1952 election and federated into the California Democratic Council. The Democratic clubs began to select candidates before the primary elections and to endorse those chosen. The clubs had the effect of concentrating party strength on winning elections. A very significant consequence in addition to that of giving Democrats greater numbers in the legislature was the selection of young, liberal, intensely partisan candidates. These young Democrats, on being elected to the legislature, very quickly changed its structure and complextion.

With the changes in the relative strength of the two parties in both the Senate and Assembly, a number of new faces began to appear in the Calfiornia State Legislature. The new senators and assemblymen were to have particular significance in the field of education during the later periods of increased partisanship. Senators Cobey, Richard, Short, Arnold, Farr, and Dolwig, elected during this transitional period, were later to assume significant leadership in the field of education. Similarly, new assemblymen such as Bee, Unruh, Winton, -- all liberals -- were destined to assume major responsibility for educational reform in the 1960's. The period of transitional politics in California which we are considering was, consequently, very significant in shaping both the structure of political leadership in education for the 1960's, and the types of educational reform which were to come about.

Legislative Leadership and Factionalism

The turnover of legislative personnel during this period of transition was not particularly high --12.5% in the Senate and 18.8% in the Assembly. Nonetheless, it was a significant turn-over in that it marked the passing of the "Republican strong-men" in the Senate and a number of factional leaders in the Assembly. The disunity which prevailed in the Assembly during the period prior to 1955 had given the balance of power to the upper house by default. The Senate had always been a more integrated body where it was possible to iron out differences privately. However, the unity of the Senate was threatened very considerably during the period of transition.

The Senate was organized by the Republicans in 1955-56, but by the Democrats in 1957-58. The President pro tempore of the Senate in 1955 was Senator Ward, who was not able to assume his responsibility because of severe illness. Senator Hulse had assumed the position on the death of Senator Ward. Hulse encountered unprecedented difficulty in maintaining the spirit in the Senate. The younger Democratic senators who had been elected in the election of 1954 -- Cobey, R. McCarthy, Richard, and Short -- were disturbing the delicate balance of control in the Senate. "Uncle Ben" Hulse announced his retirement at the end of the 1956 session.

The 1957-58 Senate was organized by the Democrats. Senator Burns of Fresno became the President pro tempore. Although there was a change in leadership personnel in the Senate during this period the change was not particularly consequential for the regionally based factionalism in the Senate. Burns had the support of the older senators who had cross-filed and who put loyalty to Burns above party loyalty. The Senate, therefore, was changing but very gradually. The leadership coalition, which was extensive, did not change in the main. The younger senators, who did not style themselves as being primarily rural, and who had been elected with support from the new California Democratic Council, were restive and somewhat more ideologically inclined.

The major splits in the Senate during this period of transition are reputed to be regional and rural-urban rather than partisan. The younger, newly-elected senators began to violate the traditional cleavages in the Senate with the formation of a very loose and subtle coalition under the leadership of a liberal senator from Contra Costa County -- Senator George Miller. THis small coalition was to gain momentum in succeeding terms but it was never able to capture more than one of the major committees in the Senate, i.e., the Finance Committee. Too many very senior Republicans continued in office through the end of 1966 to allow the younger, more highly educated, better qualified senators to form the ruling coalition.

THE ASSEMBLY, 1955-1956

Twenty-two Assembly roll-calls on 22 education and related measures proposed during the session of 1955-56, met the selection criteria on variance and participation. These measures were concerned with the establishment of new state colleges, medical examinations of school employees, school finance, property assessment, conditions for school district unification, child care centers, school safety patrols, the facilitation of newer instructional technologies, and changes in the administrative structure of county school districts. Only two measures in the group of 22 were carried by senators, 20 were authored by assemblymen. Eleven of the 22 bills were carried by Republicans and 11 by Democrats. This distribution by party held for both the Senate and the Assembly measures.

Each of the 20 Assembly measures and one Senate measure passed in the roll-call on the Assembly floor. Only one measure was defeated. However, the 20 Assembly measures had somewhat less success on the Senate side. Eleven of them were defeated in committee. One of the measures was pocket-vetoed by the Governor and nine of the 22 were signed into law.

The California Teachers Association took a position of support or oppose on ten of the 22 measures. This large teachers organization opposed a bill which would exempt members of governing boards from personal liability for injuries or damage occurring due to use of any school building, as well as another which encouraged junior college districts to engage in aviation education by allowing such colleges to operate equipment for actual flight experience as part of the curriculum. The California Teachers Association supported measures requiring school district employees to undergo physical examinations once every three years with certain exceptions based on religious faith, a bill which would lighten the local school districts' load to repay construction bonds to the state, a conflict of interest measure relevant and appropriate to local school boards, continuation of child care centers, a measure which would require local school districts to extend certain proportions of state aid on salaries for professional personnel, a measure to allow county superintendents to contract with television stations for the use of audio-visual services in the schools, and a study of the state library system. Many of the pieces of legislation supported by the C.T.A. were of great significance. However, the positions taken by this organization were for the most part in support of incremental and moderate shifts in school governance.

The California Congress of Parents and Teachers (P.T.A.) took positions on only three bills. It supported the C.T.A. in an attempt to lower the local districts burden to repay bonded indebtedness to the state. The P.T.A. was also very supportive of a bill which proposed to continue the operation of child care centers and appropriated over four million dollars for the support of such centers for an additional fiscal year. However, the P.T.A. was quite disturbed by a bill which extended the functions of safety patrols to crossings near as well as adjacent to schools and which did not require the physical presence of a supervisory school employee.

Five of the eight bills supported by the C.T.A. were lost in Senate committees. One of the bills it opposed was passed by the Senate committee but was pocket-vetoed by the Governor. Another of the bills opposed by the C.T.A. was turned down by the Senate committee. The bill opposed by the P.T.A., however, was eventually signed into law.

Evaluation of the Cluster Solution

The root mean squares of correlations between the 22 selected roll-calls in 1955-56 is .23. The sum of communalities is 7.42.

The cluster analysis of the 22 roll-calls reveals three dimensions of roll-call voting on education -- one fairly general pattern of variance, two fairly specific variances. Table 2.1 presents the evaluation of the solution. These three cluster dimensions exhaust 87% of the communalities and 80% of the mean square of raw correlations. Thus, 13% of the communalities are left over for additional dimensions; howver, the third residual correlation of .10 indicates any additional dimension might be difficult to locate. Our solution, therefore, is not entirely satisfactory. The solution presented here, nevertheless, is the best which could be obtained after five different clustering attempts.

The first of the three clusters which emerged in the analysis is the most general. It has a reproducibility of mean squares of correlations equal to .64 and a reproducibility of communalities of .55. The other two cluster dimensions are very much more specific. Cluster two reproduces only .17 of the mean squares of correlations and .28 of the communalities. Cluster three reproduces .11 of the mean squares of correlations and .23 of the communalities. Thus, in interpreting the response to education in the Assembly of 1955-56, the first dimension will be the most significant.

Table 2.1 also shows the intercorrelations between the three cluster domains. The estimated inter-domain correlations for clusters one and two is only .17. For clusters one and three it is -.28, and for clusters two and three -.22. These low correlations among the three domains seem to indicate that there is very little overlap among the clusters. They are, in other words, fairly independent dimensions.

Table 2.2 shows the inner structure of the three dimensions. The most general of the cluster domains has six defining roll-calls, the more specific dimensions have four and three definers, respectively. Only the first cluster has an adequate alpha-reliability (.89). The other two have relatively low reliabilities. Similarly, the first cluster has a domain validity of .95, whereas the other two have less satisfactory validities. The more specific variances, therefore, represent roll-calls which are not tightly interrelated. Another interesting feature of the cluster solution is the number of unique variables which appeared. Eight of the 22 selected roll-calls have communalities of less than .20 with at least one of the three identified dimensions of roll-call voting.

One major substantive conclusion can be drawn from this examination of the cluster solution. Roll-call voting on education in a factional legislature, where the factions do not represent organized parties, is not highly predictable. Legislative structure, at least in these domains of policy, is loose and ambiguous. There is a great deal of unique variance in roll-call voting in a factional legislative system.

Dimensions of Assembly Voting

Table 2.3 presents the bills in each of the clusters, the substantive content of each of these bills and the correlations of each of the roll-calls on the three oblique cluster domains. These clusters of roll-calls will now be interpreted. The search for an interpretation of these clusters of roll-calls will consist of three sorts of analyses: the characteristics of the authors of each of the bills in the three clusters, the positions taken by interest groups on bills in each of the clusters, and the content of the legislation proposed in each of the clusters. It should not be surprising if these sorts of data are not sufficient to interpret a given cluster. When these three sorts of data are insufficient to allow the interpretation of a given cluster, an effort will then be made to examine

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TABLE 2.1

SUFFICIENCY AND GENERALTIY OF KEY CLUSTER DIMENSIONS OF ASSEMBLY ROLL-CALLS ON EDUCATION MEASURES, 1955-1956, AND THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE CLUSTERS

	Cluster Dimensions		
	I	II	III
A. Sufficiency of Oblique Clusters			
Proportion of sum of estimated communalities exhausted	.49	.23	.15
Cumulative proportion of communalities exhausted	.49	.72	.87
Cumulative proportion of mean square of raw r matrix exhausted	.63	.76	.80
Residual correlation remaining after each successive dimension (RMS)*	.18	.11	.10
B. Generality of Oblique Clusters			
Reproducibility of mean squares of correlations	.64	.17	.11
Reproducibility of communalities	.55	.28	.23
C. Raw Correlations Between Cluster Scores ("factor estimates")			
I	(.89)	.14	-.21
II	.14	(.72)	.14
III	-.21	.14	(.62)
D. Estimated Inter-domain Correlations			
I	1.00	.17	-.28
II	.17	1.00	-.22
III	-.28	.22	1.00

TABLE 2.2

INNER STRUCTURE OF CLUSTERS OF ROLL-CALL VOTES ON EDUCATION MEASURES, ASSEMBLY, 1957-58

Variables (Bill No.)	Definers	Oblique Factor Coeff.	Communality	Average R with Definers	B-Reliability Variables Singly	C-Reliability Variables Added Comul.
Cluster 1						
AB 24	D	.87	.77	.65		
AB 980	D	.82	.72	.61		
AB 2541	D	.74	.66	.56		
AB 986	D	.73	.58	.55		
AB 3233	D	.69	.49	.51		
AB 181	D	.62	.42	.47		
AB 3388		.56	.36	.42	.89	.89
A-Reliability = .89						
Domain Validity = .95						
Cluster 2						
AB 635	D	.73	.59	.44		
AB 618	D	.69	.47	.41		
AB 328	D	.51	.29	.31		
SCR 8	D	.49	.32	.29		
A-Reliability = .72						
Domain Validity = .85						
Cluster 3						
AB 1139	D	.67	.50	.39		
ACA 23	D	.60	.43	.34		
AB 400	D	.44	.25	.25		
A-Reliability = .62						
Domain Validity = .79						

Unique Variables

AB 320
AB 1766
AB 1982
AB 628 C
AB 1894
SB 1981
AB 1387
AB 1907

TABLE 2.3

CORRELATIONS OF ASSEMBLY ROLL-CALLS ON SELECTED EDUCATION BILLS WITH OBLIQUE CLUSTER DOMAINS OF ASSEMBLY VOTING, 1955-56

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III
Cluster 1				
AB 24	Establishes a state college in Alameda County	.87	.15	-.31
AB 980	Continues child care centers, appropriates money for support for next fiscal year, and revises eligibility requirements.	.82	.04	-.08
AB 2541	Permits county superintendent and governing boards to create, produce contract with licensed TV stations for audio-visual services in elementary and high schools under certain conditions of cost.	.74	.35	-.36
AB 986	Requires school districts to spend a specified portion of apportionments for salaries of certificated personnel.	.74	.25	-.03
AB 3233	Appropriates money for a study of library problems in California.	.69	.05	-.30
AB 181	Deletes "rural" from the requirement to detail college instructors for school extension service in rural schools of the state.	.62	-.05	-.16
AB 3388	Encourages junior colleges to undertake aviation education and provides for them to own and operate the necessary equipment.	.56	.16	.07
AB 1982	Extends functions of safety patrols to crossing "near" as well as "adjoined to" schools. Supervision by school personnel does not require physical presence.	-.23	-.03	.17
SB 1981	Provides for a study of the need to establish a state college in the area of Napa and Solano Counties.	.22	.00	-.11

TABLE 2.3 (continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains		
		I	II	III
Cluster 2				
AB 635	Declares contracts valid in which a member of a governing board has an interest not void or voidable, if the interest is disclosed and board approves, and if contract is just and reasonable.	-.10	.73	.22
AB 618	Deletes provision that a suspended district shall not be lapsed without the approval of the county superintendent.	.17	.69	.11
AB 328	Limits to 40¢ the tax rate required of a state-aided district to pay local bonded indebtedness and state loans.	.08	.51	-.05
SCR 8	Proposes a plan for visitation of school children to the State Capitol.	.28	.49	.24
AB 1387	Permits executive sessions of governing boards to consider school sites.	.16	.30	-.02
AB 1894	Classified counties by a.d.a. for determination of county superintendent salaries and qualifications.	-.02	.19	.13
AB 1907	Exempts members of governing boards from personal liability for injuries or damage occurring due to use of any school building.	-.09	.18	-.04
AB 1766	Authorizes establishment of 24 hour schools and prescribes their operation.	-.01	.12	.02
Cluster 3				
AB 1139	Provides for the election of the county board of education and the appointment of the county superintendent. Specifies state apportionment for the county school service fund.	-.01	-.01	.67
ACA 23	Provides that the board of supervisors of each county shall appoint the county school superintendent.	-.13	.37	.60

TABLE 2.3 (continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III
AB 400	Provides a state-wide ratio for property assessment and for use in determining state aid.	-.34	.01	.44
AB 320	Requires each school district employee to undergo a physical examination, including X-ray of lungs, at least once every three years. Repeals religious and other exemptions.	.14	-.12	-.31
AB 628C	Permits majority of registered voters and two-thirds of members of boards of contiguous high school districts to petition for a unification election.	.10	.19	.23

more carefully the characteristics of those who opposed and supported the various measures in a given cluster.

Cluster 1: Professional Progressivism. The first cluster is, as has been noted, the most general form of variance. The authors of the bills in this cluster (those which have a factor coefficient of .40 or greater with a dimension) are fairly evenly divided between the two parties -- three bills were carried by Democrats, four by Republicans. Five of the seven measures in this cluster were supported by the California Teachers Association. The authors of the measures in the cluster have had reputations as being friends of the C.T.A. Three of the seven bills were carried by C.T.A. members who were in the legislature and three other bills were carried by Assemblyman Ernest Geddes, long reputed to have excellent rapport with this association. It is on the basis of these two facts -- the support from the C.T.A. for bills in this cluster and the reputation of the authors of the bills in their relationship to the C.T.A. that we interpret this dimension as a professional interest dimension.

There are two reasons for labelling this cluster "progressivism." First, the content of bills in this domain suggest a mild form of modernity or progressivism. The extension of higher education, the continuation of child care centers, the facilitation of the uses of T.V. in classrooms, the concern for problems of libraries, and interest in modernizing the junior college curriculum somewhat, are all progressive measures. The second reason for this label is the fact that the southern Republican conservatives, joined occasionally by some northern Republicans, voted in opposition to these measures. Assemblymen Collier, Levering, Shell, Smith, Lyone, Conrad, Dickey and a few others were fairly consistently opposed to these bills. However, it should be noted that the majority of Republicans were not opposed to these seven measures.

Cluster 2: Protection of Local School Authority. The bills in cluster 2 were authored by four Democrats. Three of these Democrats were, again, reputed to be in sympathy with the objectives of the California Teachers Association. Indeed, the California Teachers Association supported two of the four defining measures in this cluster. There is no general substantive thread, apparently, running through the four defining measures. Perhaps all that can be said is that each of these measures with the exception of SCR 8 is concerned, in one way or another, with the local administration and financing of education. Each of these bills would be of greater interest to rural districts than urban districts. A check on the assemblymen who voted against these measures is quite revealing in this respect. The great majority of those voting contrary are from urban areas, and from the southern part of the state. All of them are liberal Democrats -- Unruh, Munnell, Elliott, Lowery, among others. There were a number of northern liberal Democrats who voted with the southern Democratic coalition on these measures -- assemblymen like Ralph Brown, Masterson, and Brady. The majority of Democrats voted in favor of the bills in this cluster.

The liberals in the Legislature would not approve of a very moderate bill dealing with conflict of interest, nor would they be particularly sympathetic with certain more conservative goals with respect to local control. This fact is well demonstrated in California's more partisan sessions. Since this dimension represents a very specific form of variance, we may conclude that the liberal faction within the Democratic party had less to fear in education during 1955-56 than did the conservative wing of the Republican party.

Cluster 3: County Education Administration. The bills which define cluster 3 are concerned with two major issues -- the appointment of county superintendents of education, and the equalization of property assessments for purposes of state aid apportionment. The three bills were carried by two Republicans, the chairman of the Assembly Education Committee and a prominent member of this committee. These three bills did not receive the support of the California Teachers Association. These measures, if enacted, would clearly put rural school districts at a considerable disadvantage. First, the county superintendents in the many rural counties in California would rather have their boards appointed by county boards of supervisors than elected by the citizenry. Furthermore, an equalization of property assessments would increase the amount of state aid to urban and suburban districts and decrease it proportionately to rural districts. It is, therefore, not surprising that these three measures, which showed the greatest amount of conflict of any education measures, were opposed by the northern and southern rural assemblymen. To be sure, these assemblymen were joined, but without pattern, by a number of suburban and urban assemblymen in their opposition to certain of the bills in this cluster.

Unique Variables. There were eight unique roll-calls of the 22 which were selected. Four of the bills which received a unique response were lost in the senate committees; four were signed into law. Those unique measures which lost or failed to pass Senate committees included a measure requiring a physical examination for all employees of school districts every three years, a bill which would permit executive sessions for school boards under certain circumstances, a measure which allowed counties or school districts to establish 24 hour schools, and a measure determining the salaries of county superintendents of schools on the basis of county characteristics and incumbent qualifications. Those education bills to which the Assembly responded with unique roll-calls but which were passed into law were as follows: a method for determining electoral goals with respect to school district unification, the exemption of school board members from personal liability for injuries or damage occurring in the use of school buildings, the extension of the functions of safety patrols and eliminating the requirements of school employee supervision, and the establishment of a state college in Napa or Solano counties. The C.T.A. supported two of the unique measures which were lost in the senate committees, and opposed one which was signed into law. The Parent Teachers Association opposed only one of the unique measures and this one, too, was signed into law.

Summary

The analysis of roll-call voting on education issues in the Assembly during the sessions of 1955-56 seems to warrant four conclusions. These conclusions should be considered as hypotheses to be confirmed or discounted in the remaining analyses in this chapter.

First, it seems that the politics of a legislative body in transition do not permit the development of informal or formal structures which make legislative behavior in the area of education predictable. The relatively high number of unique roll-calls, the low degree of communalities among these roll-calls, and the loose clustering of these roll-calls which are not unique, all seem to warrant this conlusion.

Second, the structure which does exist is factional based on region and ideology. The major opposition to bills in cluster one came from southern conservative Republicans; to cluster two, from southern liberal Democrats; to cluster three, from northern rural assemblymen. The most general conflict is between a handful of conservatives and the loosely structured majority of moderates and liberals. More specific and narrower conflicts occur on education issues between rural and metropolitan legislators.

Third, a factional legislative body in transition does not permit any one group, majority or minority, or any one faction to develop a coherent, programmatic approach to education legislation. In the case of each of the clusters of education measures, we have a loose assortment of items dealing with a variety of education issues.

Fourth, an education interest group must, in the context of a traditional and factional legislative body, design its program in such a way as not to displease more than one faction at a time. That is to say, the C.T.A. program is proliferated and very loosely structured so that it can appeal to the majority of factions. As a consequence, a major interest group will attempt only moderate and incremental changes in policy. (There are of course many other reasons why an interest group would behave in this way.)

These four conclusions are suggested by the analysis above; they go somewhat beyond the data and the analysis of these data. Therefore, we shall consider them as hypotheses guiding the remainder of the analysis in this chapter.

THE ASSEMBLY, 1957-1958

Thirty-eight Assembly roll-calls in 1957-58 were selected for analysis, 30 on 28 Assembly bills and eight on eight Senate bills. Six roll-calls were concurrency votes and one was taken on a conference committee report.

The education and related measures on which the Assembly divided in its voting were concerned with the inculcation of basic American values, finance, tax equity, child care centers, employee benefits and rights, school construction, and property assessment. Members of both parties were involved in developing and carrying these measures. Twenty bills were introduced by Republicans and 16 by Democrats.

Of the 36 measures selected, 21 were signed into law or filed with the Secretary of State -- 14 of the 28 Assembly bills and six of the eight Senate bills. Nine Assembly bills (33% of those selected) failed to pass Senate committees, one was refused passage by the Assembly, three were pocket-vetoed by the Governor, and one was left to die on file. Two of the eight Senate bills were pocket-vetoed by the Governor.

The California Teachers Association was not very active on the selected measures. It took positions on only eight bills, and those were mainly measures necessary for continued school operation. It opposed any attempt to introduce collective bargaining into the school systems, a position it held until 1965.

We turn now to the results of the roll-call analysis.

Evaluation of the Cluster Solution

The root mean squares of correlations among the 38 selected Assembly roll-calls in 1957-58 is .21, somewhat lower than for those selected for the period 1955-56. The sum of communalities is 14.57, proportionately somewhat higher than for the 1955-56 analysis. This would seem to indicate a somewhat more definite structure in Assembly roll-call voting in 1957-58 than in 1955-56.

The cluster analysis of the 38 roll-calls yielded five dimensions of Assembly voting on education -- two fairly general patterns of variance, and three much more specific variances. Table 2.4 presents the evaluation of the solution.

The five clustered dimensions of roll-call votes exhausts 93% of the communalities and 76% of the mean squares of raw correlations. Thus, only 7% of the communalities are left over for additional dimensions. The fifth residual correlation of .09 indicates that further search for additional dimensions would probably be fruitless. The relatively low proportion of the mean square of the raw correlation matrix which is exhausted by the five dimensions. This curious discrepancy is somewhat explained later by the fact that almost one quarter of the roll-calls exhibit unique variances.

The first two cluster dimensions are the most general -- cluster 1 has a reproducibility of mean squares of correlations equal to .35, and cluster 2 has one equal to .31. The remaining three cluster dimensions are very much more specific. Cluster 3 reproduces only .07 of the mean squares of correlations, cluster 4, .12, and cluster 5, .17. The first two cluster dimensions of Assembly roll-call voting in 1957-58 are, therefore, the most general and most characteristic of the Assembly's response to education during this time.

An examination of the raw correlations between cluster scores and the estimated inter-domain correlations shows clearly that the five dimensions

TABLE 2.4

SUFFICIENCY AND GENERALITY OF KEY CLUSTER DIMENSIONS OF ASSEMBLY ROLL CALLS ON EDUCATION MEASURES, 1957-1958, AND THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE CLUSTERS

	Cluster Dimensions				
	I	II	III	IV	V
A. Sufficiency of Oblique Clusters					
Proportion of sum of estimated communalities exhausted	.30	.23	.12	.14	.14
Cumulative proportion or communalities exhausted	.30	.53	.65	.79	.93
Cumulative proportion of mean square of raw r matrix exhausted	.37	.59	.62	.69	.76
Residual correlation remaining after each successive dimension (RMS)*	.16	.13	.12	.11	.09
B. Generality of Oblique Clusters					
Reproducibility of mean squares of correlations	.35	.31	.07	.12	.17
Reproducibility of communalities	.32	.30	.14	.19	.22
C. Raw Correlations Between Cluster Scores ("factor estimates")					
I	(.89)	-.42	.16	.04	.29
II	-.42	(.85)	-.03	.13	-.10
III	.16	-.03	(.59)	.16	-.02
IV	.04	.13	.16	(.70)	.15
V	.29	-.10	-.02	.15	(.70)
D. Estimated Inter-domain Correlations					
I	1.00	-.48	.22	.05	.37
II	-.48	1.00	-.04	.16	-.14
III	.22	-.04	1.00	.25	-.03
IV	.05	.16	.25	1.00	.21
V	.37	-.14	-.03	.21	1.00

are relatively independent. The most highly inter-correlated dimensions are 1 and 2, with a raw correlation of minus .42 and an estimated correlation of minus .48.

Table 2.5 shows the inner structure of the five roll-call dimensions uncovered in the cluster analysis. Not only are clusters 1 and 2 the most general; they are also the "tightest" clusters as is indicated by their alpha reliabilities and their domain validities, as well as by the average correlations which the various definers have with their respective dimensions. Clusters 3, 4, and 5 are not only more specific in the pattern of variance which they represent but also less reliable and less valid.

It should be noted that nine of the 38 roll-calls are unique, i.e., they have communalities of less than .20 with any one of the five identified dimensions of roll-call voting. This number of roll-calls represents, proportionately, somewhat less unique variance in 1957-58 voting than in the previous term. Given the fact that the three specific patterns of variance, namely clusters 3, 4, and 5, have relatively low alpha-reliabilities and domain validities, and that almost 25% of the variables still fall into the unique category, we may conclude that the structure of the response to education in the Assembly is still somewhat diffuse, although much less so than in 1955-56.

Dimensions of Assembly Voting, 1957-58

Table 2.6 presents summaries of the bills in each of the clusters, and the correlations of the roll-calls on these bills with each of the five oblique cluster domains. The interpretation of these clusters of roll-calls will proceed in the same way as the interpretation of the analysis of the previous terms.

Cluster 1: Fair Employment in Education. The first cluster is the most general form of variance in the Assembly roll-call voting in 1957-58. The defining variables of cluster 1 are bills which attempt to legislate conditions for fair employment in education and agencies to work on behalf of this objective. AB 1150 invokes a penalty for the refusal to recommend persons for employment because of race, color or creed; AB 1151 prohibits discrimination against qualified teachers for reasons of age or marital status; AB 1727 provides the right for school and state college employees to organize for collective bargaining. The authors of the bills on which the five defining roll-calls were taken were all liberal Democrats -- Rumford, Hawkins, Masterson, and McBride. It is interesting to note that the California Teachers Association opposed two bills on which the defining roll-calls were taken. Three of the five bills on which defining roll-calls taken were lost in Senate committees; two were ultimately signed into law by the Governor.

The measures which define cluster 1 were authored and carried by assemblymen sympathetic to liberal and civil rights causes in the 1950's. They managed to rally support from most of the recently elected Democrats in order to push their legislation through the Assembly. In addition,

TABLE 2.5

INNER STRUCTURE OF CLUSTERS OF ROLL-CALL VOTES ON
EDUCATION MEASURES, ASSEMBLY, 1957-58

Variables (Bill No.)	Definers	Oblique Factor Coeff.	Commun-ality	Average R with Definers	B-Reli-ability Variables Singly	C-Reli-ability Variables Added Comul.
Cluster 1						
AB 1150	D	.91	.84	.69		
AB 2000	D	.86	.77	.55		
AB 1151	D	.72	.60	.54		
AB 1727	D	.67	.54	.50		
AB 1396	D	.60	.55	.45		
AB 136		.49	.47	.37	.89	.89
AB 2305		.44	.23	.33	.88	.88
A-Reliability = .89						
Domain Validity = .94						
Cluster 2						
AB 229	D	.80	.70	.55		
AB 18 BC	D	-.71	.64	.49		
AB 4111	D	-.70	.71	.48		
SB 1839	D	.64	.44	.44		
AB 2772	D	.60	.47	.41		
AB 1205		.47	.25	.32	.85	.85
SB 2466		.41	.28	.28	.84	.85
AB 458 C		-.38	.27	.27	.84	.84
A-Reliability = .85						
Domain Validity = .92						
Cluster 3						
AB 500 C	D	.70	.52	.39		
AB 3045 C	D	.52	.34	.29		
AB 50 BC	D	.46	.23	.26		
SB 617		-.30	.36	.17	.62	.62
A-Reliability = .59						
Domain Validity = .77						
Cluster 4						
SB 54	D	.90	.80	.50		
SB 1326	D	.69	.56	.38		
AB 25	D	.34	.21	.19		
SB 617F	D	.29	.36	.16		
A-Reliability = .70						
Domain Validity = .84						

TABLE 2.5 (continued)

Variables (Bill No.)	Definers	Oblique Factor Coeff.	Commun-ality	Average R with Definers	B-Reli-ability Variables Singly	C-Reli-ability Variables Added Cumul.
Cluster 5						
AB 1 B	D	.63	.49	.33		
SB 1231	D	.60	.49	.32		
AB 122 B	D	.54	.32	.28		
ACR 82	D	-.52	.43	.27		
ACA 7 B		.37	.34	.20	.72	.72
AB 500	D	.35	.24	.19		
SB 29 B		-.33	.20	.18	.70	.71

A-Reliability = .70
Domain Validity = .84

- -

Unique Variables

AB 10
AB 1863 C
ACA 10
AB 405
AB 2306
AB 9
AB 861
AB 3045
SCA 2 B

TABLE 2.6

CORRELATIONS OF ASSEMBLY ROLL-CALLS ON SELECTED EDUCATION BILLS WITH OBLIQUE CLUSTER DOMAINS OF ASSEMBLY VOTING, 1957-58

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains				
		I	II	III	IV	V
Cluster 1						
AB 1150	Invokes penalty for refusal to recommend persons for employment for reasons of race, color, etc.	.91	-.43	.14	.04	.35
AB 2000	Creates Commission of Fair Employment Practices, safeguards right of persons to seek, obtain and hold employment without discrimination because of race, etc.	.86	-.36	.11	.09	.48
AB 1151	Prohibits discriminating against qualified teachers for reasons of age or marital status.	.72	-.20	.19	.26	.26
AB 1727	Provides right for school and state college employees to organize for collective bargaining.	.67	-.48	.18	.01	.44
AB 1396	Provides for division of STRS members into those who desire social security coverage and those who do not.	.60	-.34	.22	-.22	-.13
AB 136	Removes time limit on existence of child care centers, adjusts fees	.49	.07	-.13	.21	.24
AB 2305	Permits governing board of school district to lease building to alleviate overcrowded schoolrooms.	.44	-.22	.22	-.02	.24
AB 405	Removes 20¢ tax limitation required in determining sufficiency of the assessed valuation of a proposed junior college district.	.28	.09	-.11	-.00	.23
ACA 10	Makes county superintendent appointive by elective county board of education.	.25	-.11	.03	.09	.07
Cluster 2						
AB 229	Advances cut-off date for questioning on past membership in subversive organizations from 9/10/48 to 10/3/45, expands subjects on which employees may be questioned.	-.37	.80	-.16	.11	-.25

TABLE 2.6 (continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III	IV	V
AB 18 BC	Pertains to state participation in the federal scholarship program.	.18	-.71	.17	-.01	-.18
AB 4111	Pertains to legislative advocates	.55	-.70	-.15	.17	.27
SB 1839	Requires district boards to prescribe procedure for selection of instructional material for use in school libraries, to prohibit materials which conflict with duties of teachers to impress pupils with principles of morality, justice, patriotism, etc.	-.34	.64	-.01	.23	.01
AB 2772	Authorizes school board to change orders on construction contracts provided work to be done is on same site and added cost does not exceed 10% of total contract.	-.21	.60	.06	.38	-.14
AB 1205	Pertains to state officers	-.08	.47	.02	.08	-.06
SB 2466	Provides detailed schedule of adjustments in county assessment ratios to effect inter-county equalization.	-.16	.41	.21	.30	-.15
AB 458 C	Declares use of tax-exempt property to be personal property and not subject to local taxation.	.15	-.38	.32	-.07	-.10
AB 9	Pertains to fees for credentials and life diplomas.	-.03	.35	.02	.19	.11
AB 1863 C	Pertains to the Vehicle Code	.10	.16	-.06	.07	-.02
Cluster 3						
AB 500 C	Provides for support of State government.	.13	-.11	.70	.10	.06
AB 3045 C	Increases state support for schools	.20	.06	.52	.19	-.15
AB 50 BC	Pertains to school records of pupils	.05	-.02	.46	.12	.03
SB 617	Appropriates $20 million from Investment Fund (Tidelands Oil Reserve) to State School Building Aid Fund	-.22	-.12	-.30	.29	-.07

TABLE 2.6 (continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III	IV	V
Cluster 4						
SB 54	Requires State Highway Dept. to pay local government agencies 25% of rents received from real property not used immediately for highway needs.	-.07	.22	.30	.90	.17
SB 1326	Requires State Park Commission to pay local taxing agencies taxes on land under its jurisdiction.	.27	.03	.34	.69	.27
AB 25	Requires State Dept. of Public Works to pay local taxes on real property until it is actually used for highway purposes.	.12	.23	.20	.34	.10
AB 2306	Permits purchase of portable buildings being used for schoolrooms.	-.07	.16	-.13	.26	.09
Cluster 5						
AB 1 B	Pertains to courses of study in the state colleges.	.25	-.02	-.06	-.13	.63
SB 1231	Requires licensing and vaccination of all dogs four months and older in rabies areas.	.18	-.12	-.34	-.13	.60
AB 122 B	Provides for salary increases for U.C. and state college academic and administrative employees.	.22	-.23	.02	.10	.54
ACR 82	Requests STRS to study cost of grantin credit under California system for varying periods of out-of-state service.	-.22	.15	-.06	-.47	-.52
ACA 7 B	Ratifies State Construction Program Bond Act of 1958.	-.15	.37	-.11	.11	.37
AB 500	Provides for support of state government.	.11	.17	.23	.25	.35

TABLE 2.6 (continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains				
		I	II	III	IV	V
SB 29 B	Requires State School Finance Committee to issue and sell bonds in amount of $200 million, proceeds to go to General Fund to restore building aid expenditures.	-.14	.18	-.20	.03	-.33
AB 3045	Increases state support for schools	.08	.18	-.06	-.06	.30
AB 10	Requires Local Allocations Board to determine for each school district the ratio of assessed valuation to total market value, statewide ratio to be determined also.	-.02	.04	.00	-.28	-.29
SCA 2 B	Provides for appointment of the Supt. of Public Education by the State Board of Ed. with Senate approval.	.07	.20	.09	.23	.29
AB 861	Repeals statute sections providing for mandatory inter-county equalization of assessments.	.08	-.01	.20	.23	.28

they mobilized support from Republican members of the Assembly Education Committee. The legislation represented in cluster 1 quite clearly divided the Assembly on ideological grounds. To some extent, parties were beginning to adopt more ideological positions on proposed education legislation.

Cluster 2: Citizenship Education. The bills on which the defining roll-calls in cluster 2 were taken were authored primarily by Republicans; those roll-calls which are reflected in cluster 2 were carried by Democrats (e.g., AB 18, AB 4111). The content of legislation represented in cluster 2 is, in many respects, opposed to the kind of legislation proposed in cluster 1. For example, AB 229 set back the date for questioning on past membership in subversive organization by three years; SB 1839 required school districts to prescribe the procedure for selection of instructional materials to be used in school libraries, and to prohibit materials which conflict with the duties of teachers to impress pupils with the principles of morality, justice, patriotism, and so forth. The California Teachers Association took positions on none of the bills in cluster 2. Furthermore, three of the five defining bills were passed into law; one was pocket-vetoed by the Governor (this is a reflected variable); and one was lost in a senate committee.

Cluster 2 is strongly negatively correlated with cluster 1. This means that the supporters of measures in cluster 1 opposed measures in cluster 2, and vice versa. The liberal Democrats who supported measures in cluster 1 oppoosed the measures in cluster 2; the conservative Republicans who opposed measures in cluster 1 supported the measures in cluster 2. Cluster 2, it should be recalled, is pattern of variance almost as general as that of cluster 1. In other words, the two most general variances in the Assembly's response to education are ideological in nature.

Cluster 3: State Finance. Bills on which the roll-calls in cluster 3 were taken pertain, primarily, to the financing of state government and specifically of education. AB 500 is the annual budget bill in the regular session; AB 3045 was a bill to increase the amount of state support for education; SB 617 was a bill to appropriate twenty million dollars to the state's school building fund. Only AB 50 in this cluster did not pertain to finance.

The bills in cluster 3 were carried by prominent Republicans who were considered leaders in the field of education legislation -- Assemblymen Geddes, J. Collier, and Senator N. Dilworth. Each of these bills was passed into law, most of them with the support of the California Teachers Association and the California Congress of Parents and Teachers (P.T.A.).

Cluster 3 has extremely low correlations with each of the other clusters. The Assembly, in other words, did not divide on cluster 3 in the same way it divided on clusters 1 and 2, i.e., on the basis of political ideology. The basis for the division of the Assembly on roll-calls on cluster 3 cannot be determined from our analysis.

Cluster 4: Tax Equity for Local Government. Cluster 4 is made up of roll-calls on bills which are designed to require the state to pay its due share of taxes on property it uses in local jurisdictions. SB 54 requires the State Highway Department to pay local government agencies 25% of rent received from real property not used for highway needs; SB 1326 requires the State Park Commission to pay local taxing agencies taxes on land under its jurisdiction; AB 25 requires the State Department of Public Works to pay local taxes on real property. Each of these three bills was carried by a Democrat, two Senate Democrats and one Assembly Democrat. Only one bill was passed into law.

Each of these three bills had a low degree of visibility, although the political implications for a number of legislators might have had considerable weight in the casting of their votes. The overwhelming majority received in the Assembly for each of these bills is an indication of the outward display of a constituency orientation at least. The measures in cluster 4 appeal to the strong norms of local control and constituency orientation pervasive in California politics.

Cluster 5: Improvement of Educational Quality. The most contentious educational measures during the 1957-58 sessions are found in cluster 5. Measures in cluster 5 are diverse and various, ranging from the regulation of courses of study in state colleges to a state finance bond issue. It is on these measures that the Assembly divided strictly along party lines. There were no ideological grounds for the Assembly's division on these issues, as can be seen from an examination of the content. However, for one reason or another, the Democrats in the Assembly were anxious to fight the issues represented by the measures in cluster 5.

The measures in cluster 5 were authored and carried by high ranking Republicans in the Assembly. The one Senate bill was also carried by a Republican, and it was the only bill which the California Teachers Association supported in this cluster. Despite the fact that there is a fairly sizeable number of defining roll-calls in cluster 5, the cluster dimension as such represents a very specific form of variance as was seen in Table 2.5.

Summary

Compared to 1955-56, the Assembly in 1957-58 responds in a more predictable and defined way to education measures. Partisanship is beginning to take shape (cluster 5) and ideology, probably reinforced by social class differences among constituencies, appears to be the basis for most of the variance in roll-call voting on education (clusters 1 and 2). Factionalism, based on differences in constituency and policy orientation seems still to be the dominant characteristic of the Assembly's response to education, however.

THE SENATE, 1955-1956

The Senate disagreed sufficiently for our criteria on only 16 roll-calls in 1955-56. Five selected roll-calls were taken on four Senate bills and 11 were taken on 11 Assembly bills. Eight of the 15 measures were carried by Democrats.

The major issues were not unlike those in the Assembly in 1955-56 -- child care centers, fair employment practices, employee rights, and rural educational development. The interest groups, the Congress of Parents and Teachers and the California Teachers Association, took the positions already described in an earlier section dealing with the Assembly in 1955-56.

Evaluation of the Cluster Solution

The sum of communalities among the 16 roll-calls is 10.15; the root mean squares of raw correlations is .34. The magnitude of these statistics for the Senate in 1955-56 is considerably higher than for the Assembly in the same period.

The cluster analysis of the 16 roll-calls reveals four major dimensions of roll-call voting on education. The proportion of communalities exhausted after four dimensions is 1.00, namely 100%. The proportion of the means squares of the raw correlation matrices which are exhausted by four dimensions is .92. There is only a residual correlation of .01 remaining after four dimensions have been extracted. The solution is highly adequate on criteria of sufficiency.

It is interesting that the four dimensions reproduce roughly the same proportions on the mean squares of correlations and of the communalities. There is not as much variation in the generality or specificity of the dimension for the Senate roll-call voting in 1955-56 as there was in the Assembly for the same sessions. These statistics are found in section A and B of Table 2.7.

Section C of this table shows the relationships between the cluster domains. The two most general clusters, cluster 1 and cluster 3 are highly negatively correlated (-.52). Cluster 2 overlaps with cluster 3 somewhat, the correlation is .32. Cluster 4 is quite independent. Table 2.8 shows the inner structure of the cluster solution. The reliabilities range from .82 to .90; the domain validities range from .90 to .95. Not only is the cluster solution sufficient, it is also satisfactory in terms of the inner structure of each of the four dimensions.

The four-cluster solution yielded only one unique variable, AB 1907. The fact that there is only one unique pattern of variance in Senate roll-call voting in 1955-56, and that the cluster solution is superior in terms of generality and inner structure, would seem to indicate that the Senate response to educational issues during this time is fairly well defined and predictable.

Dimensions of Senate Voting

Table 2.9 presents the bills in each of the clusters and the correlations of the roll-calls on each of these bills with each of the four cluster domains.

TABLE 2.7

SUFFICIENCY AND GENERALITY OF KEY CLUSTER DIMENSIONS OF SENATE ROLL-CALLS ON EDUCATION MEASURES, 1955-56, AND THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE CLUSTERS

	Cluster Dimensions			
	I	II	III	IV
A. Sufficiency of Oblique Clusters				
Proportion of sum of estimated communalities exhausted	.31	.24	.22	.23
Cumulative proportion of communalities exhausted	.31	.55	.77	1.00
Cumulative proportion of mean square of raw r matrix exhausted	.35	.54	.75	.92
Residual correlation remaining after each successive dimension (RMS)*	.06	.04	.02	.01
B. Generality of Oblique Clusters				
Reproducibility of mean squares of correlations	.31	.24	.37	.27
Reproducibility of communalities	.30	.26	.33	.28
C. Raw Correlations Between Cluster Scores ("factor estimates")				
I	(.88)	-.16	-.44	-.18
II	-.16	(.90)	.27	-.01
III	-.44	.27	(.82)	-.19
IV	-.18	-.01	-.19	(.89)
D. Estimated Inter-Domain Correlations				
I	1.00	-.18	-.52	-.21
II	-.18	1.00	.32	-.02
III	-.52	.32	1.00	-.22
IV	-.21	-.02	-.22	1.00

TABLE 2.8

INNER STRUCTURES OF CLUSTERS OF ROLL-CALL VOTES ON EDUCATION MEASURES, SENATE, 1955-56

Variables (Bill No.)	Definers	Oblique Factor Coeff.	Commun-ality	Average R with Definers	B-Reli-ability Variables Singly	C-Reli-ability Variables Added Cumul.
Cluster 1						
AB 984	D	-.85	.77	.67		
SB 1039	D	.80	.74	.64		
SB 1981 C	D	.71	.75	.56		
AB 3252		-.47	.25	.37	.85	.85
AB 1982		-.25	.26	.19	.83	.81
A-Reliability = .88						
Domain Validity = .94						
Cluster 2						
SB 639	D	.92	.85	.77		
SB 1392	D	.83	.77	.69		
AB 980	D	.76	.65	.63		
A-Reliability = .90						
Domain Validity = .95						
Cluster 3						
AB 2220	D	.85	.73	.51		
AB 970	D	.80	.76	.48		
SB 639 C	D	.74	.71	.45		
AB 1546	D	.47	.47	.28		
A-Reliability = .82						
Domain Validity = .90						
Cluster 4						
AB 1656	D	.99	.99	.82		
AB 616	D	.99	.99	.82		
AB 1160	D	.48	.27	.39		
A-Reliability = .89						
Domain Validity = .94						
Unique Variables						
AB 1907						

TABLE 2.9

CORRELATIONS OF ASSEMBLY ROLL-CALLS ON SELECTED EDUCATION BILLS WITH OBLIQUE CLUSTER DIMENSIONS OF SENATE VOTING, 1955-56

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III	IV
Cluster 1					
AB 984	County superintendent may supply school districts with services in connection with television. Governing boards in behalf of districts and director of education in behalf of state colleges may contract with licensing of television station for use of facilities.	-.85	.06	.49	.02
SB 1039	Concerns expansion of public supported higher education by the establishment of several new state colleges in this state.	.80	-.12	-.42	.13
SB 1981 C	An act to provide for the study of the need for the establishment of a state college in the area of Napa County and Solano County.	.71	-.24	-.31	-.60
AB 3252	(No description given.)	-.47	.09	.38	-.02
AB 1982	Extends functions of safety patrol to crossing "near" as well as "adjacent to" schools. Supervision by school employee does not require physical presence.	-.25	.19	-.10	-.09
Cluster 2					
SB 639	Removes June 30, 1955, as closing date from provisions for child care centers. Appropriates unspecified sum for operation of centers and provides for state apportionment to districts maintaining centers.	-.09	.92	.22	.04
SB 1392	Extends operation of child care centers from June 30, 1955 to same date 1957.	-.08	.83	.43	-.04

TABLE 2.9 (continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains			
		I	II	III	IV
AB 980	Continues child care centers. Appropriates four million, five hundred thirty-five thousand eight hundred dollars for support for Julyll, 1955 through June 30, 1956. Adds to list of those qualified child of parent receiving instruction under state vocational rehabilitation program. Means eligibility: parent salary limits revised upward.	-.27	.76	.14	-.04
Cluster 3					
AB 2220	Declares it to be public policy that all public school employees shall have the right to organize without administrative interference for the purpose of collective bargaining.	-.44	.35	.85	-.21
AB 970	Persons charged by governing boards with responsibility for recommending certificated personnel not to refuse or fail so to do for reasons of color, creed, religion or national origin.	-.15	.40	.80	-.21
SB 639 C	(See SB 639 in cluster 2.)	-.61	.27	.74	-.34
AB 1546	Creates 120 competitive four year scholarships per year for attendance in privately endowed universities and colleges each one thousand dollars per year.	.11	-.10	.47	-.14
AB 1907	Exempts members of governing boards from personal liability for injuries or damages occurring due to use of any building.	.30	-.14	-.36	-.13
Cluster 4					
AB 1656	Extends section 13841.1 and bereavement leave to non-certificated employees.	-.12	-.07	-.23	.99
AB 616	Changes maximum age of truant subject to arrest from fifteen years to sixteen years.	-.16	-.10	-.25	.99
AB 1160	Provides for payroll deductions of professional dues.	-.23	.13	-.05	.48

Cluster 1: Rural Educational Development. Bills in cluster 1 were offered and carried by two Republicans prominently involved in education and two Democrats also highly involved. The legislation proposed was fairly controversial in that it was designed for the improvement of educational opportunities in rural areas. It did not aid urban education in any way. (Note that AB 984 is reflected in this cluster, and consequently, must be considered as opposite to it's intent for purposes of analysis. This bill would actually have given urban areas greater advantage than rural areas, but the reflection of its vote in dimension in cluster 1 means that the vote was pro-rural.) The major concern among the measures of cluster 1 was the expansion of higher education to rural areas. This had been a contentious issue for the last several years. Obviously, the rural senators were interested in giving their own constituencies the greatest possible advantage in any expansion plans for higher education which the state might have.

It should be noted that the interest groups in education are not, typically, concerned with constituency oriented legislation. Thus, they did not take active positions on the bills in this cluster. Furthermore, as is to be expected, the urban senators lead the opposition to the proposed legislation in cluster 1.

Cluster 2: Child Care. The measures in cluster 2 were not nearly as controversial as those of cluster 1, judging from Senate roll-call. The Senate was not nearly as divided on these measures as those of cluster 1. The Congress of Parents and Teachers and the California Teachers Association supported the extension of child care centers. However, they were careful to support only the bills offered by Assemblyman Geddes, a prominent Republican rahter than the two bills carried by Democrats. The opposition to the extension of child care centers came from a sprinkling of Republican and Democrats, northern senators and southern senators, but mainly rural members. However, the pattern is not at all clear.

Cluster 3: Employee Rights. The most controversial measures before the Senate in 1955-56 are found in cluster 3. These measures, for the most part, are concerned with defining and providing rights to public school employees -- collective bargaining and protection against employment discrimination. The bills were carried by liberal Democrats from the Assembly -- Masterson and Rumford -- and Senator Richards from Los Angeles. The California Teachers Association was, predictably, opposed to the proposed legislation.

The response of the Senate was not precisely along party lines. Rather, the division was between conservatives and liberals. Since many of the Democrats, especially rural Democrats were conservative in their political orientation, they voted along with the Republicans on these measures. The major support came from the liberal urban Democrats, many of whom were pro-labor and "New Deal" in their orientation.

Cluster 4: Education Welfare. The least controversial education measures on which there was some disagreement in the Senate in 1955-56 are found in cluster 4. These issues were supported by the California Teachers Association, and indeed one was sponsored by that organization. The bills were concerned with the extension of bereavement leave to non-certificated employees, provision for payroll deductions for professional dues, and with increasing the age of truants subject to arrest from 15 to 16 years. The three bills which define cluster 4 were carried by two Assembly Democrats and one Republican. The opposition to these bills in the Senate was mixed. No discernable pattern of opposition emerged.

Only one unique roll-call was found in the 16 roll-calls selected for this analysis. AB 1907, which proposed the exemption of governing school boards from personal liability for injury or damage occurring due to use of any building, was a controversial piece of legislation. However, no structure internal to the Senate seems to have governed the response of senators to this measure. Perhaps, constituency variables and interest group pressure interfered sufficiently with the decision making on this measure to result in a unique response on the part of the Senate.

Summary

The Senate was much more highly predictable and structured in its response to education than was the Assembly in 1955-56. The higher communalities, the lower amount of unique variance, and the more adequate cluster solution give considerable weight to this conclusion.

The major division in the Senate was between rural and urban senators, but regionalism and policy orientation or ideology seem also to be important in structuring the Senate. It was also a factional body during this time, but for a number of reasons (discussed later), it was a more integrated body than the Assembly.

THE SENATE, 1957-1958

Seventeen Senate roll-calls on 16 bills introduced in 1957-58 have been selected for analysis. Seven of these bills were carried by Republicans, mainly concerned with financing of school construction, child protection, the financing of state government, and school management. The remaining bills were carried by Democrats. These were concerned with the appointment of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and of county superintendents, child care centers, fair employment practices, state college expansion, and new educational programs.

These 17 roll-calls were clustered in four cluster domains. The analysis of these cluster domains will be presented below.

Evaluation of Cluster Solution

The 17 select Senate roll-calls for the sessions of 1957-58 had a sum of communalities of 9.38; the mean squares of the raw correlations among these 17 roll-calls was .31. The magnitude of these statistics is lower for the 1957-58 Senate than for the Senate in 1955-56. The magnitude of these two statistics is higher than for the Assembly of 1957-58.

Four clusters were determined in the analysis of the 17 roll-call votes. Table 2.10 shows the results of the analysis. The proportion of the mean squares of the raw correlation matrices exhausted by four dimensions is .83; the proportion of communality exhausted after four dimensions is .95. The residual correlation remaining after four dimension have been extracted is .01. This solution is not as adequate in terms of the sufficiency criteria as for the Senate solution for 1955-56. However, the residual correlation remaining after four dimensions have been extracted indicates strongly that further exploration for additional dimensions would be fruitless.

Section B of Table 2.10 indicates that there are two patterns of variance which are fairly general, clusters 2 and 4. Cluster 1 and cluster 3 are somewhat more specific in their variance. This indicates a pattern somewhat similar to the Senate analysis for 1955-56; however, the pattern here is more marked. It is clearer in the 1957-58 analysis that two patterns of variance are much more general than the two others.

In sections C and D of Table 2.10 we find that the four dimensions are fairly independent of each other. The highest inter-domain correlation is -.38 between cluster 4 and cluster 3. The remaining sets of relationships vary in magnitude from .07 to .18.

In Table 2.11 the statistics on the inner structure of the clusters are given. The reliabilities range from .75 to .89; the domain validities range from .87 to .95. Cluster 3 has the lowest reliability and validity.

Three of the 17 roll-calls were unique -- AB 85, SB 2566, and AB 4. The proportion of unique variance in the roll-call voting on education in the Senate in 1957-58 is somewhat higher than for the Senate of 1955-56.

Dimensions of Roll-call Voting

Table 2.12 shows the content of bills in the various clusters and the correlations of roll-calls on these bills with each of the four cluster domains. Each of these clusters will be interpreted below.

Cluster 1: State Government Finance. Cluster 1 contains two defining variables, one is a bill to ratify the State Construction Program Act of 1958 and authorizes the issuance of two hundred million dollars for construction purposes; AB 500, the budget bill, makes appropriations for the support of state government for the fiscal year. Both bills were passed, the one signed by the Governor and the other filed with the Secretary of State.

The opposition in the Senate to the measures in cluster 1 came primarily from senators who represented southern districts. The great majority of the opponents of these measures came from the exurban counties.

TABLE 2.10

SUFFICIENCY AND GENERALITY OF KEY CLUSTER DIMENSIONS OF SENATE ROLL-CALLS ON EDUCATION MEASURES, 1957-58, AND THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE CLUSTERS

	Cluster Dimensions			
	I	II	III	IV
A. Sufficiency of Oblique Clusters				
Proportion of sum of estimated communalities exhausted	.24	.29	.21	.21
Cumulative proportion of communalities exhausted	.24	.53	.74	.95
Cumulative proportion of mean square of raw r matrix exhausted	.17	.47	.67	.83
Residual correlation remaining after each successive dimension (RMS)*	.06	.04	.03	.01
B. Generality of Oblique Clusters				
Reproducibility of mean squares of correlations	.19	.33	.19	.30
Reproducibility of communalities	.25	.32	.24	.30
C. Raw Correlations Between Cluster Scores ("factor estimates")				
I	(.89)	-.12	-.14	.08
II	-.12	(.86)	.06	.15
III	-.14	.06	(.75)	-.31
IV	.08	.15	-.31	(.85)
D. Estimated Inter-Domain Correlations				
I	1.00	-.14	-.17	.07
II	-.14	1.00	.07	.18
III	-.17	.07	1.00	-.38
IV	.09	.18	-.38	1.00

TABLE 2.11

INNER STRUCTURES OF CLUSTERS OF ROLL-CALL VOTES ON EDUCATION MEASURES, SENATE, 1957-58

Variables (Bill No.)	Definers	Oblique Factor Coeff.	Communality	Average R with Definers	B-Reliability Variables Singly	C-Reliability Variables Added Cumul.
Cluster 1						
ACA 7 B	D	1.03	1.11	.89		
AB 500	D	.70	.54	.60		
A-Reliability = .89						
Domain Validity = .95						
Cluster 2						
SCA 2 B	D	.97	.94	.70		
SCA 2 BC	D	.82	.75	.59		
SB 1667	D	.65	.60	.47		
AB 959	D	.59	.44	.43		
SB 1839	D	-.47	.36	.34		
A-Reliability = .87						
Domain Validity = .93						
Cluster 3						
AB 1392	D	.86	.74	.58		
AB 456	D	.84	.73	.56		
SB 2680	D	-.33	.20	.23		
A-Reliability = .75						
Domain Validity = .87						
Cluster 4						
AB 1239	D	.81	.87	.58		
AB 770	D	.81	.73	.58		
SB 1231	D	.71	.61	.51		
SB 617 C	D	.54	.30	.39		
A-Reliability = .85						
Domain Validity = .92						
Unique Variables						
AB 85						
SB 2566						
AB 4						

TABLE 2.12

CORRELATIONS OF SELECTED SENATE ROLL-CALLS ON SELECTED EDUCATION BILLS WITH OBLIQUE CLUSTER DIMENSIONS OF SENATE VOTING, 1957-58

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains			
		I	II	III	IV
Cluster 1					
ACA 7 B	Ratify State Construction Program Board Act of 1958 and authorizes issuance of two hundred million dollars in bonds for purposes thereof.	1.03	-.32	-.29	.20
AB 500	Makes appropriations for support of government of State of California and for several public purposes.	.70	.08	.00	-.05
AB 4	Establishes the state college of Alameda County and appropriates twenty million dollars for construction.	.27	.08	-.22	-.04
Cluster 2					
SCA 2 B	Provides that State Board of Education, with advice and consent of Senate, shall appoint the Superintendent of Public Instruction upon expiration of term of office of person elected to that office in 1958.	-.05	.97	-.06	.23
SCA 2 BC	(See above.)	-.14	.82	.15	.35
SB 1667	Fixes salaries and qualifications of all county superintendents of schools on basis of ADA in the county.	.15	.65	-.17	-.04
SB 1839	Requires district boards to prescribe procedure for selection and review of books and other instructional material for use in school libraries, the regulations to prohibit selection or retention of materials which conflict with duties of teachers, set forth in section 13230, to impress pupils with principles of morality, justice, patriotism, free government and American citizenship.	.37	-.47	-.29	.02

TABLE 2.12 (continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III	V
AB 959	Authorizes State Department of Education to make a study of special educational programs for gifted pupils, and appropriate one hundred thirty-seven thousand, five hundred and thirty-two dollars for the study.	-.14	.59	-.20	.35
SB 2566	State Board of Education may establish in the department a commission to assist and advise local school districts in problems relating to racial, religious or other discrimination in connection with the employment of certificated employees.	-.24	.25	-.16	.16
Cluster 3					
AB 1392	Requires county superintendent of schools to certify to county board of supervisors that cost of educating non-resident JC pupils, rather than pupils in grades 13 and 14, for purposes of levying tax for payment of non-resident JC tuition.	-.08	.02	.86	-.29
AB 456	Defines possessory interest of leasehold as personal property with result that local taxing agencies, including school districts, are denied revenue from operation of private activities on government or other tax exempt property.	.02	-.05	.84	-.25
SB 2680	Expansion of publicly supported higher education.	.28	-.17	-.33	.23
Cluster 4					
AB 1239	Permits high schools to pay costs of accreditation by any accrediting association.	.51	-.04	-.41	.81
AB 770	Adds school farm accounts to those not required to be deposited in the general fund of the district.	-.16	.06	-.26	.81

TABLE 2.12 (continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III	IV
SB 1231	Requires licensing and vaccination of all dogs four months and older in rabies areas.	-.20	.37	-.22	.71
SB 617 C	Appropriates twenty million dollars from investment fund (Tideland Oil Reserve) to State School Building Aid Fund.	.10	.12	-.21	.54
SB 85	Delete June 30, 1957, termination date from child care center provisions and makes them "permanent."	-.01	.10	-.17	.39

Cluster 2: Administrative Professionalism. The defining variables in cluster 2 are concerned with administrative professionalism and with certain very basic values in the school program.

One bill dealt with the appointment of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction by the State Board of Education. Three of the roll-calls on two bills deal with the problem of county superintendent appointments and salaries; one bill is concerned with establishing a program for gifted pupils, another with the selection of materials for school libraries which would facilitate the teaching of basic American values. In all cases but the last the California Teachers Association was very supportive. It sponsored SB 1667 and supported the others actively. SB 1839 received a roll-call which is reflected in cluster 2, i.e., those who opposed SB 1839 were in favor of the other bills in this cluster and those who favored SB 1839 were, for the most part opposed to the other bills in cluster 2. The major opposition, taking into account the reflection of SB 1839, in cluster 2 came from the conservative Republicans. The Democrats overwhelmingly supported these measures, and many of the moderate Republicans joined in that support. The more conservative members of the Republican party were opposed to taking the appointment of the Superintendent away from direct public involvement; they were also very much in favor of facilitating the teaching of American values and concepts.

Cluster 3: Local Tax Equity. The defining variables in cluster 3 have only a thin thread in common, namely, concern for local tax equity. The authors of bills in this cluster were Democrats. The major opposition to two bills in cluster 3 came from a mixture of conservative and moderate Republicans, as well as some liberal Democrats. Some of the opponents came from urban areas; other from exurban and rural areas. Beyond the content, there seems to be no interpretation possible for this particular cluster.

Cluster 4: Educational Management. The bills in cluster 4 are concerned with the following: grating permission to high schools to pay costs of accreditation, removing school farm accounts from the general fund of the district, requiring the licensing and vaccinating of all dogs four moths old and older in rabies areas, and the appropriation of twenty million dollars to the school building fund. These measures did not divide the Senate severely. Only a hand full of Republican senators, from both exurban and rural areas, opposed these measures. The California Teachers Association supported most of these measures actively.

CHAPTER III

THE POLARIZING POLITICS OF EDUCATION
1959-1962

INTRODUCTION

In the history of California politics, the period between 1959 and 1962 saw partisanship beginning to develop in the state which had heretofore been a classic example of the non-partisan art of politics. Hiram Johnson's dream of a truly non-partisan state seemed to be waning. In addition to the structural changes in the partisanship level of the California legislature, there were outside influences during this period which had a deep imprint on education. This was the era of Sputnik. The public blamed the lack of scientific knowledge in the United States upon the public schools. A decade of progressive education in the public schools was coming under attack. This was also the era in which federal aid to education seemed at last about ready to become a true reality.

SENATE, 1959-1960

A total of 40 roll calls on 39 measures pertaining to education were selected for the analysis of the Senate's response to education in 1959-1960. Twenty-five measures were originated in the Assembly; 14 were originated in the Senate. Of the 25 Assembly bills, 18 were signed into law, four were pocket-vetoed, one was lost in conference committee, and two were lost elsewhere in legislative process. Of the 15 Senate bills, only three were signed by the governor and one was filed with the Secretary of State; two were lost on the second floor, five in the Assembly committees, and two on the Assembly floor.

The interest groups were particularly active in registering positions of support or opposition to the 39 selected bills. A total of 65 positions were registered by the following interest groups: the California Congress of Parents and Teachers, the California School Board's Association, the California Teacher's Association, the California Association of School Administrators, the California School Employee Association, and the Department of Education. There appeared to be a high degree of unanimity among these interest groups as to which measures should be passed and which should be defeated.

Examination of the authorship of the 39 selected measures leaves no doubt that the Democrats have taken firm control. Of the 39 selected measures, 29 were carried by Democrats. Five of the 15 Senate measures were carried by Republicans, but only five of the 25 Assembly measures were carried by Republicans.

The major thrust's in the selected measures were as follows: reform of the system of taxation which would allow for greater participation on the part of the state in the financing of education, a concern for fair employment practices, and the moderate revision of local authority in education. An examination of the selected measures, in contrast to the measures selected for previous years, leaves no doubt that the Democratic party was taking hold of legislation pertaining to education. It seems, also, that the kind of legislation proposed for education by the Democrats in 1959-1960 was consistent with the major objectives of the established education interest groups. There were, of course, a number of exceptions. This is the case particularly in the field of fair employment practices.

The four year roll-calls were subjected to a cluster analysis. Five major patterns of voting were discovered. The cluster solution and the interpretation of the discovered clusters will be given below.

The Evaluation of the Cluster Solution

The sum of communalities for the 40 roll-calls in 1959-1960 is 22.98; the root mean squares over all correlations is .32. Compared to the Assembly analysis for 1959-1960, the Senate roll call voting on education is considerably more predictable. Compared to the Senate voting on education in 1957-1958, the predictability in 1959-60 remained at about the same magnitude.

Table 3.1 gives the statistics for the sufficiency, generality and interdependence of five clusters. The proportion of communalities exhausted by the five-cluster solution is .96; the proportion of mean squares over all correlations exhausted is .87. These two statistics indicate that the solution, comparatively, is a highly adequate one. Section B of this Table suggests that there are two highly general clusters -- cluster 1 and cluster 3; and there are two which are very specific -- cluster 4 and cluster 5. Cluster 2 falls in between these two extremes.

Sections C and D of Table 3.1 show the intercorrelations between the five clusters. The two most general clusters are highly intercorrelated. Cluster 2 is highly related to cluster 3, 4, and 5. In other words, clusters 2 and 3 sample the highly related variances. Perhaps, with further analysis, somewhat more independence could have been obtained for the several clusters.

Table 3.2 shows the inner structure of the five clusters. The alpha reliabilities are high for the three most general clusters, ranging from .91 to .98. The reliabilities for clusters 4 and 5 are somewhat lower, .86 and .82 respectively. The domain validities range from .91 to .99. There are five unique variables in the selected set.

The cluster solution appears to be adequate. It has one defect, mainly, a comparatively high set of inter domain correlations.

Dimensions of Roll-Call Voting

Cluster 1. Tax Reform. The first cluster, which is also the most general, contains six major tax bills. This tax "package" was the governor's attempt to increase the revenues for state government. In addition to these bills, there is a Senate bill in cluster 1 which extends to all districts the provision that

TABLE 3.1

SUFFICIENCY AND GENERALITY OF KEY CLUSTER DIMENSIONS OF SENATE ROLL-CALLS ON EDUCATION MEASURES, 1959-60, AND THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE CLUSTERS

	Cluster Dimensions				
	I	II	III	IV	V
A. Sufficiency of Oblique Clusters					
Proportion of sum of estimated communalities exhausted	.33	.23	.17	.11	.12
Cumulative proportion of communalities exhausted	.33	.56	.73	.84	.96
Cumulative proportion of mean square of raw r matrix exhausted	.47	.70	.80	.83	.87
Residual correlation remaining after each successive dimension (RMS)*	.05	.03	.02	.02	.01
B. Generality of Oblique Clusters					
Reproducibility of mean squares of correlations	.39	.23	.37	.14	.10
Reproducibility of communalities	.35	.27	.34	.21	.17
C. Raw Correlations Between Cluster Scores ("factor estimates")					
I	(.98)	.22	.49	-.07	.14
II	.22	(.91)	.40	.37	.40
III	.49	.40	(.95)	.26	.17
IV	-.07	.37	.26	(.86)	.13
V	.14	.40	.17	.13	(.82)
D. Estimated Inter-Domain Correlations					
I	1.00	.24	.51	-.07	.16
II	.24	1.00	.43	.42	.47
III	.51	.43	1.00	.29	.19
IV	-.07	.42	.29	1.00	.16
V	.16	.47	.19	.16	1.00

TABLE 3.2

INNER STRUCTURE OF CLUSTERS OF ROLL-CALL VOTES ON EDUCATION MEASURES, SENATE, 1959-60

Variables (Bill No.)	Definers	Oblique Factor Coeff.	Communality	Average R with Definers	B-Reliability Variables Singly	C-Reliability Variables Added Cumul.
Cluster 1						
AB 1176	D	.99	.98	.90		
AB 1172	D	.97	.95	.89		
AB 1171	D	.94	.96	.86		
AB 1177	D	.89	.82	.82		
AB 1175	D	.89	.80	.82		
AB 1172 R	D	.82	.80	.75		
SB 899		.66	.54	.61	.97	.97
AB 1173		.59	.55	.54	.97	.97
SB 18		.33	.30	.30	.96	.96
A-Reliability = .98						
Domain Validity = .99						
Cluster 2						
AB 1439	D	.96	.71	.84		
SB 1093	D	.91	.69	.80		
SB 1093 C	D	.86	.60	.75		
AB 1193	D	.75	.77	.66		
SB 41 B		.55	.47	.48	.90	.90
AB 1992		.44	.37	.38	.89	.90
A-Reliability = .91						
Domain Validity = .95						
Cluster 3						
SB 876	D	.96	1.02	.81		
AB 590	D	.94	.91	.79		
AB 594	D	.93	.91	.78		
SB 597	D	.81	.78	.68		
AB 91	D	.78	.68	.65		
AB 2429	D	.60	.49	.51		
AB 368		.37	.33	.31	.94	.94
AB 2485		.34	.27	.29	.94	.93
A-Reliability = .95						
Domain Validity = .98						

TABLE 3.2 (continued)

Variables (Bill No.)	Definers	Oblique Factor Coeff.	Commun- ality	Average R with Definers	B-Reli- ability Variables Singly	C-Reli- ability Variables Added Cumul.
Cluster 4						
AB 1538	D	.90	.92	.58		
SB 18 RB	D	.75	.58	.48		
AB 47	D	.60	.76	.39		
AB 2395	D	.57	.60	.37		
SB 1206		.56	.47	.36	.86	.86
AB 1992	D	.43	.37	.28		
AB 2674		.41	.42	.27	.85	.86
AB 800		.39	.32	.25	.84	.85
A-Reliability = .86						
Domain Validity = .92						
Cluster 5						
SB 186	D	-.69	.70	.45		
AB 2823	D	.69	.71	.45		
AB 2827	D	.62	.58	.41		
SB 831 R	D	.61	.52	.40		
SCA 20		.35	.20	.23	.79	.79
A-Reliability = .82						
Domain Validity = .91						
Unique Variables						
AB 2160						
AB 2299						
SCA 25						
SB 33 CB						
SCA 2 CB						

probationary teachers may be dismissed for cause only. All the bills in cluster 1 were carried by Democrats. The tax bills received strong support from the three major education interest groups, namely, the California School Board's Association, California Teacher's Association, and the California Association of School Administrators.

The measures in cluster 1 divided the Senate deeply. In fact, the division was partisan in nature. The Republicans almost to a man, opposed the measures in cluster 1. It was quite apparent, that the liaison between the major education interest groups and the Republicans in the Senate had come to an end in so far as revenue issues were concerned.

Cluster 2. State Paternalism. Cluster 2 is a form of variance which is neither as general as clusters 1 and 3 nor as specific as the variance represented by clusters 4 and 5. The division on measures in cluster 2 was also deep, indeed, the variance in voting was as great as for the measures in cluster 1. Those who opposed the measures in cluster 2 came from both parties, from all parts of the state, and represented various ideological positions. The opposition to these majors included senators with a long tenure and those who were freshman.

The interest groups took no interest in the measures contained in cluster 2. AB1992, a bill which extended rights of probationary employees in school districts, was opposed by both the California School Board's Association and the California Association of School Administrators.

The bills in cluster 2 were carried by urban legislators for the most part. These legislators had state colleges in their district and were, perhaps, intereste in appeasing local voters critical of student behavior. The one thing the bills have in common is content -- they are concerned with the distribution of alcoholic beverages in the vicinity of colleges or prisons. And, for the most part, they attempt to introduce an environment around local college campuses which will protec students from risks from certain antisocial behavior.

Cluster 3. Fair Employment Practices. Measures in cluster 3 are, for the most part, concerned with fair employment practices. SB376 regulates the affairs of the State Fair Employment Practices Commission; AB590 increases maximum weekly benefits for unemployment insurance; AB594 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race or color. AB91 prohibits discrimination by employers on the same basis; AB2429 permits classified employees of school districts to transfer sick leave and other benefits when they change school districts. All the bills in cluster 3 were carried by Democrats.

The education interest groups were strangely quiet on the measures in cluster 3. There was some opposition but no significant support from the major education interest groups.

The opposition in the Senate to the measures in cluster 3 came primarily from a subgroup of Republicans and one or two rural Democrats. It would appear that the opposition was a small group of conservative senators. This group of conservatives was made up of Republican senators who represented suburbanized counties and Democratic senators who represented rather low income rural counties.

This opposition, however, was small. The division of the Senate on these measures was considerably less even than the division on the previous two clusters.

Cluster 4. Enhancing the Local School Authority. Cluster 4 represents a very specific form of variance. Conflict in the Senate on measures in cluster 4 was not intent as represented by the distribution of roll-call votes. Most of the bills were measures designed to enhance the local authority. SB188B, AB47, SB1206, AB2674, and in some respects AB2395 -- described in Table 3.3 -- are all designed to extend the authority of local school districts. Even the Budget Act of 1959, AB800, is, to a large extent, designed to assist local authorities.

The major education interest groups were supportive of measures in cluster 4. Only one opposing position was registered, and that by the Department of Education on SB188B.

The bills in cluster 4 were carried by members by both parties. The opposition to these measures came mainly from senators who represented urban or highly suburbanized counties. Many of them were Democrats. However, this handful of Democrats was joined by one or two rural senators, and certain more conservative senators.

Cluster 5. The Ascription of Responsibility. The measures in cluster 5 are each concerned with the ascription of responsibility. SB186 specifies the responsibility of school district reorganization committees; AB2823 suggests responsibility to certain types of cities or counties and their school districts: AB827 makes it permissable to give out certain information about the state teachers retirement system; SB831R ascribes yet other responsibilities. The effect of these ascriptions of responsibility are to limit the freedom of the local school districts or certain authorities or individuals.

The authors of bills in cluster 5 represent both parties. There was major opposition to bills in this cluster. This opposition came from those senators who represented urban districts. However they were joined in strong force by Republicans from a variety of constituencies. It would appear that on matters of local control and the use of state authority to describe responsibility, opposition was not partisan nor a rural-urban issue. The opposition could best be described as mixed.

SENATE 1961-1962

Thirty-three roll-calls were selected for the analysis of Senate voting on education measures in 1961-62. These 33 roll-calls were taken on 30 separate measures or bills, 15 originated in the Senate and 15 in the Assembly. All Assembly bills in the selected group were passed by the Senate and ultimately signed into law. Nine of the 15 Senate measures were signed into law by the Governor, whereas one was pocket vetoed, three were lost in Senate voting, one was lost in the Senate committee and one which was passed by the Senate was ultimately lost in a Senate committee when it returned with an amendment from the Assembly. Of the 15 Senate bills selected, 11 were carried by Democrats and only four by Republicans. The 15 Assembly bills on which the selected roll-calls were taken, 12 were carried by Democrats and only three by Republicans.

TABLE 3.3

CORRELATIONS OF ASSEMBLY ROLL-CALLS ON SELECTED EDUCATION BILLS WITH OBLIQUE CLUSTER DOMAINS OF SENATE VOTING, 1959-60

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III	IV	V
Cluster 1						
AB 1176	Amends and repeals sections of Rev. & Tax Code. Increase inheritence and gift taxes, eliminates deduction for federal state taxes.	.99	.20	.47	-.06	.11
AB 1172	Imposes 3¢ tax per pack on cigarettes and 15% tax on wholesale price of other tobacco products.	.97	.22	.56	-.10	.12
AB 1171	Amends Rev. & Tax Code. Increases beer tax from 2¢ to 7¢ per gallon.	.94	.06	.26	-.15	.12
AB 1177	Reduces minimum taxable income, increases from 6 to 7 per cent tax on income over $25,000 and makes other changes in income tax provisions.	.89	.20	.48	-.12	.03
AB 1175	Increases tax rates on corporations, banks and financial corporations.	.89	.16	.42	-.14	.10
AB 1172R	(See above.)	.82	.46	.63	.16	.38
SB 899	Extends to all districts the provision for dismissal of probationary teachers for cause only, and gives every employee the right to a hearing	.66	.35	.47	-.01	.03
AB 1173	Increases state's share of pari-mutuel handle and breakage.	.59	.13	.04	.02	-.12
SB 18	Adds and repeals sections of Govt. Code. Changes definitions of conflict of interests of public officers.	-.33	.29	-.11	.25	.23
SB 33CB	Creates the Coordinating Council for Higher Education and prescribes membership and duties thereof.	-.21	.05	-.17	.19	.14

TABLE 2.3 (Continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III	IV	V
Cluster 2						
AB 1439	Exempts from liquour license prohibition existing licences in vicinity of University of San Francisco and U.C. Medical Center in San Francisco when enrollment of these institutions reaches 1000 or residents reach 500.	.38	.96	.35	.36	.35
SB 1093	Repeals various provisions re sale of alcoholic beverages within certain distances of universities and authorizes ABC Dept. to refuse issuance of licenses within immediate vicinity of such institutions.	.09	.91	.23	.44	.55
AB 1093C	(See above.)	.17	.86	.31	.37	.49
AB 1193	Provides measurement between Folsom State Prison and nearby alcoholic beverage stores be made from the entrance gate of the prison. (Concerns definition of prohibited zone for sale of alcoholic beverages in vicinity of state prison.)	.39	.75	.60	.31	.24
SB 41B	Provides that a county board of education, upon request of the county clerk, may require the election of board members to be conducted throughout the county rather than only the trustee areas.	-.05	.55	.26	.52	.17
AB 1992	Extends tenure to districts of 250 a.d.a. provides for written statement of reasons for dismissal of probationary employee upon request, such reasons to relate solely to welfare of the school and its pupils.	.06	.44	.41	.43	.05

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TABLE 3.3 (Continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III	IV	V
Cluster 3						
SB 876	Relating to the Office of the State Fair Employment Practice Commission - requires Commission to keep its principal office in Sacramento.	.56	.52	.96	.30	.02
AB 590	Increases maximum weekly benefit from $40 to $65 for unemployment insurance. Changes from $40 to $30 the increments in schedule of wages on which benefits are based where wages in a quarter are $840 or more.	.57	.29	.94	.18	.16
AB 594	Broadens provision prohibiting discrimination against citizens on basis of race or color in places of public accomodation or amusement to preclude discrimination on basis of religion, ancestry, or national origin and extends prohibition to forbid discrimination in any public or private institution or organization in rendition of professional services and with respect to purchase of real property. Changes penalty from a civil action for not less than $100 to a civil action for damages + $500.	.43	.26	.93	.26	.02
SB 597	Establishes the State Office of Planning in the Department of Finance, providing state, regional and local planning assistance.	.25	.56	.81	.49	.25
AB 91	Prohibits discrimination by employers because of race, creed, color, national origin, or ancestry.	.48	.39	.78	.02	.21
AB 2429	Permits classified employee of school district to have his sick leave and other benefits transferred if he changes school districts.	.28	.13	.60	.20	.29

TABLE 3.3 (Continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III	IV	V
AB 368	Permits governing boards to contract for services of an attorney in private practice and to pay him out of district funds.	.31	.24	.37	-.18	-.05
AB 2485	Allows governing board of school district to provide an annual contract with employees in classified services for 1-4 years, or provide for making such employees permanent subject to dismissal for cause only, rather than prohibiting any contract extending beyond the end of the next ensuing school year. Prescribes length of work week, provides compensation or compensatory time off for overtime.	.23	.13	.34	.13	-.27
AB 2299	Permits governing board of a school district to adopt rules and regulations authorizing teachers, principals and other certified personnel to administer reasonable corporal punishment to pupils when such action is deemed an appropriate corrective measure	.01	-.01	.24	-0.6	.12
SCA 20B	Authorizes issuance of state bonds totaling $300 million to be used for loans and grants to school districts for school building purposes and payment of expenses of bond issue.	-.01	.06	.15	-.10	.07

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Cluster 4

Bill No.	Bill Description	I	II	III	IV	V
AB 1538	Requires county committee to prepare and submit master plan prior to September 15, 1963. Appropriates $300,000 to State Supt. for study grants.	.13	.22	.36	.90	.07

TABLE 3.3 (Continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III	IV	V
SB 1828	Provides for creation of a union high school district public library if a majority rather than two-thirds of the voter cast are in favor of it.	-.08	.38	.26	.75	.21
AB 47	Increases maximum tax rate of unified district not maintaining a junior college by not to exceed 10¢ for each $100 of assessed value and 15¢ for those maintaining a junior college.	-.08	.30	-.10	.60	.58
AB 2395	County superintendent salary increases.	-.27	.03	.02	.57	-.41
SB 1206	Provides that local agency revenue bonds of less than $50,000 in principal may be issued without prior voter approval.	-.22	.39	.05	.56	.37
AB 2674	Chapter 1466 repealed requiring assessment equalization.	-.38	.25	-.16	.41	-.08
AB 800	Budget Act of 1959	-.38	.25	-.16	.41	-.08
SCA 25	Allows Legislature to provide for appointment or election of the county supt. of schools, rather than requiring his election at each gubernational election. Deletes language authorizing legislature to allow two or more counties to unite and elect one supt.	-.15	-.07	-.05	-.18	-.12

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TABLE 3.3 (Continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III	IV	V
Cluster 5						
SB 186	Requires county committee to submit plans for district organization by December 1, 1959, if not submitted by December 1, 1958 and if it fails to do so, permits State Board of Education to direct the Department of Education to submit such plans.	-.13	-.22	.21	.21	-.69
AB 2823	Permits a city or county, unless otherwise provided by charter, to give preference in the purchase of materials, supplies and other personal property to persons selling within the boundaries of the city of city and county to extend that the bids and prices quoted by such persons do not exceed by 5% those quoted by outside sellers.	.19	.23	.44	-.08	.69
AB 2827	Makes an exception to the law that individual records of STRS are confidential, to provide that on request of a state officer or a member of the press or radio or TV news service, such requester shall be told whether a particular person is a member of the System, the total amount of his contribution, and amount of retirement allowance he is receiving.	.00	.25	.21	.44	.62
SB 831R	Provides that jr. permit, not valid in darkness, may be issued for motor driven cycles. Provides that proximity of public transportation to residence of a minor shall not be grounds for refusal of permit.	.09	.53	.06	.26	.61

TABLE 3.3 (Continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III	IV	V
SCA 20	Requires taxation of state or county or city property acquired for a public purpose, but not used or prepared for such purpose, until actually so used.	-.19	.07	-.14	-.06	.35
AB 2160	Child care employees required to have certificate, but not eligible for retirement membership.	-.19	-.17	-.12	-.08	-.26

It was becoming quite evident during this term that the Democrats in the Senate were intent on making their distinctive mark on the state's educational policy. Once again, they introduced a bill which would have provided for county superintendents to be elected by county boards of education rather than by voters. A number of bills were concerned with the availability and regulation of educational television; and a number of others were concerned with duties and rights of teaching personnel. Perhaps the most controversial Senate bill was the famous Fisher Bill, which established a new system for the credentialing and education of teachers. This was perhaps the most major of the reforms of the system of public education in California initiated and carried and passed into law by the Democratic party. The interest groups were also very active in the Senate during this period. The Fisher Bill inevitably was the major battle ground between the established interest groups in the state and the liberal Democratic senators. It was on this particular bill that the major education interest groups lost much of their credibility in the Legislature. The California School Board's Association as well as the California State Federation of Teachers supported the bill vigorously, and consequently, gained a certain amount of influence in the Legislature for a few years to come.

The interest groups were paticularly active in terms of the selected bills. A total number of 62 positions were registered by the major education groups on the 30 selected measures. It is particularly interesting to note that the California School Board's Association took positions of either support or opposition to 23 of 33 selected bills. Predictably, measures which particularly divided the interested groups were measures such as the following: a bill requiring probationary employees in school districts to be dismissed for cause only; a bill which would provide a uniform basis for recognizing the right of public employees to join organizations of their choice and be represented by such organizations in employment relationships and negotiations; a bill which would make it mandatory to teach a foreign language in elementary schools; the establishment of a new teacher education and credentialing system; and a bill which would make it a ground for the denial of a teaching credential if the employee or prospective employee would fail to appear or refuse to answer legislative questions concerned with subversive doctrines or membership in subversive organizations. The interest groups did not divide on these issues in the same way, but at the two poles of conflict among the interest groups were the California School Board's Association and the California State Federation of Teachers. The California Teacher's Association, the California Association of School Administrators, the California School Employee's Association and the Department of Education sometimes moved to one pole and sometimes to the other. The one exception was the Fisher Bill, in which the California Federation of Teachers and the California School Board's Association formed an alliance in favor of its passage; the other organization formed the major opposition to the bill.

There are a number of observations to be made about the analysis of Senate local voting on education in 1959-60. First, the most general pattern of variance represents a partisan conflict. The tax measures sponsored by Democrats who had newly acquired control of the governorship as well as of the two houses was opposed by Senate Republicans unanimously. Second, the other general pattern of variance, highly related to cluster 1, was to be found on fair employment practices legislation. Here the opposition was not so much from one or another party but rather from the conservative wings of both parties. Third, it is interesting to note that on the partisan cluster interest groups in education are willing to take very firm positions of support for the Democratic attempt to reform the tax structure. However, on fair employment practices legislation, the major education interest groups were not willing to register open positions. Fourth, it appears that the new majority in the legislature sought to accommodate the objectives of the major interest groups although some trade off might be inferred. The objective was to gain more revenue for the state, an opportunity which the interest groups saw as obtaining more money for education. However, the fair employment practices legislation, which might have been contrary to certain interest group's goals was none the less introduced with the minimum of interest group opposition. Also, it is noteworthy that no other major substantive reform legislation in the field of education was introduced. Thus, it would appear there is some mutual ajustment which takes place between the new majority party and powerful entrenched interest groups.

It is quite apparent that the California Federation of Teachers aligned itself with the liberal Democrats in the Senate; The California School Boards Association aligned with liberal Democrats when they chose to carry legislation which would restrict the powers of teaching and administrative school personnel. The California Congress of Parents and Teachers, the California Teachers' Association, the California Association of School Administrators, and the Department of Education refused to align themselves with the actively pushed reform by the liberal Democrats. It is obvious that the established education groups were not about to align themselves with the Democratic party, nor with any faction within it.

Evaluation of the Cluster Solution

The 33 roll-calls, were reduced to four distinct patterns of variance, i.e., four variable clusters. The sum of communalities among the 33 selected roll-calls for this term was 17.29; the mean squares of raw correlations was .09, and the root mean square of raw correlation s was .30. Compared with the same statistics for the 1959-1960 Senate voting, we may infer that roll-call voting on education in 1961-62 was a somewhat less predictable in the Senate.

There are a number of reasons which might explain the lower predictability of Senate voting on education during 1961-62. First, a number of the freshman senators in 1959-60 were now formulating their own correlations and factions within the Democratic party. The freshman senators were younger, more highly educated, more liberal in their call for change, and, perhaps importantly, they represented urban or highly urbanized areas. It is possible that they were developing a countervailing force to the conditional rural oligarchy which dominated the Senate to that date. Secondly, it is to be expected that during a period of reform in a given policy area there will be a good less agreement among legislators under the direction of the suggested reforms, and the implementation of them. Consequently, there is likely to be, in a period of reform, less stability than during a period when ideologies are not so strongly challenged. Thirdly, during a period of reform in a given policy area, the interested groups may be expected to be a good deal more active in their attempts to influence the direction of change or indeed, to veto it. This was certainly the case in the California legislative system during 1961-62. All the interest groups interested in education were using the "political muscle" they had developed. The consequence of interest group influence might well be to cause legislative behavior to be somewhat less predictable, especially when there is multidirectional pressure from the interest group system. Thus, the interplay of internal political factors, ideological alternatives in the reform of education and multi directional pressures of competing interest groups could well be the reasons for somewhat lower predictability in the Senate response to education in 1961-62.

In Table 3.4 the sufficiency and generality of the four cluster solution for Senate voting in 1961-62 is shown. It should be noted that 90 per cent of the commonalities are exhausted by the four-cluster solution; the proportion of the mean square of the raw correlation matrix exhausted by four clusters is .88. Only .01 remains as a residuals correlation after the four dimensions have been factored out. The four-cluster solution, therefore, is as adequate as other solutions described earily in terms of the criteria of sufficiency.

Section B of Table 3.4 gives the statistics indicating the generality of the various clusters of roll-calls. We note that cluster 1 is by far the most general of the four clusters. It reproduces .54 of the mean square of correlations, and .42 of the commonalities. The other three clusters are much more specific forms of variance.

Sections C and D of Table 3.4 show the interrelationships of the four clusters. The highest interdomain correlation is between cluster 1 and cluster 4, .35. The four cluster solution, thus, is very adequate in that it yields four highly independent clusters, and it reproduces a very high proportion of the variance in the raw correlation matrix. Table 3.5 shows the inner structure of four clusters. The alpha reliabilities range from .85 for cluster 2 to .95 for cluster 1. The domain validities range from .92 for cluster 2 and .97 for cluster 1. Five of the 33 variables are unique.

Dimensions of Roll-Call Voting

The four clusters which were determined by analysis are not easy to interpret. Cluster 1, the most general pattern of variance, shows the least amount of dissention; cluster 3, however, which is a relatively specific form of variance, shows the highest degree of dissention. The interpretation of clusters in this analysis is somewhat by an examination of the degree of dissention. An analysis of the party membership of authors of the bills in the various clusters, an accounting of the positions taken by the major education interest groups, and an examination of the legislative history of the bills in the various clusters do not assist in their interpretation. An examination of the content of clusters 2 and 3 is useful. An attempt will now be made to name and describe clusters.

TABLE 3.4

SUFFICIENCY AND GENERALITY OF KEY CLUSTER DIMENSIONS OF SENATE ROLL-CALLS ON EDUCATION MEASURES, 1961-62, AND THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE CLUSTERS

	Cluster Dimensions			
	I	II	III	IV
A. Sufficiency of Oblique Clusters				
Proportion of sum of estimated communalities exhausted	.37	.19	.19	.15
Cumulative proportion of communalities exhausted	.37	.56	.75	.90
Cumulative proportion of mean square of raw _r_ matrix exhausted	.54	.65	.80	.88
Residual correlation remaining after each successive dimension (RMS)*	.04	.03	.02	.01
B. Generality of Oblique Clusters				
Reproducibility of mean squares of correlations	.54	.12	.16	.17
Reproducibility of communalities	.42	.20	.23	.24
C. Raw Correlations Between Cluster Scores ("factor estimates")				
I	(.95)	-.05	-.07	.32
II	-.05	(.85)	.12	.08
III	-.07	.12	(.88)	-.17
IV	.31	.08	-.17	(.87)
D. Estimated Inter-Domain Correlations				
I	1.00	-.05	-.08	.35
II	-.05	1.00	.14	.09
III	-.08	.14	1.00	-.20
IV	.35	.09	.20	1.00

TABLE 3.5

INNER STRUCTURES OF CLUSTERS OF ROLL-CALL VOTES ON EDUCATION MEASURES, SENATE, 1961-62

Variables (Bill No.)	Definers	Oblique Factor Coeff.	Commun-ality	Average R with Definers	B-Reli-ability Variables Singly	C-Reli-ability Variables Added Comul.
Cluster 1						
SB 829	D	1.10	1.22	.87		
SB 828	D	1.02	1.07	.81		
AB 2512	D	1.01	1.04	.80		
AB 1940	D	.99	.99	.78		
SB 1154	D	.65	.46	.52		
SB 1111	D	.63	.43	.50		
AB 1118	D	.61	.49	.48		
AB 873	D	.57	.33	.45		
AB 2375	D	.55	.32	.44		
AB 873 F		.42	.21	.33	.94	.94
SB 288		.37	.36	.30	.94	.94
A-Reliability = .95						
Domain Validity = .97						
Cluster 2						
SB 750	D	.91	.62	.71		
AB 156	D	.88	.59	.69		
AB 2564	D	.68	.53	.53		
AB 3110	D	.66	.54	.51		
A-Reliability = .85						
Domain Validity = .92						
Cluster 3						
A 1979 F	D	.98	.98	.72		
SB 1246	D	.76	.59	.56		
AB 337	D	.66	.60	.48		
AB 1305	D	.65	.47	.48		
SB 57	D	.63	.51	.46		
SB 1326		.44	.33	.32	.87	.87
SB 33		.40	.36	.30	.87	.87
A-Reliability = .88						
Domain Validity = .94						

TABLE 3.5 (continued)

Variables (Bill No.)	Definers	Oblique Factor Coeff.	Communality	Average R with Definers	B-Reliability Variables Singly	C-Reliability Variables Added Cumul.
Cluster 4						
SB 498	D	.77	.96	.52		
SCA 17 R	D	.73	.70	.50		
AB 161	D	.69	.57	.47		
AB 54	D	.62	.52	.43		
AB 419	D	.61	.44	.42		
SB 388		.39	.38	.27	.86	.86

A-Reliability = .87
Domain Validity = .93

Unique Variables

AB 65
SB 196
SB 946
AB 1979
SCA 17

Cluster 1. Moderately Progressive Changes in Policy. Cluster 1 contains a variety of bills which seem to have very little in common substantially. SB829 gives local school districts a little more freedom to let contracts for supplies and materials; SB828 requires the school districts to let a contract for work materials or supplies to the lowest bidder but restricts somewhat more than SB829 in the conditions of letting a contract; AB2512 allows the formation of students political clubs in high schools and junior colleges; AB1940 prescribes immunization for teachers; SB1154 authorizes state college trustees to employ legal counsel. There are a number of other defining bills in this cluster but they vary in content as much as those described. Further descriptions are given in Table 3.6.

The measures in cluster 1 are moderately progressive, incremental, and low changes in policy. As we said above, they do not stimulate much opposition in the Senate. The opposition appears to come primarily from certain older senators, particularly those who came from poor rural or poor mountain counties. Furthermore, a number of the senators in opposition to these measures were reputed to be rather "close" to Senator Donnelly, the chairman of the Education Committee.

Cluster 2. Limitations on local Authority.

The measures in cluster 2 seem to aim at a more careful delimitation of local school board authority. SB750 pertains to the assessment for cost purposes of educating children in licensed institutions; AB156 continues the policy which constricts local authority in the determination of areas for adequate construction; AB2564 is a controversial measure mandating the teaching of foreign language in elementary schools; and AB3110 prohibits school officers in placing pupils into institutions for psychological or psychiatric treatment without prior consent of parents or guardians.

The major opposition for measures in this cluster came from rural Democrats who had recently been elected to the Senate and who were formulating a new force in the Senate, a force which represented rural liberalism. The senators who were in opposition to these measures have styled themselves since as "New Deal Democrats." The great majority of this group were Democrats who took seriously the matter of individual rights as well as equity in educational policy. It should be noted that the rural Democrats in opposition to these measures were strong supporters of the Democratic governor, Edmund "Pat" Brown.

Cluster 3. Education Reforms.

Cluster 3 contains the major reform bills introduced during the 1961-62 sessions of the legislature. The famous Fisher Bill was included in this cluster as well as the controversial AB337 which required that the probationary employees of any school district could be dismissed for cause only and that no employee could be denied the right for a hearing. The bills in cluster 3 were carried by Democrats. It should be noted, also, that the California Federation of Teachers supported legislation proposed in cluster 3.

Cluster 3 contained measures which provoked major conflict in the Senate. Opposition to measures in cluster 3 came from primarily the Republicans and one or two conservative Democrats.

TABLE 3.6

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains			
		I	II	III	IV
Cluster 1					
SB 829	Allows governing board of school district with ADA of 1,000 or more to let contract for work, material or supply on the basis of the lowest submitted estimate without publishing a notice for bids if the estimate is less than 4,000 dollars, rather than less than 2,000 dollars as presently provided.	1.00	-.03	-.18	.39
SB 828	Requires school districts governing boards to let contract for work materials or supplies to the lowest responsible bidder, or to reject all bids if the contract involves expenditures of more than $2,500. Replaces present $1,000 ceiling.	1.00	-.03	-.18	.52
AB 2512	Allows formation of student political clubs by student of public high schools and junior colleges.				
AB 1940	Prohibits admission of any person to public or private elementary or secondary schools unless person has been immunized against poliomyelitis. Prescribed certain exemptions.	1.00	-.04	-.18	.32
SB 1154	Authorizes state college trustees to employ legal council other than the attorney general.	.65	.08	.03	.38
SB 1111	Eliminates from provisions requiring school district employees to submit to tuberculosis examination, language exempting adhering to faith or teachings of well recognized religions depending for healing upon prayer.	.63	-.10	.00	.05
AB 1118	Exempts from prohibition of employment of aliens by the state, counties, and the cities any specialist or expert temporarily employed in teaching.	.61	.02	.29	.17

TABLE 3.6 (Continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III	IV
AB 873	Increases age for voluntary retirement of warden or forestry member from 50 to 55. Suspends compulsory retirement provision regarding wardens and forestry members.	.57	-.07	-.09	.25
AB 2375	Provides uniform basis for recognizing right of public employees to join organizations of their own choice and be represented by such organizations in their employment relationships with public agencies.	.55	-.07	-.02	.08
AB 873 F	(See above.)				
SB 288	Companion bill to AB 48. Provides in-lieu taxes on state owned park lands.	.42	-.11	-.10	.00
SCA 17	County superintendent of schools election. Amends article 9 State Constitution providing for county superintendents of schools to be elected by county boards of education rather than by voters. Provides a four year term and that salaries be fixed by county board of education instead of by legislature.	.37	-.14	-.05	.16
SB 946	Companion Senate version of AB 2197, Hanna, extending provisions of teacher ten-year law to districts of 250 ADA or more.	-.26	-.01	-.03	.04
Cluster 2					
SB 750 C	Pertains to assessment of educating children in licensed insitutions. Removes provisions limiting to situations where the ADA of pupils in a licensed childrens institution exceed 1% of the ADA of the school district. The authority of a school district providing education to minors in such institutions to assess costs to the school districts of each childs home residence.	-.06	.91	.22	.18

TABLE 3.6 (Continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III	IV
AB 156	Extends from ninety-first day after 1961 session to ninety-first day after 1963 session the termination date of state school building aid law of 1952 the section pertaining to allocation board rules determining areas of adequate school construction.	-.04	.88	.26	.14
AB 2564	Makes English and foreign mandatory in elementary schools, also natural history or science. Deletes mandatory training in healthful living. Prescribes required courses for secondary school exclusive of grades 13 and 14.	.00	.68	.11	-.08
AB 3110	Prohibits school officers from placing a pupil in an agency or institution outside of the pupils school of attendance, for psychological or psychiatric treatment without prior consent of pupils parent or guardian.	-.07	.66	-.15	.03
Cluster 3					
AB 1979F	RE: obscenity Makes a crime sending or causing to be sent into this state for sale any obscene matter. Increases penalties for obscenity crimes. Provides that possession of either two or more copies or a particular item creates presumption of intent to distribute.	-.04	.18	.98	-.07
SB 1246	Changes terms of school district governing boards from four years to three years. Requires annual election third Tuesday of May,				

TABLE 3.6 (Continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III	IV
SB 1246 (cont.)	rather than bi-annual elections in odd numbered years on third Tuesday in April.	.08	-.19	-.76	.16
AB 337	Requires that probationary employees of any school district, rather than only those with an ADA of 85,000 or more maybe dismissed for cause only. Provides that no employee shall be denied the right to a hearing as stipulated by existing law pertaining to dismissed employees.	.00	.46	.66	-.09
AB 1305	Prohibits board to fail or refuse to interview or recomend a certificated employee for a position because of age or marital status.	-.05	-.11	.65	-.13
SB 57	Establishes new teacher credentialing system composed of five types of credentials. Prescribes requirements for credentials and services authorized thereby.	-.11	-.21	.63	-.28
SB 1326	Adds to grounds upon which issuance of credentials for the diploma may be denied: wilfull failure to appear before court on legislative committee or refusal to answer questions concerning past or present advocacy of subversive doctrines or membership in subversive organizations on grounds of possible self-incrimination.	-.19	-.01	-.44	-.25
SB 33	Allows school districts or county superintendant to acquire, construct, maintain and operate translators or other devises for relaying television signals.	.10	.25	-.40	.40
AB 1979	(See description above.)				

TABLE 3.6 (Continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III	IV
Cluster 4					
SB 498	Affects insurance code relating to titel insurers. Increases capital required to be maintained by title insurers from $100,000 to $250,000.	-.12	.53	-.08	.77
SCA 17R	(See description above, in Cluster 1)	.45	-.09	.14	.73
AB 161	Allows school districts to contract for private legal council for district litigation.	.51	.03	-.26	.69
AB 54	Specifies that expenditures of school bond procedes for a swimming pool prior to application for state school aid apportionment shall not alone render district ineligible.	-.04	-.04	-.33	.62
AB 419	Regarding property tax bills. Requires county tax bill be itemized to show tax rates or amounts levied for county, city, and district purposes.	.39	-.13	-.15	.61
Sb 38B	Fixes maximum annual salary of Chancellor of California State Colleges at $36,000, but no less than $30,000. Fixes max. annual salary of Director of Coordinating Council of Higher Educ. at $30,000 and not less than $25,000.	-.13	-.10	.23	.39
AB 65	Extends privilege to keep secret their source of news information to persons connected with or employed by press associations, TV, reporters, etc.	-.14	-.15	-.03	.24
SB 196	Amends Sec 8857. Authorizes governing boards to own or lease televidion transmitting facilities or purchase broadcasting time for instructional use or teachers' in-service education services.	-.07	-.12	-.11	-.25

Cluster 4. Enhancement of Local School Authorities.

Cluster 4 is, in many respects, very difficult to interpret. Again the bills range over a variety of policy areas. However, it appears that each enhances the authority of local school districts. SB498 gives local school districts greater protection; SCA17 gives the county boards the right to appoint superintendents at the county level; AB161 allows school districts to contract for private legal council; SB54 allows school districts to spend money for the construction of swimming pools even though they are dependent to some extent on the state school financial aid.

Major opposition to the legislation opposed in cluster 4 came from conservative Democrats and Republicans who represented the Central Valley counties. Once again, Senator Donnelly, chairman of the Senate Education Committee, was a leader in the opposition in these measures. The interest groups took varying positions on these bills in cluster 4 seemingly without discernible effect on Senate voting.

In conclusion it may be observed that the Senate during 1961-62 was somewhat less predictable in its response to educational legislation than it had been previously.

CHAPTER IV

THE PARTISAN POLITICS OF EDUCATION
1963-1966

INTRODUCTION

Starting with the special budget session of 1962, the California State Legislature took on a rather dramatically different character than it had had in the previous decade. The reapportionment of the Assembly was a major item on the agenda of the Assembly which met in 1962. In September of 1961, Jesse Unruh had been elected Speaker of the Assembly. Using reapportionment as a lever to gain support for his candidacy to the Speakership, Mr. Unruh was able to introduce both a partisan organization of the Assembly and a high degree of party discipline on policy matters. In the State Senate the level of partisanship was also increased. However, in this well integrated "private" club there was little public drama connected with intensified partisanship. Certainly, the external aspects of Senate structure appeared to change very little. However, the younger, Democratic senators who had been elected in the late 1950's had acquired a considerable amount of seniority and were, consequently, making their impact on Senate procedures and policy.

In this chapter a brief sketch of developments between 1963 and 1966 in the State Legislature will be given. This chapter is intended to give context to the roll-call analyses of education measures which follow in subsequent chapters.

The Partisan Assembly

In 1961 it became apparent that Speaker Ralph Brown would retire from the Assembly to accept an appointment to the District Court of Appeals. Jesse Unruh, a very aggressive assemblyman who had been elected to the Assembly in 1954, and who had by this time worked his way up to the chairmanship of the very powerful Ways and Means Committee, was determined to become the next Speaker. In the early summer of 1961, the Speaker pro tempore, Carlos Bee, became a candidate in the Speakership race. Unruh was not about to let Carlos Bee become the "acting Speaker" between the time that Ralph Brown retired in July of 1961 and the next sitting of the Assembly. Very successfully, Unruh backed a rules change which would require an immediate caucus of the Assembly to elect a new Speaker upon the retirement of Ralph Borwn.

During the summer another assemblyman became a candidate for the Speakership. Gordon Winton, the representative for Merced and Madera Counties, actively campaigned for support from his colleagues for the election to the Speakership. When the caucus of the Assembly met in September to elect a new Speaker, Unruh was elected with the support of 44 Democrats and 13 Republicans. Winton could not even get himself nominated.

The new Speaker proceeded to move immediately to a partisan organization of the Assembly and the development of a very competent staff of assistants. He was deeply committed to a professionalization of the Legislature and began to streamline its procedures, its facilities, and its policy resources. The rate at which legislative staff and committee staff increased during the first year of the Speakership marked, to say the least, a dramatic change in the conception of the role of the Legislature.

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On the agenda of the 1962 Assembly was the very difficult question of reapportionment. The Democrats were in the majority and took major responsibility for redrawing boundaries for the Assembly districts. The attempt on the part of the Democrats was, of course, to ensure a very substantial majority for themselves after the next election. The number of urban core districts was somewhat reduced, as was the number of rural districts, while the number of suburban districts was substantially increased. It was in the suburban areas that the major population growth had taken place since the 1951 apportionment. Perhaps the most significant feature of the 1962 apportionment was the increase in the number of lower middle-class suburban districts and lower class urban districts. It was in these areas that the Democrats had done extremely well in previous elections. They had failed in the lower middle class exurban districts as well as in the upper middle class suburban districts, but they had been successful in the previous three elections in getting Democrats elected in lower and working class districts. In fact, their success was almost total in these areas.

When the 1962 election was over, the Democrats had 52 members in the Assembly and the Republicans 28. Of the total number of 80 assemblymen elected in 1962, 32 were new members, most of them young, most of them well educated, and most of them having professional occupations.

Supported now by a majority of 52 to 28, Mr. Unruh appointed only four Republicans to committee chairmanships. He served notice that he intended to organize the Assembly on partisan lines and that he was committed to a complete destruction of the Hiram Johnson legacy of nonpartisanship. When the Republicans, though a small minority, organized effectively to oppose the Governor's tax and budget policy, Mr. Unruh, who was responsible for seeing to it that at least some of the Governor's major policies were passed in the Assembly, was frustrated. Angered by the Republican position time and again, Unruh promised to destroy the unity of the Republican minority. First, he locked up the Assembly for what is probably the longest continuous session in Assembly history in order to pass the budget bill. Putting a "call" on the house is a legitimate parlimentary maneuver in which members of the house, under force of law enforcement, must be present to consider the business at hand. Some members of the Assembly were arrested by the Highway Patrol on their way to their homes or enroute to perform certain legislative duties and brought back to the Assembly for this session. The budget bill was finally approved after a 24-hour continuous session.

The next day, Mr. Unruh moved immediately to make certain changes in Assembly rules. First, he wanted the Speaker, henceforth, to be elected by the caucus of the majority party. Second, he wished all committee chairmen and vice-chairmen to be members of the majority party. On the floor of the house he proceeded to move these changes in the rules of the Assembly. They were passed, with the immediate effect of eliminating all but one of the Republicans as chairmen of standing committees. (these rules were rescinded in the opening of the 1964 session.)

During the course of the 1963 session, it was evident that Mr. Unruh was firmly in control of the Assembly. By 1965, however, he began to relax his control somewhat. The election of 1964 had returned 33 Republicans to the Assembly, five more than in the previous session. However, this was not the main reason for the relaxation of partisan and central control. Mr. Unruh had developed a public image of being a "political boss" an image which he did not prefer to have. Although the Republicans did not receive any more chairmanships of standing committees, their bills were given a more adequate hearing in the committees and on the floor of the house. Moreover, Mr. Unruh had developed means by which he could maintain his power without the visible negative effects. He was an excellent fund raiser and could distribute these funds to his political friends running for public office.

Once Mr. Unruh had organized the Assembly according to his goals, and once he had developed more functional procedures for the Assembly, he proceeded to enmesh himself in a variety of salient policy issues. In 1964, he became deeply involved in certain major educational reforms. His involvement in these reforms will be mentioned after a brief description of developments in the Senate during this period.

The Anguished Senate

During the period 1963-1966 no events as dramatic as those in the Assembly occurred in the Senate. Perhaps the major pressure on the Senate during these years was the inevitable reapportionment required by Baker vs. Carr. The reapportionment of the California State Senate in 1966, the events leading to this reapportionment, and the gnawing pressure accruing from the realization that reapportionment was required, had a major impact on the Senate. Two additonal factors anguished the Senate greatly during this time. First, there was the struggle between the Senate and the Assembly for policy initiative, an initiative gained by the Senate during the 1950's when the Assembly defaulted in this respect (this was largely a struggle between Mr. Unruh and his coalition and the Senate). Second, there was growing disaffection in many Senators' constituencies resulting from the urban emphasis in Governor Brown's program and in the legislation initiated by the Assembly. The great majority of Senate constituencies were rural -- only eight Senate districts could be considered urban, eight more might be considered exurban, and 24 were completely rural. These forces or pressures transformed the Senate into an anguished house during the years 1963-66.

The leadership in the Senate did not change during this period. Senator Burns remained President pro tempore, Senator Miller remained chairman of the powerful Senate Finance Committee, Senator Donnelly remained chairman of the Education Committee, and Senator Gibson remained chairman of the Governmental Efficiency Committee. The changes which occurred in the distribution of power were subtle and, for the most part, hidden away from public view. The newly elected senators -- Lagomarsino, Schrade, Cologne, Bradley, all Republicans, and Lunardi and Rees, Democrats -- did not make much of an impact on either policy or structure. As has been mentioned earlier, the seniority system placed these new senators essentially in the observer role rather than in the participant role. However, the liberal senators who had been elected in the elections of 1954, 1956, and 1958 -- O'Sullivan, Teale, Rodda, Farr, and McAteer

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were making their influence felt primarily in the kinds of legislation they introduced. These senators, among others, were intensely interested in policy questions, in programs of legislation and their development, and in larger ideological problems and problems of governance. If there had been a more partisan basis for the organization of the Senate, these men would unquestionably have been intense partisans. As it was, however, they formed only a loose coalition of "New Deal" Democrats under the leadership of Senator Miller. It was the Miller coalition which did constant battle with the Unruh Democrats in the Assembly, as well as with the Governor himself.

The Senate was not particularly successful in its battles with the Unruh forces in the Assembly on a range of policy issues dealing with taxation problems, budget allocations, and substantive policy issues, such as compensatory education and school district reorganization. Many of these Senators became "lame ducks" during 1965 and 1966 when the reapportionment issue was forced upon them. The rising tide of Republican sentiment in many of the rural areas as well as in certain of the exurban counties, further discouraged and depressed the liberal Democratic senators.

Educational Reform and Its Aftermath

In Chapter III we traced some of the major educational reforms passed by the Legislature during 1961. Large scale changes in policy seem to carry with them a certain amount of backlash. During 1963-66, one of the major chores of the legislature was to try to hold the line on the reforms it had initiated and struggled for in the previous terms. The Legislature seemed to adopt two strategies on behalf of this objective: (1) it made minor modifications in the reform legislation passed in the previous term, a kind of reverse incrementalism; and (2) it attempted to redirect the attention of those supporting the backlash movement by introducing additional major and therefore controversial reforms.

The modified appeasement or reverse incremental strategy can be seen in the history of such major reforms passed in 1961 as the Fisher Bill, a bill reforming teacher credentials, the bill requiring the introduction of foreign language teaching in the elementary schools, and the bill requiring state-wide testing. The second strategy of introducing additional reform legislation is evident in such measures as Mr. Unruh's bill requiring a major school district reorganization effort in the state, and various major measures which would change the curriculum to accommodate the so-called culturally deprived students from lower-class areas. It should be noted that this latter strategy tends to favor the interests of urban districts rather than rural districts. This is not a generalization; it is simply an accommodation of the Legislature to pressing educational issues of the time.

There were certain other major issues which the Legislature faced in the area of education during this period. One of these, the famous Winton BIll, proposed modified negotiation rights for teachers. This measure was sponsored by the California Teachers Association and was vigorously opposed by the California Federation of Teachers. This bill may be taken as a third strategy which the Legislature adopted in attempting to cope with the reform backlash. In this case, the largest education interest group in the state was accommodated with a modified but nonetheless controversial piece of legislation. It gave the C.T.A. a certain amount of self-assurance, assurance that its legislative creditability had not been totally demolished in the previous reform era. The fact that the C.T.A. initiated and sponsored this particular measure also was an indication of the fact that it was attempting to accommodate its objectives and legislative strategies to the increased level of partisanship. This accommodation was essential but was very slow in coming.

The Education Interest Groups

The education interest groups had, by and large, been thoroughly beaten by the Legislature in 1961. The C.T.A. had suffered a major defeat with the passing of the Fisher Bill. The Federation of Teachers had enjoyed certain favors from the Legislature during the sessions of 1961 and 1962 and continued to gain strength not only in the Legislature but also in local school districts during this time. The California School Boards Association not only changed leadership but shifted its legislative program sharply to the "right," i.e., its program became distinctly conservative. The California Association of School Administrators increasingly distinguished itself from the C.T.A. program and became an autonomous organization with distinctive policy objectives. The California School Employees Association became another force in the legislative system during this period, with its own legislative program and a highly effective legislative advocate. The California State Department of Education, now under the leadership of Dr. Max Rafferty who had been elected in 1962, became a much more visible influence in California politics.

During 1963-66, there was little or no unity among the interest groups. Each worked on policy independently of the others. The tradition of a coordinated approach to legislation had been abandoned when the legislature charted its own course in the field of education during 1959-1962. The interest groups were in a chaotic state, and this had very definite consequences for legislative behavior in education. Many legislators decried the fact that education should be represented by "so many voices." They were confused as to which interest group was the most credible and spoke with the greatest amount of authority and support from the education sector. To a large extent this chaos was a consequence of the reform passed in 1961; however, to a large extent it was also the result of some internal changes in the Legislature, namely, the intensified partisanship.

In summary, the following developments characterize the legislative system during the period 1963-66: (1) an increased level of partisanship, visible in the Assembly and less so in the Senate; (2) a high degree of centralized control in each of the houses of the Legislature; (3) a fierce struggle for power between the two houses, primarily between the Senate Democrats under the leadership of Senator Miller and an Assembly coalition of Democrats led by Speaker Unruh; (4) a focus on urban issues in the field of education and an attempt to hold the line on reforms passed earlier; (5) an uncoordinated, disparate, and conflictive interest group system in the area of education. An attempt will be made in the following sections to examine roll-call voting on education in this context.

THE ASSEMBLY, 1963-1964

Seventy-eight Assembly roll-calls on education measures were selected for the sessions of 1963 and 1964. Fourteen of these 78 roll-calls were concurrency votes, i.e., votes taken in the Assembly on measures which had been amended by the Senate. The selected roll-calls were taken on 69 bills, nine were Senate bills, and 60 were Assembly bills. Of these 69 bills, four were vetoed by the Governor, three were pocket-vetoed by the Governor, two were constitutional amendments which were filed with the Secretary of State, 23 were lost in the Senate committee, and five were voted down on the floor of the house.

The bills on which the selected roll-calls were taken covered a very wide variety of issues. Indeed, they covered the whole range of education. Perhaps the major issues represented by the selected measures were school employee rights and perquisites, school district reorganization, school curriculum, compensatory education, and, of course, school finance. The policy agenda did not contain very much that was new.

The interest groups were particularly active during these sessions despite the fact they had been badly beaten during the previous sessions. The major education interest groups took positions of support or opposition on 59 of the 69 selected measures. There was, despite the lack of coordination among the interest groups, wide-spread agreement on the issues which came up for a vote on the Assembly floor. More specifically, there was wide-spread agreement among the major groups -- including the California Congress of Parents and Teachers, the California School Boards Association, the California Teachers Association, the California Federation of Teachers, the California Association of School Administrators, the California Association of School Employees and the Department of Education -- on the following issues: increase in the minimum annual salary of credential teachers, waiving non-resident tuition fees for teachers enrolled to fulfill credential requirements, bereavement leave for school employees, the administrative separation of junior colleges from elementary and secondary school districts, increases in state aid to education, revision of school district reorganization procedures, decentralization of the preparation of courses of study, reduction of the two-thirds vote required for school district indebtedness to a majority, the development of a program of compensatory education, and the relaxation of age as a prerequisite to entry into the first grade of elementary school.

There were several kinds of conflict in the interest groups on the issues which were selected for the analysis below. The conflict between the employee groups and the administrative groups was evident on measures which were designed to give teachers leaves of absence under certain circumstances, which would bring child care center personnel into the merit system, and which would increase the minimum teacher wage to $5000 per annum. There was a good deal of conflict among the interest groups on state vs. local control issues. Specifically the groups disagreed on such measures as increasing state aid for reducing class size and school district unification, reducing the freedom of school districts with an average daily attendance of less than 900 with respect to supplementary purchases, the requirements for the state approval of plans for construction and alteration of school buildings, giving increased discretion to individual school districts on foreign language study, and increasing the maximum tax rate permitted for adult education programs. The State Department of Education and the California Association of School Administrators typically took a state orientation; the California School Boards Association Typically favored local freedom and discretion. The teacher associations vacillated.

The third type of conflict discernible from the positions taken by the various education interest groups was minor in importance. It is a conflict between a radical as opposed to a more traditional approach to certain kinds of problems. Typically, this kind of conflict was between the State Federation of Teachers and the other groups. The measures on which this kind of interest group conflict occurred had to do with teacher authority and disciplinary rights, and the right of school districts to join national organizations. It is very likely that this kind of conflict was fairly pervasive among the interest groups during 1963-64, but that those issues on which this conflict occurred never came out of the Assembly Education Committee.

We turn now to an evalution and an interpretation of the results of the cluster analysis of these 78 roll-calls.

Evaluation of the Cluster Solution

Despite the fact that there were 32 freshmen assemblymen during this term, the sum of communalities on the selected roll-calls is very high, 34.57. Also, the root mean squares of raw correlations is .29, another indication that roll-call voting during this term was highly predictable despite the low level of legislative integration. Perhaps, the centralization of control in the Assembly and the definite organization of this house supplement those processes toward integration formerly left uncontrolled. Five dimensions of roll-call voting were discovered in the analysis of the correlation matrix among the 78 roll-calls. Table 4.1 shows the sufficiency of this five dimension solution, the generality of the key cluster dimensions and the interrelationships among them. We note that 81% of the communalities are exhausted by the solution, and that 88% of the mean squares of the raw correlation matrix are exhausted. After the fifth dimension, the residual correlation reamaining is .09. The fact that this solution could not be improved upon may be taken as evidence that the central control of a legislature and the discipline exerted in a partisan house, are not sufficient for immediate integration of new members into their roles as legislators.

In examining sections B and D in Table 4.1 we find that the most general dimension is cluster 1. Cluster 1 is able to reproduce 67% of the mean squares of correlations among the 78 roll-calls. Cluster 5, which is very highly correlated with cluster 1, reproduces 47%. The most specific cluster is cluster 2. The others, clusters 3, 4, and 5, increase in generality as their correlations with cluster 1 increase. In examining the estimated inter-domain correlation it is quite evident that the clusters are not independent. The highest inter-domain correlation is between cluster 1 and cluster 5, which is .76. The lowest inter-domain correlation is

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TABLE 4.1

SUFFICIENCY AND GENERALITY OF KEY CLUSTER DIMENSIONS OF ASSEMBLY ROLL CALLS ON EDUCATION MEASURES, 1963-1964, AND THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE CLUSTERS

	Cluster Dimensions I	 II	 III	 IV	 V
A. Sufficiency of Oblique Clusters					
Proportion of sum of estimated communalities exhausted	.44	.07	.11	.12	.07
Cumulative proportion or communalities exhausted	.44	.51	.62	.74	.81
Cumulative proportion of mean square of raw r matrix exhausted	.78	.79	.82	.87	.88
Residual correlation remaining after each successive dimension (RMS)*	.14	.13	.12	.11	.09
B. Generality of Oblique Clusters					
Reproducibility of mean squares of correlations	.67	.05	.28	.40	.47
Reproducibility of communalities	.53	.14	.34	.41	.45
C. Raw Correlations Between Cluster Scores ("factor estimates")					
I	(.96)	.28	.49	.63	.70
II	.28	(.86)	-.06	.19	.17
III	.49	-.06	(.87)	.46	.41
IV	.63	.19	.46	(.93)	.57
V	.70	.17	.41	.57	(.89)
D. Estimated Inter-domain Correlations					
I	1.00	.30	.53	.67	.76
II	.30	1.00	-.07	.21	.19
III	.53	-.07	1.00	.51	.46
IV	.67	.21	.51	1.00	.63
V	.76	.19	.46	.63	1.00

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between cluster 2 and cluster 3. The most general dimension, cluster 1, and the most specific dimension, cluster 2, do not overlap to any great extent. But there is a very considerable overlap between cluster 1 and clusters 3, 4, and 5. This overlap requires interpretation.

Table 4.2 presents the analysis of the inner structure of the five clusters. The most noteworthy feature of the inner structure is the relatively high reliabilities of each of the dimensions and the domain validities. The lowest alpha reliability is .86; the lowest domain validity is .93. Once again, the most specific variance is the least reliable and valid dimension of roll-call voting.

Although the cluster solution exhausts only 88% of the communalities among the roll-call votes, the internal structure of the dimensions or patterns of roll-call voting uncovered in the analysis is highly satisfactory. In other words, for the most part, the response of the Assembly to education issues was quite well structured during 1963-64.

Table 4.2 also lists those variables which had a communality value of less than .20 with one or another of the dimensions. There are 18 unique roll-calls, seven of which are concurrency votes. Apparently, the Senate's amendments to a given measure tend to make the response of the Assembly somewhat less predictable than would otherwise be the case. The Senate has some degree of influence over certain assemblymen. This is particularly the case when a real delegation develops in the Legislature encompassing both senators and assemblymen. This was the case for legislative representatives from San Diego County and Kern County. The fact that such a high percentage of the unique roll-calls are concurrency votes seems to suggest that there are interesting inter-house relationships which need to be explored.

Dimensions of Roll-Call Voting

Table 4.3 shows the correlation of roll-calls on various bills with each of the oblique cluster domains. In this chapter, as in the previous two chapters, we will again attempt to interpret each of the dimensions or clusters on the basis of the authorship of bills in a given cluster, interest group position on the bills in a given cluster, the content of these bills, and when necessary, an examination of the distribution of the roll-calls themselves.

Cluster 1: Partisanship. The first cluster of roll-calls were taken on measures on which the parties divided. The Democrats supported all those measures which are not reflected and the Republicans opposed them; the Republicans supported all those measures which are reflected in Table 4.3 and opposed all the others. Interest group positions made no discernible difference on the distribution of the vote on the measures in cluster 1.

It is interesting to note the kinds of issues on which the parties divided. First, they divided on tax and budget measures. Second, the parties divided on selected public employee issues, particularly those pertaining to the political rights of public employees and those pertaining

TABLE 4.2

INNER STRUCTURES OF CLUSTERS OF ROLL-CALL VOTES ON EDUCATION MEASURES, ASSEMBLY, 1963-64

Variables (Bill No.)	Definers	Oblique Factor Coeff.	Communality	Average R with Definers	B-Reliability Variables Singly	C-Reliability Variables Added Cumul.
Cluster 1						
AB 1950	D	.92	.87	.76		
AB 800	D	.91	.84	.76		
SB 4 B	D	.91	.84	.75		
AB 2947 C	D	.91	.82	.75		
AB 2280	D	.86	.83	.72		
AB 2843	D	-.80	.69	.67		
AB 1662	D	.78	.68	.64		
SB 4 FB	D	.76	.66	.63		
AB 1663	D	.74	.59	.61		
AB 114	D	.73	.63	.61		
ACA 29		.73	.63	.61	.97	.97
ACA 5		.66	.47	.55	.96	.96
AB 846		.66	.53	.55	.96	.97
AB 1079		-.57	.40	.47	.96	.96
ACA 9		.56	.37	.47	.96	.96
AB 145 B		.45	.29	.38	.96	.96
AB 1238		-.44	.25	.37	.96	.96
AB 957		.43	.24	.36	.96	.96
AB 91		.37	.29	.31	.96	.96

A-Reliability = .96
Domain Validity = .98

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Variables (Bill No.)	Definers	Oblique Factor Coeff.	Communality	Average R with Definers	B-Reliability Variables Singly	C-Reliability Variables Added Cumul.
Cluster 2						
SB 60 FB	D	1.10	1.24	.77		
SB 60 B	D	1.07	1.17	.75		
AB 57	D	-.35	.20	.24		
AB 635 C	D	.29	.16	.20		
AB 1851 C		.27	.23	.19	.83	.83

A-Reliability = .86
Domain Validity = .93

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Variables (Bill No.)	Definers	Oblique Factor Coeff.	Communality	Average R with Definers	B-Reliability Variables Singly	C-Reliability Variables Added Cumul.
Cluster 3						
AB 2006	D	.75	.60	.51		
AB 2712	D	.72	.55	.49		
SB 53 FB	D	.69	.52	.47		
AB 1890	D	.67	.54	.46		
AB 182 B	D	.67	.50	.45		
SB 723	D	.66	.59	.44		

TABLE 4.2 (continued)

Variables (Bill No.)	Definers	Oblique Factor Coeff.	Commun-ality	Average R with Definers	B-Reli-ability Variables Singly	C-Reli-ability Variables Added Comul.
SB 53 B		.65	.51	.44	.89	.89
AB 313	D	.58	.49	.39		
AB 1853		.51	.37	.35	.88	.89
SCA 9		.51	.31	.34	.88	.90
ACA 21		.50	.50	.34	.88	.89
AB 188		-.44	.37	.30	.88	.90

A-Reliability = .87
Domain Validity = .94

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Cluster 4

Variables (Bill No.)	Definers	Oblique Factor Coeff.	Commun-ality	Average R with Definers	B-Reli-ability Variables Singly	C-Reli-ability Variables Added Comul.
SB 115	D	.85	.74	.68		
AB 2569	D	.85	.73	.68		
SB 12 B	D	.83	.72	.67		
AB 1000	D	.83	.73	.66		
AB 419 C	D	.80	.67	.64		
AB 2540		.76	.71	.61	.97	.94
AB 120	D	.72	.54	.58		
AB 1566	D	.71	.54	.57		
AB 69 B		.57	.40	.45	.93	.94
AB 2339		.43	.29	.34	.92	.93
AB 703 C		-.35	.28	.28	.92	.93
AB 1000 F		.21	.28	.17	.92	.92

A-Reliability = .93
Domain Validity = .96

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Cluster 5

Variables (Bill No.)	Definers	Oblique Factor Coeff.	Commun-ality	Average R with Definers	B-Reli-ability Variables Singly	C-Reli-ability Variables Added Comul.
AB 856	D	.80	.80	.52		
AB 37 B	D	.79	.71	.51		
AB 64		.75	.67	.49	.90	.90
AB 590C	D	.72	.56	.47		
AB 1663 C	D	.68	.59	.44		
AB 375	D	.67	.54	.43		
AB 590	D	.62	.45	.40		
AB 181	D	.55	.37	.36		
AB 1545		.53	.30	.34	.89	.91
AB 1722		.52	.40	.34	.89	.91
AB 1853	D	.51	.37	.33		
AB 2259	D	.49	.31	.32		

TABLE 4.2 (continued)

Variables (Bill No.)	Definers	Oblique Factor Coeff.	Communality	Average R with Definers	B-Reliability Variables Singly	C-Reliability Variables Added Comul.
AB 800 C		-.48	.27	.31	.89	.91
AB 145 CB		-.47	.45	.31	.89	.91

A-Reliability = .89
Domain Validity = .94

Unique Variables

AB 579
AB 658
AB 977
AB 1374
AB 2488 C
SB 12 FB
AB 579 C
AB 888 C
AB 1223
AB 1403
AB 2847 C
SB 1072
AB 635 C
AB 889
AB 1229
AB 2027
AB 2941 C
SCR 24 B

TABLE 4.3

CORRELATIONS OF ASSEMBLY ROLL-CALLS ON SELECTED EDUCATION BILLS WITH OBLIQUE CLUSTER DOMAINS OF ASSEMBLY VOTING, 1963-64

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains				
		I	II	III	IV	V
Cluster 1						
AB 1950	Pertains to tax exemptions for gifts.	.92	.25	.45	.58	.58
AB 800	Provides "austerity" Budget Act of 1963	.91	.28	.45	.58	.62
SB 4 B	Augments the skeleton budget of the General Session.	.91	.24	.39	.63	.66
AB 2947 C	Governs political activities of public employees.	.91	.27	.48	.63	.70
AB 2280	Increases salary of various state officers.	.86	.25	.53	.41	.54
AB 2843	Provides for workshop attendance by school board members-elect.	-.80	-.32	-.29	-.50	-.52
AB 1662	Creates Local Agencies Formation Commission whose function is to approve of incorporations of cities and special districts.	.78	.30	.39	.65	.74
SB 4 FB	(See SB 4 B above.)	.76	.15	.49	.71	.59
AB 1663	Creates Coordinating Council on Urban Policy to investigate problems of urban development.	.74	.18	.44	.47	.68
AB 114	Provides for leaves of absence for teachers elected to the Legislature.	.73	.28	.49	.39	.67
ACA 29	Requires 60% vote rather than 2/3 vote for passage of bonds.	.73	.17	.64	.62	.56
ACA 5	Permits school district indebtedness for capital outlay purposes with a majority vote rather than 2/3 vote.	.66	.21	.50	.51	.53
AB 846	Authorizes 1-year leave for teachers preparing foreign language instruction in elementary school.	.66	.21	.45	.31	.59
AB 1079	Pertains to the teaching of foreign language to all students who can benefit by it.	-.57	-.31	-.42	-.34	-.48

TABLE 4.3 (continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains				
		I	II	III	IV	V
ACA 9	Deletes requirement that proceeds of lands granted to the State by federal government shall remain a perpetual fund.	.56	.24	.42	.36	.49
AB 145 B	Grants additional monies to school districts; increases foundation programs; makes provisions for class size and unification.	.45	.03	.43	.25	.42
AB 1238	Provides a 2-year extension for submission of school district organization master plans to the State Board of Education.	-.44	-.11	-.40	-.28	-.29
AB 957	Permits financing of out-door education from override tax in selected types of districts.	.43	.21	.21	.15	.36
AB 91	Pertains to age limits for issuance of driver's license.	.37	-.08	.29	.21	.08
AB 658	Requires Regents of U.C. to report to Governor and Legislature on salaries, etc.	.38	.12	.19	.27	.17
SB 1072	Defines value of motion pictures for property taxation.	-.29	-.09	-.18	-.22	-.24
AB 2027	Provides for physical fitness tests in testing program.	-.24	-.04	-.13	-.15	-.21
AB 1223	Extends to 1967 the deadline for submission of county master plans of district organization.	.21	-.20	.03	.04	.14
Cluster 2						
SB 60 FB	Pertains to revenues from tidelands and submerged lands granted by the State to the City of Long Beach.	.28	1.10	.01	.14	.14
SB 60 B	(See above.)	.28	1.07	.02	.14	.15

TABLE 4.3 (continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III	IV	V
AB 57	Prevents licentiate (credentialed personnel) prosecuted for and absolved from public offense from being subject to disciplinary action by local governmental authority on same charge.	-.28	-.35	.10	-.13	-.20
AB 635 C	Extends period for application and approval of junior college district tax relief grants.	.01	.29	-.11	.18	.05
AB 1851 C	Provides for preparation of courses of study by district governing board for grades 7 through 12.	-.10	.27	.10	.13	-.08
AB 889	Pertains to transit districts in Alameda and Contra Costa counties.	-.08	-.22	-.18	-.18	-.18
SCR 24 B	Commends Regents of U.C., Trustees of Calif. State Colleges and the Coordinating Council for Higher Education for initiating plans for year-around academic programs.	.12	.19	.03	.15	.04
AB 2941 C	Permits hiring of aliens as schoolbus drivers.	-.05	-.17	-.07	.06	-.02
Cluster 3						
AB 2005	Creates Dept. of General Services; includes functions of Dept. of Finance, Dept. of Public Works, Sec. of State and State Fire Marshall.	.51	.08	.75	.50	.39
AB 2712	Gives teachers disciplinary rights without governing board interference.	.28	-.15	.72	.34	.30
SB 53 FB	Pertains to state officers and their compensation. Makes appropriation.	.44	.13	.69	.38	.42
AB 1890	Provides for permanent expulsion of public school pupil who intentionally inflicts corporal injury on a schoolteacher.	.46	-.17	.67	.30	.45
AB 182 B	Allows for loans from various funds to State School Building Aid Fund to cover interim needs.	.43	.08	.67	.51	.37

TABLE 4.3 (continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains				
		I	II	III	IV	V
SB 723	Permits kindergarten child, of at least 5 years of age, to enter first grade if ready for first grade work.	.08	-.02	.66	.11	.16
SB 53 B	(See SB 53 F B above.)	.55	.12	.65	.40	.51
AB 313	Permits district board to join national organization.	.32	-.27	.58	.27	.10
AB 1853	Increases maximum tax rate for adult education by 10¢.	.42	.11	.51	.41	.51
SCA 9	Abolishes School Land Fund.	.38	.14	.51	.25	.33
ACA 21	Exempts specified water rights owned by a public agency from property taxation.	.12	.02	.50	-.13	-.02
AB 188	Reduces a.d.a. to 900 or less of school districts required to follow county board rules in supply purchases.	-.41	-.28	-.44	-.31	-.15
AB 1229	Allows display of flashing amber light by slow-moving distance-measuring Los Angeles district vehicle.	.14	-.09	.25	.01	-.04
AB 888 C	Pertains to public school support proposal presented by State Dept. of Educ. at the request of the State Board of Education.	-.05	.02	-.20	.09	-.08
SB 12 FB	Provides for financing the public schools over the next 2 years.	-.05	.02	.16	-.16	-.01
AB 2847 C	Prohibits public agency from denying use of park, school or playground to organization of aged persons.	-.09	-.03	-.10	.04	.00
Cluster IV						
SB 115	Authorizes programs of compensatory education for culturally disadvantaged minors; establishes Office of Consultant on Compensatory Education; authorizes state-district agreement on grants.	.49	.16	.40	.85	.53

TABLE 4.3 (continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III	IV	V
AB 2569	Pertains to unemployment compensation.	.62	.21	.40	.85	.54
SB 12 B	Provides for financing the public schools over the next two years (see prior).	.51	.16	.39	.83	.42
AB 1000	Pertains to financial support of public schools.	.60	.17	.42	.83	.43
AB 419 C	Pertains to private trade schools.	.58	.19	.35	.80	.60
AB 2540	Pertains to medical assistance.	.65	.22	.65	.76	.51
AB 120	Brings child care center personnel under merit system.	.45	.13	.46	.72	.43
AB 1566	Pertains to state employment.	.48	.15	.42	.71	.57
AB 69 B	Provides a minimum annual salary of $5,000 for credentialed teachers.	.56	.21	.36	.57	.54
AB 2339	Revises provision relating to proportionate reduction in equalization aid when total amount provided for basic state aid and equalization aid is less than the total of the allowances computed. Reductions to be computed for school districts in direct proportion to district aid factor and inverse proportion to equalization aid allowance.	.13	.19	.06	.43	.28
AB 703 C	Provides for a separate board for a detached junior college district.	-.20	.11	-.08	-.35	-.00
AB 1000 F	(See AB 1000 above.)	-.16	-.09	-.19	.21	-.02
AB 579	Waives non-resident tuition fees for teachers enrolled at the university or a state college to fulfill credential requirements.	.00	-.06	.02	.25	.18
AB 2488 C	Pertains to vocational eduction.	.09	.15	.10	.19	.06
AB 579 C	(See above.)	-.09	-.01	-.01	-.10	.07

TABLE 4.3 (continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains				
		I	II	III	IV	V
Cluster V						
AB 856	Repeals present provisions proscribing political activities of county and city employees. Provides that no local agency shall limit participation of employees in political activities during their off-duty hours.	.74	.23	.26	.72	.80
AB 37 B	Fixes maximum general fund tax rates for school districts.	.42	.12	.34	.50	.79
AB 64	Pertains to aid to needy families. Changes "needy children" to "aid to families with dependent children."	.70	.22	.60	.57	.75
AB 590 C	Provides program of state grants to improve and extend local library service.	.49	.21	.19	.46	.72
AB 1663 C	Creates Coordinating Council on Urban Policy to investigate urban development problems.	.47	.20	.12	.18	.68
AB 375	Provides same foreign language course requirement for grades 7 and 8 of junior high school as for grades 7 and 8 of elementary school.	.55	.02	.48	.32	.67
AB 590	(See AB 590 C above.)	.51	.22	.11	.44	.62
AB 181	Provides a minimum annual salary of $5,000 for credentialed teachers.	.44	-.06	.25	.22	.55
AB 1545	Pertains to scholarships. State agricultural scholarship must be used at a California school accredited by Western Assoc. of Schools and Colleges.	.42	.12	.36	.34	.53
AB 1722	Pertains to special state school fund allowance.	.51	-.15	.42	.36	.52
AB 1853	Increases maximum tax rate for adult education by 10¢.	.42	.11	.51	.40	.51
AB 2259	Provides for school library research coordinator and 2-year study of school libraries.	.38	.04	.42	.43	.49

TABLE 4.3 (continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III	IV	V
AB 800 C	Provides "austerity" Budget Act of 1963.	-.33	-.21	-.25	-.24	-.48
AB 145CB	(See AB 145 B in cluster 1.)	-.44	-.01	-.36	-.05	-.47
AB 1403	Permits district to provide free breakfast and lunch for pupils.	.27	.15	.10	.22	.33
AB 977	Requires State Fire Marshal to approve plans for construction or alteration of school buildings.	.14	.21	-.00	.19	.27
AB 1374	Pertains to the taxation of cigarettes.	.19	.12	.05	.24	.24

to salaries. Third, the parties divided on the foreign language study program introduced in 1961. The Republicans seemed to oppose this issue whereas the Democrats took a very hard line. Fourth, the Republicans took issue with the Democrats on the creation of state administrative machinery which would deal with urban and suburban problems. Lastly, the Republicans did not favor the removal of constraints on increasing local school district bonded indebtedness. They unanimously voted against any reduction in the percentage of the vote required for the passage of bond issues.

On 11 of the 18 roll-calls with correlates greater than .40 with cluster 1, one or more interest groups registered a position of support or opposition. For the most part there is no discernible pattern of support or opposition to the measures in this cluster. However, there is a slight tendency for the California School Boards Association to oppose the Democratic vote (this association supported only 2 measures and opposed 5). There is a slightly stronger tendency for the California State Federation of Teachers to support measures in this cluster (it supported 5 and opposed only 1). Furthermore, 17 of the 18 bills in cluster 1 were carried by Democrats; the one bill carried by a Republican was carried by Milton Marks who was the only Republican to retain a chairmanship under Mr. Unruh's Speakership.

Cluster 2: State Revenues. This cluster has only two definers, i.e., two roll-calls, on one major bill. The bill, authored by Senator Burns, was concerned with revenues accruing to the state from the tide lands and submerged lands in southern Calfironia. The bill was overwhelmingly defeated on the Assembly floor but because the Senate had passed it, it proceeded to a conference committee made up of representatives from the two houses. On the Assembly floor, the committee conference report, revising the bill so that the representatives on the committee from both houses could agree to it, was also overwhelmingly defeated. Only a few liberal Democrats voted in favor of the bill on the two occasions. From the information at hand, it is impossible to interpret this cluster or even label it appropriately.

Cluster 3: Liberalism-conservatism. This cluster contains a variety of issues and measures. The content of the bills in cluster 3 have no discernible common theme. There are 12 roll-calls on 12 measures in this cluster, and 10 of the 12 bills were carried by Democrats. The distribution of interest group positions on these 12 bills gives no indication that this is in any way an interest group dimension or that the bills contained in this cluster are part of a program of a given interest group. However, an examination of the distribution of roll-call votes shows that those opposing measures in this cluster come from both parties, from both the southern and northern part of the state. Those opposing measures in cluster 3 include the hard-core southern Republican conservatives, as well as a number of northern Democrats who have reputations for conservative orientations. Of course, we would expect a greater number of conservatives in the Republican caucus, and a greater number of liberals in the Democratic caucus. The correlation between cluster 1 and cluster 3 is .53, an indication that the parties do not divide cleanly ideologically.

A number of bills in cluster 3 would reduce the degree of discretion on the part of local school districts, particularly rural school disctricts. AB 188, ACA 21, SCA 9, and AB 1853 seem to fall into this category. There is another category of measures which deal with teacher and state employee rights. We would expect conservatives and liberals to divide on teacher authority and teacher protection. A third class of measures in cluster 3 on which conservatives and liberals might be expected to divide, has to do with finance and taxation.

It would appear that most of the issues here are not sufficiently strong to divide conservatives and liberals. Most of these measures introduce minor but somewhat progressive changes in the educational and administrative system. Given the relative specificity of this form of variance, as shown in Table 4.1 we may conclude that party discipline intervenes, especially on the majority party, to mediate the impact of ideological inclinations on educational voting. This is the case because American parties, both legislative and electoral parties, have liberal and conservative wings.

Cluster 4: Democratic Progressivism. There are 10 measures in cluster 4, nine of which were authored by Democrats. Once again, these 10 measures cover a range of educational and related issues. However, there seems to be a common thread, namely, an orientation to problems particularly intense in urban lower-class areas. This cluster contains a measure which establishes compensatory education programs in the State of California, another which deals with unemployment compensation, a third which deals with extension of medical assistance. Two measures in cluster 4 are concerned with the financial support of public schools. A third set of issues deals with employee benefits. Each of these issues, in its own way, represents some form of progressive change. But these proposed progressive changes are not sufficiently large to scare away moderates in either party. Among the interest groups only the California School Boards Association, with its newly assumed far right orientation opposed several more measures than it supported in this particular cluster. The State Department of Education, under its new leader, supported seven of the 10 measures.

An examination of the distribution of roll-call votes on bills in cluster 4 shows that the Democrats supported these measures without a single dissenting vote. The Republicans, however, were split on these measures. The great majority of southern Republicans, and all those who had a reputation for their conservatism, opposed measures in this cluster. Assemblymen Badham, Chapel, Collier, Cusanovich, Conrad, Ashcraft, Barnes, Holmes, and Stevens, were those who led the fight against the passage of these measures. The moderate conservatives whether from the north or south supported these measures, almost without exception.

Cluster 5: Regional Republicanism. Cluster 5 is extremely difficul to interpret. On the one hand, it is very highly related to cluster 1 in terms of the distribution of roll-call votes; on the other hand it is not strictly a partisan dimension. Democrats as well as northern Republicans opposed them. Those who opposed measures in cluster 5 came from both the moderate and conservative wings of the Republican party, although they happened all to come from Southern California. The measures in cluster 5 seem not to be of a different character than those in cluster 4. One measure is concerned with the political rights of public employees, another deals with aid to needy families, and still others pertain to finance, salaries of teachers, and grants to libraries. An examination of the distribution of interest group positions on measures in cluster 5 does not reveal any discernible patterns. Again the California School Boards Association seems to be somewhat opposed to measures in this cluster, but the evidence for this is not particularly strong.

Unique Roll-Calls. We noted earlier that many of the unique roll-calls were concurrency votes. In other words, many of the unique roll-calls take place on measures which have been through the legislative mill and on which a good deal of consensus has already been built. However, unique roll-calls also are to be expected on minor measures which have regional implications. For example, AB 1223, a measure which extended the deadline for the submission of county master plans on district reorganization, was a bill which gave advantage to certain areas of the state only. Another such measure which has no particular ideological content nor partisan content is a measure to introduce physical fitness tests in the school testing program. In other words, it appears that the unique roll-calls during the term under consideration, occur on bills which have either regional import, or measures on which a good deal of consensus and legislative work has already occurred, providing that these bills have little if any ideological content or partisan interest. These are hypotheses which need further validation.

Summary

There are five major conclusions which emerge from the analysis of Assembly voting in 1963-64. First, the major cleavage in the Assembly during this time was partisan. The evidence for this is in cluster 1, the most general of the five clusters. Second, it appears that partisanship intervenes to negate an ideological approach to education legislation. This can be seen in cluster 3. Third, the roll-call voting in the Assembly of 1963-64 showed no evidence of a systematic bias on the part of the Assembly towards interest grups. To be sure, the California School Boards Association tended to line itself up with the Republican party, particularly the southern conservative wing of the party. But the dimensions of voting do not coincide as they did in earlier terms with the position of any given interest group. Fourth, the minority party was badly divided. This can be seen in clusters 4 and 5 specifically. There were two major factions in the minority party: one faction was composed of young, newly-elected, for the most part northern and progressive Republicans; the other was based in the southern part of the state and composed of more experienced, older and very conservative Republicans. The fifth major conclusion which can be drawn from the analysis of Assembly voting on education in 1963-64 is that partisanship disciplines the response to education legislation and structures roll-call voting in a way which would not be possible if a less controlled approach were used in a house with such a high number of freshman legislators. In other words, partisanship provides structure and, therefore, compensation for a low level of legislative integration.

THE ASSEMBLY, 1965-1966

During the sessions of 1965-66, there were 89 roll-calls on education measures which indicated some controversy and which had a sufficiently high participation rate to merit analysis. Of the 89 roll-calls, 15 were concurrency or reconsideration votes. Thus, there were only 75 measures on which 89 roll-calls took place. These measures, for the most part, were not the result of any major educational reform movement or generated by major political upheaval. Only a few measures were sufficiently controversial and consequential to merit special mention here. AB 52 introduced by Mr. Unruh during the 1966 session was a major school finance and taxation bill. It stirred much controversy in the legislature and indeed outside it. The Winton bill (AB 1474) was a significant bill in that it served notice of the return of the California Teachers Association to a position of considerable power; however, it was not a major piece of substantive legislation. Indeed, the changes it proposed were of minor significance. Several important measures were introduced during the 1965 session of the Assembly which dealt with the problem of student radicalism on university and state college campuses. These measures represented the Assembly response to the free speech movement on the Berkeley campus of the University of California in the fall of 1964.

The major education interest groups in the state were, once again, very active. One or more of the major interest groups took a position of support or opposition on 55 of the selected bills. There was wide-spread agreement among the major interest groups -- the California Congress of Parents and Teachers, the California School Boards Association, the California Teachers Association, the California Federation of Teachers, the California Association of School Administrators, the California School Employees Association and the California State Department of Education -- on the following issues: the establishment of the State Attorney General's opinion as prevailing over the opinion of a district attorney or a county council in case of conflict, the reduction of the required two-thirds majority for local bonded indebtedness to 50 or 60 percent, the permission for school districts to provide field trips to foreign countries for secondary school students, the provision of credentials for limited service for the teaching of mentally retarded pupils, and for the provision of uniform achievement tests for each grade level in the state wide testing program.

There was a good deal of conflict among the education interest groups as indicated by the conflicting positions they took on a number of measures in a number of areas. The most salient conflict during 1965-66 was between the main-line education interest groups and the California Federation of Teachers, a radical union-oriented group. The major conflict between the "establishment" and the Federation of Teachers was on AB 1474, a bill which introduced the so-called "professional negotiations" instead of a full-fledged collective bargaining procedure. Also, the Federation decided during 1964 and 1965 to take the side of radical professors and university students. Thus, it was in conflict with some of the other major groups on issues pertaining to "law and order" on the campus of a state college or a state university. Another area of conflict had to do with proposed amendments to the Fisher Bill of 1961. A number of efforts

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had been made since 1961 to amend the teacher credential law and modify some of its provisions for the academic preparation of teachers. Such was the case again in 1965 with the introduction of bill AB 1275. The Federation of Teachers, which had supported the Fisher bill in 1961, was opposed to the inclusion of physical education, industrial arts, home economics, health education, and business education as academic subject matter areas. The other groups concurred in this proposed amendment.

There was also fairly intense conflict on a number of issues which normally and typically divide administrators and governing boards on the one hand, and employees on the other. Bills pertaining to unprofessional conduct on the part school district employees, authority for the preparation of curriculum materials, the issuance of credentials to Peace Corps members who did not have teacher education, and the financial settlement in the case of dismissal of employees -- these were the kinds of issues that divided the administrative groups from the teacher groups during this term.

The state-local conflict was not nearly as intense during this period. Only minor skirmishes took place among the interest groups on this syndrome of issues.

The cluster analysis of the selected 89 roll-calls uncovered five major patterns of roll-call voting in the Assembly. An evaluation of this solution and the interpretation of the dimensions which were discovered will follow.

Evaluation of Cluster Solution

The sum of communalities among the 89 roll-calls for 1965-66 is 44.26, somewhat higher than for the previous term. The root mean squares of raw correlations had a value of .33, also higher than the value for the previous term. These higher values are to be expected with less turn-over of Assembly personnel and a higher degree of what we have called legislative integration. Under more structured conditions, legislative voting should be more predictable. This seems to be the case when we contrast these communalities and mean squares of raw correlations with a period when legislative integration was lower.

Table 4.4 presents data relevant to the evaulation of this five dimensional cluster solution. We note, first, that 80% of the communalities are exhausted by five dimensions, and that 92% of the mean squares of the raw correlation matrix is exhausted by the five dimensional solution. These values indicate that five dimensions are sufficient to exhaust what is in the correlation matrix and that the residual correlation would, if clustered further, yield only trivial dimensions.

An inspection of Section B of Table 4.4 shows that cluster 1 reproduces 70% of the mean squares of correlation in the correlation matrix. This is, in other words, a very general dimension. Clusters 2, 3, and 4 have a medium level of generality, whereas cluster 5 represents a very specific form of variance. In our interpretation of roll-call voting for this term, then, we must pay special attention to cluster 1.

TABLE 4.4

SUFFICIENCY AND GENERALITY OF KEY CLUSTER DIMENSIONS OF ASSEMBLY ROLL CALLS ON EDUCATION MEASURES, 1965-1966, AND THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE CLUSTERS

	Cluster Dimensions				
	I	II	III	IV	V
A. Sufficiency of Oblique Clusters					
Proportion of sum of estimated communalities exhausted	.44	.12	.08	.08	.08
Cumulative proportion of communalities exhausted	.44	.56	.64	.72	.80
Cumulative proportion of mean square of raw r matrix exhausted	.81	.86	.88	.90	.92
Residual correlation remaining after each successive dimension (RMS)*	.14	.12	.11	.10	.09
B. Generality of Oblique Clusters					
Reproducibility of mean squares of correlations	.70	.43	.25	.25	.10
Reproducibility of communalities	.55	.43	.33	.33	.20
C. Raw Correlations Between Cluster Scores ("factor estimates")					
I	(.97)	.64	-.60	.60	-.31
II	.64	(.96)	-.36	.34	-.03
III	-.60	-.36	(.94)	-.29	.21
IV	.60	.34	-.29	(.92)	-.36
V	-.31	-.03	.21	-.36	(.82)
D. Estimated Inter-domain Correlations					
I	1.00	.66	-.63	.64	-.35
II	.66	1.00	-.37	.36	-.03
III	-.63	-.37	1.00	-.31	.24
IV	.64	.36	-.31	1.00	-.41
V	-.35	-.03	.24	-.41	1.00

Sections C and D of Table 4.4 show that the first four dimensions overlap very considerably. The inter-correlations are, generally, quite high. They are particularly high between cluster 1 and clusters 2, 3, and 4. The most specific dimension, cluster 5, is much more independent. In comparing the independence of the dimensions for the 1965-66 solution and the independence of dimensions in 1963-64 solution we find very similar pehnomena, one major dimension which is highly correlated with several of the others. The most specific dimensions in both solutions are at the same time the most independent.

In Table 4.5 we find the analysis of the inner structure of the five dimensions. The most specific form of variance, represented by cluster 5, has the lowest alpha reliability (.82) as well as the lowest domain validity (.90). Each of the other four clusters have reliabilities and validities exceeding .92. The solution, therefore, is highly satisfactory.

There are 11 variables which have a unique variance. In contrast to the 1963-64 Assembly solution we have only three reconsideration or concurrency votes among the unique roll-calls. Also, and particularly noteworthy, is the sharp drop in the percent of unique roll-calls from 1963-64 to 1965-66, a drop from 23% to 12%. This gives some confirmation to the earlier statement that a more highly integrated legislature behaves in more predictable ways.

Dimensions of Assembly Voting

We have learned from previous analyses that the specific dimensions are more difficult to interpret than the more general ones. This is also the case with the Assembly analysis for 1965-66. We shall now turn to an exploration of the meaning of these five dimensions.

Cluster 1: Partisanship. cluster 1 contains, as can be seen in Table 4.6, a wide range of education issues or issues relevant in one way or another to education. An examination of the roll-calls indicates that these issues were ones on which the parties sharply and cleanly divided. There are several categories of issues represented by those measures on which the roll-calls correlate .40 or greater with cluster 1. First, a number of the issues pertain to financing education and to fiscal procedures in the public administration of education. Second, included in cluster 1 are a number of personnel issues -- issues pertaining to the credentialing of teachers, transference of leave from district to district, experience of teaching personnel, and so on. Third, certain of the defining roll-calls were on measures which were concerned with the electoral process. Lastly, cluster 1 contains the budget bill for 1965 and the budget bill for 1966.

Interest group positions show no discernible pattern of support or opposition on bills in cluster 1. The only inference which can be made is that the California Federation of Teachers was somewhat more supportive of the measures in cluster 1 than the other groups. As was the case in 1963-64, interest group positions have very little effect on legislative voting when the issues themselves have a partisan interest. This is the case except for those interest groups which align themselves with one or

TABLE 4.5

INNER STRUCTURES OF CLUSTERS OF ROLL-CALL VOTES ON EDUCATION MEASURES, ASSEMBLY, 1965-66

Variables (Bill No.)	Definers	Oblique Factor Coeff.	Commun-ality	Average R with Definers	B-Reliability Variables Singly	C-Reliability Variables Added Comul.
Cluster 1						
SB 1402	D	.97	.95	.81		
SB 1	D	.91	.85	.76		
SB 34 B	D	.91	.83	.76		
AB 241 C	D	-.90	.84	.76		
AB 1212 C	D	.90	.82	.76		
SB 34 BF	D	.89	.81	.75		
AB 1212	D	.86	.74	.72		
AB 2270	D	.85	.74	.71		
AB 245	D	.77	.61	.65		
ACA 49		.76	.65	.64	.97	.97
AB 241	D	.74	.62	.62		
AB 1752	D	.72	.57	.60		
AB 592		.72	.70	.60	.97	.97
AB 2710	D	.70	.60	.59		
AB 500 F		.69	.53	.58	.97	.97
ACA 51		.67	.60	.57	.97	.97
SB 1 D		.66	.55	.56	.97	.97
AB 2717 C		.62	.56	.52	.97	.97
AB 1539		.60	.44	.51	.97	.97
AB 257		.58	.37	.49	.97	.97
AB 1507		.57	.53	.48	.97	.97
AB 1701		.56	.39	.48	.97	.97
SB 1291		-.53	.35	.45	.97	.97
AB 88 B		.52	.42	.44	.97	.97
ACR 102		.50	.32	.42	.97	.97
AB 80 B		.46	.26	.39	.97	.97
A-Reliability = .97						
Domain Validity = .99						
Cluster 2						
ACA 1 B	D	.93	.91	.74		
AB 259	D	.91	.85	.72		
ACA 8	D	.89	.81	.71		
AB 2548	D	.87	.81	.69		
AB 36 B	D	.85	.81	.68		
SB 757	D	.82	.72	.66		
SB 757 R	D	.82	.72	.66		
ACA 8 C	D	.79	.79	.63		

TABLE 4.5 (continued)

Variables (Bill No.)	Definers	Oblique Factor Coeff.	Communality	Average R with Definers	B-Reliability Variables Singly	C-Reliability Variables Added Comul.
AB 152	D	.75	.59	.60		
AB 4	D	.67	.47	.53		
AB 1599		.65	.63	.52	.96	.96
AB 45 B	D	.65	.52	.52		
AB 1618	D	.64	.44	.51		
AB 1622		.62	.44	.49	.96	.96
AB 36		.56	.53	.45	.96	.96
AB 2857		.53	.33	.43	.96	.96
AB 241 F		.47	.24	.38	.96	.96
AB 267		.42	.26	.34	.96	.96
AB 2946	.4	.41	.22	.32	.96	.96
A-Reliability = .96						
Domain Validity = .98						
Cluster 3						
AB 1920 C	D	.89	.84	.74		
ACR 156 C	D	.87	.78	.72		
AB 853	D	.85	.74	.70		
AB 1920	D	.84	.73	.69		
AB 1474	D	.75	.62	.62		
AB 1474 C	D	.75	.69	.62		
AB 295		-.66	.51	.54	.94	.94
A 141 B		-.62	.52	.51	.94	.94
AB 1275		.59	.39	.49	.93	.94
AB 934		.57	.35	.47	.93	.94
AB 45 BC		-.39	.26	.32	.92	.93
AB 52 B		.28	.24	.23	.92	.93
A-Reliability = .94						
Domain Validity = .97						
Cluster 4						
AB 9	D	.99	1.07	.83		
SB 675	D	.93	.89	.77		
AB 769 C	D	.71	.61	.59		
AB 2274	D	.70	.51	.58		
AB 655		.60	.42	.50	.91	.91
SCA 4 B		.60	.54	.50	.92	.92
AB 1609		.50	.30	.42	.90	.90
AB 946		.47	.33	.39	.90	.90
ACA 19		.39	.26	.33	.89	.90
A-Reliability = .92						
Domain Validity = .96						

TABLE 4.5 (continued)

Variables (Bill No.)	Definers	Oblique Factor Coeff.	Communality	Average R with Definers	B-Reliability Variables Singly	C-Reliability Variables Added Cumul.
Cluster 5						
AB 52 BC	D	.84	.73	.57		
AB 52 BF	D	.84	.72	.56		
SB 2 BF	D	-.58	.39	.39		
AB 1806	D	-.55	.34	.37		
AB 312	D	-.54	.33	.36		
AB 3329		-.47	.33	.31	.82	.83
AB 500		-.46	.38	.31	.82	.82
AB 870		-.42	.27	.28	.82	.83
AB 432		-.39	.28	.26	.81	.84
AB 432 R		-.39	.29	.26	.81	.83
AB 98 BC		-.26	.22	.17	.80	.84

A-Reliability = .82
Domain Validity = .90

Unique Variables

AB 500 C
AB 554
ACR 69
SB 19
SB 1 DF
AB 562
AB 790
AB 2329
SB 19 R
AB 540
AB 1684

TABLE 4.6

CORRELATIONS OF ASSEMBLY ROLL-CALLS ON SELECTED EDUCATION BILLS WITH OBLIQUE CLUSTER DOMAINS OF ASSEMBLY VOTING, 1965-66

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains				
		I	II	III	IV	V
Cluster 1						
SB 1402	Permits governing boards of public agencies to assign employees to act as voter registrars.	.97	.70	-.56	.58	-.23
SB 1	Provides that Attorney General's opinion re Education Code prevails over that of the District Attorney and County Counsel when in conflict.	.91	.53	-.57	.50	-.25
SB 34 B	Specifies that revenue derived under Banking and Corporation Tax Law shall be treated as earned during year of receipt.	.91	.56	-.58	.52	-.28
AB 241 C	Increases worker rate of contributions to unemployment disability insurance.	-.90	-.55	.57	-.51	.22
AB 1212 C	Provides for candidate's statement of qualifications to be mailed with sample ballot.	.90	.60	-.59	.57	-.32
SB 34 BF	(See SB 34 B above.)	.89	.50	-.57	.52	-.36
AB 1212	(See AB 1212 C above.)	.86	.57	-.57	.50	-.30
AB 2270	Revises sales and use tax law.	.85	.53	-.48	.50	-.40
AB 245	Prohibits any district except a junior college district from maintaining a junior college after July 1, 1966.	.77	.49	-.56	.54	-.34
ACA 49	Authorizes counties and cities to reduce the tax rate on, or exempt, improvements and personal property.	.76	.47	-.66	.45	-.42
AB 241	(See AB 241 C above.)	.74	.52	-.43	.59	-.10
AB 1752	Authorizes issuance of standard teaching credential to Peace Corps member who has a Bachelor's Degree, has taught in a foreign country, and meets other specified requirements.	.72	.57	-.50	.53	-.37

TABLE 4.6 (continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III	IV	V
AB 592	Pertains to the reorganization of local districts, mainly city and non-school districts.	.72	.67	-.42	.46	-.50
AB 2710	Requires 90-day notice prior to filing of charges of unprofessional conduct against a permanent employee of a school district. Provides for report by statewide professional organization.	.70	.60	-.39	.57	-.40
AB 500 F	Provides for 1965 State budget.	.69	.47	-.38	.39	-.39
ACA 51	Authorizes Legislature to exempt new or expanding businesses from property taxation for 10 years if business is in a county where defense industry or military installation has been phased out and the new industry employs generally the same persons.	.67	.37	-.34	.61	-.56
SB 1 D	Makes appropriation for support of State government for 1966-67 fiscal year.	.66	.63	-.35	.55	-.26
AB 2717 C	Authorizes city to impose income tax on city residents in accordance with provisions of the Calif. Personal Income Tax Law.	.62	.26	-.29	.52	-.58
AB 1539	Requires that unified school districts with a.d.a. of less than 25,000, high school districts under 5,000 and elementary districts under 10,000 use curriculum material prepared by county supt. rather than publish similar materials.	.60	.47	-.39	.33	-.40
AB 257	Permits teacher transfering to another school district to transfer leave of absence.	.58	.38	-.37	.47	-.35
AB 1507	Changed definition of "necessary small school" by specifying that such school is an elementary school with an a.d.a. of less than 101, exclusive of 7th and 8th grades.	.57	.45	-.46	.18	-.44

TABLE 4.6 (continued)

No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains				
		I	II	III	IV	V
ACR 156 C	Creates Joint Committee on Higher Education to study problems of higher education.	-.46	-.29	.87	-.22	.16
AB 853	Provides that the name "California State Colleges" and the name of any state college be property of the state.	-.47	-.27	.85	-.22	.23
AB 1920	(See AB 1920 C above.)	-.44	-.27	.84	-.22	.05
AB 1474	Pertains to teacher negotiations. Major bill, Winton Act.	-.60	-.34	.75	-.30	.36
AB 1474 C	(See above.)	-.73	-.41	.75	-.37	.29
AB 295	Provides clarification of terms "local agency" and "legislative body."	.48	.35	-.66	.30	-.38
AB 141 B	Pertains to the STRS and the OASDI.	.57	.44	-.62	.34	-.41
AB 1275	Provides that "academic subject matter area" for purposes of administrative or supervision credentials includes physical ed., industrial arts, home ec., health ed., and business education.	-.52	-.30	.59	-.31	.13
AB 984	Provides that savings and loan associations may arrange for collection of savings from school children by principal, teachers or collectors.	-.44	-.26	.57	-.23	.10
AB 1684	Authorizes County Superintendent of Schools with Board of Education approval to employ personnel to conduct research.	-.30	-.19	.40	-.17	.05
AB 45 BC	Ratifies Compact for Education.	.29	.27	-.39	-.09	.01
SB 19 R	(See SB 19, cluster 1.)	-.08	-.06	.33	.15	-.09
AB 52 B	Increases sales and use tax to 4%. Revises law re state support for public schools.	.08	.23	.28	.01	.15

TABLE 4.6 (continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains				
		I	II	III	IV	V
Cluster 4						
AB 9	Creates commission to study the status of women in various fields and report to Legislature.	.52	.43	-.24	.99	-.20
SB 675	Creates Commission on the Status of Women.	.50	.32	-.24	.93	-.31
AB 769 C	Pertains to mental retardation	.57	.22	-.27	.71	-.54
AB 2274	Authorizes Dept. of Rehabilitation to expand services to implement an anti-poverty program.	.54	.23	-.29	.70	-.32
AB 655	Permits school district governing board to provide for field trips to a foreign country by pupils in a secondary school.	.48	.40	-.33	.60	.16
SCA 4 B	Declares it to be in the best interests of the state to conserve undeveloped open space lands.	.43	.52	-.25	.60	.02
AB 1609	Provides for authorization of credentials for limited service for the teaching of the mentally retarded.	.20	.20	-.09	.50	-.25
AB 946	Requires public meetings of legislative bodies of local agencies except in certain personnel matters.	.21	-.10	-.15	.47	-.37
ACA 19	Requires public meetings by U.C. Regents except in certain personnel matters and those relating to national security.	.06	-.14	.06	.39	-.15
AB 554	Provides that a public employee be entitled to the difference between his military pay and his salary for the first 30 days he is on military leave.	.27	.23	-.22	.37	-.14
Cluster 5						
AB 52 BC	(See AB 52 B, cluster 3.)	-.36	-.11	.29	-.34	.84
AB 52 BF	" " " " " "	-.36	-.11	.28	-.34	.84

TABLE 4.6 (continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III	IV	V
SB 2 BF	Creates Capital Outlay Fund for Public Higher Education to draw income from tideland oil and dry gas revenues from Long Beach.	.01	-.07	.04	.13	-.58
AB 1806	Requires reimbursement of school district employee and payment of attorney fees when dismissal case is settled in favor of employee or proceedings are discontinued.	.22	.01	-.05	.36	-.55
AB 312	Provides that school district assessment rates conform to statewide average assessment level.	.24	-.05	-.22	.21	-.54
AB 3329	Provides for a uniform achievement test for each grade level in statewide testing program.	.40	.04	-.22	.31	-.47
AB 500	Provides for 1965 state budget.	.42	.41	-.22	.26	-.46
AB 870	Imposes hotel tax of 4%.	.27	.22	-.02	.34	-.42
AB 432	Pertains to news coverage of governmental agencies.	.14	-.15	.10	.22	-.39
AB 432 R	(See above.)	.02	-.08	.14	.32	-.39
AB 98 BC	Pertains to motor vehicle pollution control.	-.04	-.08	.23	-.13	-.26
AB 562	Provides for a fee from school districts to Dept. of Ed. for review of school building construction plans.	.13	.13	-.01	-.10	-.13

another party. Most of the education interest groups in California seem to adopt a bi-partisan or a nonpartisan strategy. The California Federation of Teachers is, of course, the exception; it aligns itself firmly with the liberal wing of the Democratic party.

Cluster 2: Interest Group Consensus. The issues in cluster 2 have no common substantive content. The major issues in cluster 2 are concerned with lowering the voting requirement for incurring school district indebtedness from the 67% majority to a 50% or 60% majority. However, there are a number of other issues mixed in with measures pertaining to the incurrence of school district indebtedness. A bill to ratify the Compact for Education, an appropriation to finance faculty research in the state colleges, the regulation of non-resident apprentice tuition, discrimination in employment, and the requirement that classified employees of a school district be subject to one or another of the civil service systems, are all measures in cluster 2. What is common in cluster 2 is the party affiliation of the authors who carried the bills in cluster 2. They are, with one exception, all Democrats. However, this is not startling in a partisan legislature. Inevitably, the bills carried by members of the minority party will receive less favorable hearing at the committee stage. What is startling about the measures in cluster 2 is the fact that there was such a high degree of consensus among the interest groups on the bills which received this response from the Assembly. A total of 50 positions were recorded on the bills in this cluster by seven major groups. Forty-four of the registered positions favored the measures; only six opposed positions were taken. In Table 4.4 we note that the correlation between clusters 1 and 2 is .30. One may therefore draw the inference that issues and measures on which there is a high degree of inter-interest group agreement, even in a partisan legislature, will not call forth a partisan response. Inter-interest group agreement or consensus, in other words, intervenes and ameliorates the partisan response to education.

Cluster 3: Educational Conservatism. Cluster 3 is highly negatively correlated with cluster 1 (the inter-domain correlation is -.63). Cluster 3 is about as highly negatively correlated as clusters 2 and 4 are positively correlated with cluster 1. Cluster 1 divided the parties; cluster 2 divided the Republican party mainly. Cluster 3, however, divides the Democratic party. The liberals in the Democratic party voted against the measures in cluster 3.

Cluster 3 is distinguished both in terms of content and in terms of the patterns of behavior of the major interest groups on the various measures in it. First, cluster 3 contains measures which counter student unrest. Indeed, the four most highly correlated roll-calls with cluster 3 are on issues which are designed to restrict radicalism on the campuses. The next most highly correlated roll-calls are on the famous Winton Act which introduced teacher negotiations but did not go far enough for the Federation of Teachers. The legislation proposed in cluster 3 would appeal to hard-core conservatives and a good many moderates. It would be anathema to the hard-core liberals all of whom are in the Democratic party by this time. It is with this hard-core coalition of liberals that the Federation of Teachers had its strongest ties. Of the 11 roll-calls in cluster 3,

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The California Federation of Teachers opposed eight. It did not support even one measure in this cluster. It is interesting to note that the California Teachers Association Bill, the Winton Bill, received the same response as did other pieces of legislation which would appeal to the more ideologically conservative legislators. The Federation of Teachers, on the other hand, was radicalizing its own image by taking the positions it did on all the bills in this cluster.

It is interesting to note that this is the only cluster of the five in which there was a sprinkling of both Republican and Democratic authors of bills. It appears that the Unruh coalition was, by 1965, willing to give the conservative wing of the Assembly its occasional taste of success. This was not the case during 1962, 1963, and 1964.

Cluster 4: Quality of Life. Cluster 4 exhausts about the same percentage of variance in the correlation matrix as cluster 3, and as has been noted, it has about the same degree of relationship, though in opposite directions, as cluster 3 with cluster 1. Cluster 4 is very difficult to interpret. The measures it contains are all mildly progressive but there is no substantive theme running through them. Nor is there any discernible pattern of support and opposition from the interest groups. Perhaps the main clue to its interpretation is the fact that selected moderate and conservative southern California Republicans voted in opposition to the measures in this cluster. This is not to say that the opposition comes from Southern California Republicans, nor is it to say that it comes from conservative Republicans. The oppostion comes from a strange mixture of Southern California conservative and moderate Republicans. However, a closer examination of those who voted in opposition to measures in cluster 4 shows that many were highly involved in education, at least on those committees which were concerned with education matters. Assemblymen Flournoy, Hinkeley, Lanterman, Thelin, Vesey, Collier, Biddle -- all highly involved in education in one way or another -- were the core opposition group to measures in cluster 4. The votes these men cast in opposition to these measures may simply reflect their frustration with the chairman of the Education Committee, Gus Garrigus, or it may reflect a small coalition of highly involved Republican assemblymen under the guidance of Mr. Flournoy.

Cluster 5: The Unruh Inter-Party Coalition. There are several facts which should be taken into account in interpreting this last dimension of roll-call voting in the Assembly of 1955-56. First, it should be noted that the three most integral definers of cluster 5 are bills which were introduced in the sessions of 1966, just prior to the 1966 general election. Second, these three definers are roll-call votes taken on either amendments which the Senate made to the bill or on conference committee recommendations. Third, the opposition to measures in cluster 5 came from both the Democratic and Republican parties. Those who voted against these measures were led by Gordon Winton, a previous candidate for the Speakership in fall of 1961. Gordon Winton was a man whom Mr. Unruh had never forgiven for this opposition. These three facts might lead one to suspect that those who favor these issues (or voted against those which are reflected) were members of a very broadly based inter-party coalition which Mr. Unruh tried to develop in 1966. To be sure, this coalition included members of both parties. Those who voted for the measures in cluster 5 may have done so out of conviction; but the majority who voted for these measures were also voting for bills authored by Mr. Unruh himself (AB 52).

Summary

The cluster analysis of roll-call voting in 1965-66 uncovered five major dimensions of voting. An attempt has been made to interpret each of them. We may summarize this chapter as follows: (1) the major and most general dimension of roll-call voting is one which divides the parties; (2) a partisan response to education is ameliorated by a high degree of consensus on the part of the major education interest groups; (3) the level of integration in a legislature structures its response to education in a highly predictable way; (4) interest group positions are irrelevant to a legislature's response to education when those issues have a partisan interest. What determines the partisan interest of an education issue is, of course, unspecifiable except in context.

There is, perhaps, one more observation which can be made on the basis of the data presented thus far. In a highly integrated and partisan legislative setting there emerges a more programmatic approach to educational legislation. That is to say, although the clusters seem to cover a wide range of education issues, several of the dimensions seem to represent a slightly more programmatic and coordinated approach to education legislation. Cluster 3, for example, represents a conservative program; cluster 1, a Democratic party program. Cluster 2, of course, is not really a program but at least it is a series of measures on which interest groups representing a variety of constituencies can agree. The problem of a programmatic approach to educational legislation will be explored further in the concluding chapter.

THE SENATE, 1963-1964

Thirty-two Senate roll-calls on education and related measures were selected for the sessions of 1963 and 1964. Three of these 32 roll-calls were concurrency votes; one was a vote taken on a conference committee report. The selected roll-calls were taken on 29 bills, 15 were Senate bills and 14 were Assembly bills. Of the total number of bills, 19 were signed into law, one was pocket vetoed by the Governor, two were filed with the Secretary of State, two were refused passage in the Senate, four were lost in an Assembly committee, and one was refused passage on the Assembly floor.

The bills selected for the Senate roll-call analysis covered a wide range of issues. However, the bills on which roll-calls met the criteria of variance and participation in the Senate have a distinctive urban focus. Particularly, there seems to have been a division in the Senate on measures which the state might undertake to improve urban education and conditions pertaining to it, as well as on the funding and organization of urban services. That conflict or disagreement should occur in the Senate on these issues is not surprising. The Senate was, after all, a body which largely over-represented the rural areas, in contra-distinction to the Assembly which approximated representation by population.

Interest groups were very active on the selected bills. The disagreements between the various interests groups are much the same on the selected bills for the Senate analysis as they were for the Assembly analysis for the same sessions.

Evaluation of the Cluster Solution

The sum of communalities for the selected roll-calls is 16.59, again somewhat proportionately higher than for the Assembly analysis for the same term. The root mean square of raw correlations is .37, compared to .29 for the comparable analysis. The magnitude of these two statistics for the Senate indicates that Senate roll-call voting on education and related matters is, comparatively, more highly predictable than in the Assembly for the sessions of 1963-64.

Four dimensions of roll-call voting were discovered in the cluster analysis of the correlation matrix among the 32 roll-calls. Table 4.7 shows the sufficiency of this four-dimension solution, the generality of the key cluster dimensions, and the inter-relationships among them.

That the cluster solution is highly satisfactory is indicated in Section A of Table 4.7. The proportion of communalities exhausted after four dimensions have been factored out is .90; the proportion of mean squares of the raw correlation matrix exhausted after four dimensions is also .90. The residual correlation remaining after four dimensions is only .01.

In Section B, we find that two of the four dimensions have patterns of variance which are very general; the two others are much more specific. Clusters 1 and 2 have reproducibilities of the mean square of correlations

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TABLE 4.7

SUFFICIENCY AND GENERALITY OF KEY CLUSTER DIMENSIONS OF SENATE ROLL-CALLS ON EDUCATION MEASURES, 1963-64, AND THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE CLUSTERS

	Cluster Dimensions			
	I	II	III	IV
A. Sufficiency of Oblique Clusters				
Proportion of sum of estimated communalities exhausted	.52	.17	.11	.10
Cumulative proportion of communalities exhausted	.52	.69	.80	.90
Cumulative proportion of mean square of raw r matrix exhausted	.80	.86	.89	.90
Residual correlation remaining after each successive dimension (RMS)*	.03	.02	.01	.01
B. Generality of Oblique Clusters				
Reproducibility of mean squares of correlations	.66	.72	.06	.22
Reproducibility of communalities	.57	.60	.18	.33
C. Raw Correlations Between Cluster Scores ("factor estimates")				
I	(.94)	.74	.15	.48
II	.74	(.95)	.25	.47
III	.15	.25	(.85)	.12
IV	.48	.47	.12	(.73)
D. Estimated Inter-Domain Correlations				
I	1.00	.78	.17	.58
II	.78	1.00	.27	.56
III	.17	.27	1.00	.16
IV	.58	.56	.16	1.00

of .66 and .72, respectively. Cluster 3 has a reproducibility of .06, and cluster 4 has a reproducibility of .22.

In Sections C and D, we note the high intercorrelations between clusters 1 and 2, between 1 and 4, and between 2 and 4. Cluster 3, the most specific form of variance, is relatively independent. Clusters 1 and 2 overlap the most (with an inter-domain correlation of .78).

Table 4.8 shows the inner structure of the four clusters. The reliabilities range from .85 to .95; the domain validities range from .92 to .98. The magnitude of the reliabilities and the domain validities would seem to indicate that the response of the Senate to education measures during these sessions was well structured.

Only five of the 32 roll-calls may be considered unique, having a communality value of less than .20 with one or another of the cluster dimensions. This is somewhat a lower percentage of unique variance than we found in the Assembly for the comparable sessions. Notice should be taken of the fact that, unlike the Assembly, the unique patterns of roll-call voting in the Senate are on Senate bills.

Dimensions of Roll-Call Voting

Table 4.9 shows the correlation of roll-calls on various bills with each of the oblique cluster domains. An attempt will now be made to interpret each of the four clusters.

Cluster 1: The Expansion of Governmental Services. The first cluster of roll-calls were taken on measures which have only one common element, namely, they provide for an expansion of governmental services to people. Each of the bills in this cluster was carried by a fairly liberal and progressive Democrat. Among the authors were Senators Short, Rodda and Rattigan, and Assemblymen Knox, Elliot, and Carroll. The education interest groups tended to support measures in this cluster. Seventy-five percent of the registered positions by interest groups were in support of these measures; only 25% of the positions taken were in opposition. It is noteworthy that the California Federation of Teachers as well as the Department of Education supported most of the measures and opposed none. The measures in this cluster seem to represent the meeting point of the more radical Federation of Teachers and the State Administration of Education.

The measures in this cluster, as has been said, seem to be concerned with the extension of governmental services to people. For example, one bill allows local districts and counties to establish child care centers, another is concerned with duty-free lunch periods for teachers, a third extends bereavement leave provisions. These measures are not reformist nor are they radical departures from existing policy. They are mildly progressive, and consequently, received the overwhelming support of the Senate. The only opposition to these measures came from a core of conservative Republican senators, largely representing the exurban counties. Senators Bradly, Lagomarsino, Schrade, and Backstrand led the opposition in the Senate.

TABLE 4.8

INNER STRUCTURES OF CLUSTERS OF ROLL-CALL VOTES ON EDUCATION MEASURES, SENATE, 1963-64

Variables (Bill No.)	Definers	Oblique Factor Coeff.	Communality	Average R with Definers	B-Reliability Variables Singly	C-Reliability Variables Added Comul.
Cluster 1						
SB 989	D	.99	1.00	.81		
AB 617	D	.95	.93	.78		
AB 128 B	D	.93	.94	.77		
SJR 2 R	D	.80	.66	.66		
AB 226	D	.67	.54	.55		
SB 638	D	.61	.46	.50		
AB 120	D	.59	.40	.49		
SB 1221		.49	.28	.40	.93	.93
A-Reliability = .94						
Domain Validity = .97						
Cluster 2						
AB 1663	D	.98	1.03	.80		
SB 170	D	.88	.81	.72		
AB 800	D	.88	.81	.71		
AB 1110	D	.81	.71	.66		
AB 1662	D	.81	.75	.66		
SB 857	D	.79	.76	.64		
AB 37 B	D	.73	.57	.60		
SB 445	D	-.61	.41	.49		
SB 468		.49	.28	.40	.94	.94
ACA 29		.43	.26	.35	.94	.94
SB 60 CB		-.40	.37	.33	.95	.95
A-Reliability = .95						
Domain Validity = .98						
Cluster 3						
SB 153 C	D	.84	.89	.63		
AB 145 F	D	.75	.66	.56		
SB 52	D	.66	.58	.50		
ACA 13		.24	.32	.18	.81	.81
A-Reliability = .85						
Domain Validity = .92						

TABLE 4.8 (continued)

Variables (Bill No.)	Definers	Oblique Factor Coeff.	Commun-ality	Average R with Definers	B-Reli-ability Variables Singly	C-Reli-ability Variables Added Cumul.
Cluster 4						
SB 52 C	D	.77	.44	.53		
AB 145 B	D	.65	.52	.44		
AB 590	D	.64	.44	.44		
AB 2247		.41	.23	.28	.72	.72

A-Reliability = .85
Domain Validity = .92

Unique Variables

SB 12 B
SB 60 B
SB 275
SB 866
SB 1248

TABLE 4.9

CORRELATIONS OF SELECTED SENATE ROLL-CALLS ON SELECTED EDUCATION BILLS WITH OBLIQUE CLUSTER DIMENSIONS OF SENATE VOTING, 1963-64

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains			
		I	II	III	IV
Cluster 1					
SB 989	Allows a district or county to establish child-care centers.	.99	.71	.18	.48
AB 617	Includes mother-in-law and father-in-law as "immediate family" in bereavement leave of absence provisions.	.95	.74	.17	.43
AB 128 B	Adds to the present school civic center and community recreation expenditure purposes for which a special statutory override tax may be levied, the purpose of expenditures involved in providing duty-free lunch periods for teachers. Urgency measure.	.94	.62	.25	.58
SJR 2 R	Asks California state employees be excluded from Hatch Act.	.80	.62	.18	.40
AB 226	Prohibits charging nonresident tuition to child or spouse of university or state college academic employee.	.67	.64	-.02	.51
SB 638	Public school testing program. Requires result to be reported to State Board annually by State Department of Education.	.61	.56	-.04	.51
AB 120	Brings child-care center personnel under merit system.	.60	.54	.06	.50
SB 1221	Sets tuition to be paid a high school district for elementary district students' junior high attendance and provides special tax to cover the costs.	.49	.41	.13	.16

TABLE 4.9 (continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III	IV
Cluster 2					
AB 1663	Creates coordinating council on urban policy to investigate urban development problems.	.63	.98	.23	.45
SB 170	Allows Commission on Equal Employment Opportunities for Teachers to aid local districts in solving problems of de facto segregation.	.63	.88	.40	.52
AB 800	The "austerity" or "stripped down" budget act of 1963.	.74	.88	.06	.50
AB 1110	Allows all districts to levy tax for employee health and welfare benefits.	.76	.81	.14	.54
AB 1662	Creates the Local Agencies Formation Commission made up of nine members appointed by the Governor. Specifies the function of the commission to approve or disapprove of incorporations of cities and formation of special districts and to study the state law with regard thereto. Suspends formation proceedings until commission has rendered decision and terminates proceedings if commission disapproves formation.	.73	.81	.02	.61
SB 857	Provides for a teacher exchange program with foreign countries and the recruitment of foreign born Americans as foreign language teachers.	.71	.79	.46	.32
AB 37 B	(No description given.)	.49	.73	.12	.39
SB 445	Provides that a prompt and reasonable search for evidence, after a lawful arrest for specified narcotic offense, of arrested person's vehicle, house, apartment, or room shall be deemed incident to the arrest.	-.41	-.61	-.33	-.33
SB 468	Authorizes marketing orders under the California Marketing Act of 1937 to limit the total quantity of an agricultural commodity handled during a	.40	.49	-.06	.22

TABLE 4.9 (continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains			
		I	II	III	IV
	marketing season, as well as any specified period, and to establish producer marketing quotas prior to or during the planting or production season.				
SB 866	Exempts inquiry as to applicants' place of birth in a form of application for employment by the State or any political subdivision thereof from general prohibition against such inquiry on employment application.	-.30	-.34	-.07	-.14
ACA 29	Requires 60% vote, rather than 2/3 vote, by electors on incurring indebtedness by county, city, board of education or school district.	.28	.43	.37	.26
SB 60 CB	An act relating to the tide lands and submerged lands granted by the State to the City of Long Beach, and the revenues therefrom.	-.34	-.40	-.15	.08
SB 60 B	(See above.)	-.09	-.22	-.16	-.08
Cluster 3					
SB 153 C	Provides for submission to voters at 1964 general election of the State Beach Parks Recreational and Historical Bond Act of 1964, which if adopted would authorize issuance, subject to state general obligation bond law, of bonds in the amount of one hundred and fifty million dollars to provide funds to acquire and establish beaches, parks, recreational facilities and historical monuments.	.27	.30	.84	-.12
AB 145 F	Grants additional 51.7 million dollars to school districts during 1964-65 fiscal year, and a maximum amount of 119.2 million dollars in 1965-66 and in each year thereafter. Increases all elementary and high school foundation programs in 1964-65 by $10.00 per ADA	.32	.39	.75	.41

TABLE 4.9 (continued)

Bill No.	Bill Description	Correlation with Oblique Cluster Domains I	II	III	IV
	to levels of $249.00 and $339.00 respectively. Districts will receive an additional $10.00 for each pupil in ADA contains first increase in adult education support since 1953. Contains class size provision. Unification policies stated.				
SB 52	Calls for a survey of State Colleges needed and adequacy of service rendered by existing institutions.	-.20	-.08	.66	.07
ACA 13	Permits investments of public retirement funds (STRS excluded) in corporate stock or shares.	-.14	.19	.24	-.13
SB 12 B	Provides for financing the public schools over the next 2 years.	-.17	-.12	-.19	-.16
SB 1248	School district re-organization elections. Adds as an alternative requirement for carrying a unification proposal where a majority of votes are cast in one district or portion of a district, that the proposal be carried by 2/3 of all votes cast. Effective only if SB 718 is enacted.	.10	.08	.25	-.15
Cluster 4					
SB 52 C	(See above in Cluster 3.)	.21	.31	.21	.77
AB 145 B	(See above in Cluster 3.)	.57	.40	-.00	.65
AB 590	Provides program of state grants to improve and extend local library service.	.42	.45	.12	.64
AB 2247	Changes vote requirement for library district bonds to a simple majority.	.22	.19	.21	.41
SB 275	In lieu tax payments.	.17	.07	.12	.23

Cluster 2: Urban Improvement. The second cluster, and somewhat more general than the first, contains measures which are concerned with urban problems. AB 1663 creates a coordinating council on urban policy, SB 170 allows the Commission on Equal Employment Opportunities for Teachers to assist local school districts in solving problems of the defacto segregation, AB 800, the budget bill for 1963, carried a number of programs for urban development. The authors of bills in cluster 2 are all Democrats, and most of them form the liberal end of the spectrum.

The education interest groups registered positions of support for most of these bills. The one exception was the California School Boards Association. School Boards Association, with its large rural and small town membership, was not favorable toward urban development legislation. Thus, it deviated in its postions with respect to bills in cluster 2 from each of the other major education interest groups.

In many respects, the measures in cluster 2 represent a companion program to the measures in cluster 1, in the sense that they are designed for the improvement of local government. However, the measures in cluster 2 received a much more pervasive opposition from the Republican party. Indeed, there was a total split of the two parties on measures in cluster 2. The Republicans opposed these measures; the Democrats supported them.

Cluster 3: The Funding and Organization or Urban Services. The most specific variance on roll-call voting in the Senate in 1963-64 is found on the measures in cluster 3. These measures seem to be concerned with the funding and organization of services in urban areas. The measures found much support among the Republican senators who were concerned with the adequacy of state colleges and the services they provided, as well with state financing of local school district programs. The urban emphasis of the measures in cluster 1, as well as the large scale changes required by the School District Reorganization Act (AB 145) caused consternation among the rural democrats who rallied to oppose these measures.

Cluster 4: The Structure of Educational Organization and Finance. The measures in cluster 4 are concerned with structuring the organization of state education and with the improvement of state library services. An examination of interest group positions, authorship of the measures represented in this cluster, and the distribution of the Senate vote do not reveal any meaningful data for the further interpretation of this cluster of roll-calls. The measures in cluster 4 are, to some extent, more progressive and require somewhat larger changes than those of cluster 3. The response to the more progressive measures is by no means partisan, but the major opposition came from conservative Republicans. The relatively high correlation of this cluster domain with clusters 1 and 2 would seem to indicate that some modified partisanship may be present in the Senate's response to these measures.

CHAPTER V

EDUCATIONAL POLICY-MAKING IN PARTISAN AND NON-PARTISAN LEGISLATURES: COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The primary objective of this study was to analyze empirically the development of partisanship in the California Legislature and its effect upon educational issues during the period from 1955 through 1966. The transition from factualism to partisanship in educational policy as indicated by the voting record of the Assembly and Sentate allowed an internal comparison of the shifting patterns of partisanship within the two houses. Some external influences were also considered to the degree to which they affected partisanship in educational policy-making. These external influences included the relationships between interest groups and political parties, patterns of legislators' involvement in education, and the legislative strategies of political parties with respect to education policy. This longitudinal study revealed three progressive phases and distinctive periods of development; each of these periods lasted for your years.

The first period, between 1955 and 1958 was characterized as one of transitional politics with a low level of partisanship but a high degree of factionalism based upon ideological and regional factors. During the second period, between 1959 and 1962, partisanship was reintroduced into both houses of the legislature, resulting in major reforms in educational policy. The third period, from 1963 to 1966, was identified in this study as one of intense partisanship. Pressure for reform within the urban education centers and higher education was modified by the internal restraints within the legislative system.

The study of the entire period (1955 to 1966) revealed a marked transition from regional-ideological factionalism to intense partisanship on the part of the legislators as reflected in their roll call votes upon legislative issues.

Period I: Factional Non-Partisanship (1955 to 1958)

During the first part of this period the legislature was dominated by Republicans elected largely from the rural areas of the north. This had been accomplished in a large measure by the rather unique cross-filing procedure which had been in effect since 1914 and had only recently been modified for the 1954 election, and finally abolished in 1959. The dropping of cross-filing had a salutary effect for the Democrats in the elections of 1956 and 1958, which made it possible for the Democrats to control the Assembly in 1959. During the first half of this four-year period, the Assembly was factionalized and non-partisan, but by 1957-58 partisanship was taking shape.

Analysis of roll call voting by Assemblymen on educational issues indicated that while the legislative body was in transition the development of formal and informal political structures were hindered thus making legislative behavior less predictable. During this time the legislative structure was based upon regional and ideological factions. On major educational issues the legislators often polarized toward liberals or conservatives and rural or urban interests depending upon the effects of the individual issue to their geographical or ideological considerations. At other times, it was more expedient to respond to partisan strategies thereby submerging their factional interests and preventing any one faction from developing a coherent, systematic or programmatic approach to educational legislation. Educational pressure groups therefore designed programs which would displease no more than one segment of the legislature at a time. During this time in which the Assembly possessed a high degree of factionalism and low level partisanship, the interest groups were able to exert more influence than they would be able to attain in a more partisan climate. Partisanship was beginning to take shape in the Assembly in 1957-58, although factionalism remained a dominant characteristic of the Assembly's behavior towards education.

In 1955-56, the Senate was somewhat factionalized and non-partisan although it was a more unified body and the major division within the Senate seemed to be between the rural and urban senators. Any major split in voting could be attributed to this factor rather than to partisanship. It was able to resist to a greater degree some of the outside forces and pressures which caused stress and divisions within the Assembly. During the entire period of 1955-58 the Senate was more concerned than was the Assembly with assisting the rural schools in the areas of finance, buildings, bonds and organization.

During this four-year period, the analysis of the roll call votes and the official position taken by the California Teachers Association (CTA) indicated that factionalism and non-partisanship permitted the interest groups to exert significant influence. This was accomplished by the CTA coordinating the efforts of many educational associations, including the California Congress of Parents and Teachers to support educational measures which were acceptable to most of the non-partisan and factional legislature.

Period II: Moderate Partisanship (1959-1962)

The California Legislature during this period of time clearly marked itself as being moderately partisan in educational policy-making. This was accomplished after the Democrats gained control of the Senate with 70 percent of the members and 58 percent of the Assembly in 1958. They also won the Governorship for the first time in many years. This newly acquired dominance in state politics soon left its mark upon educational legislation. Their party cohesion was ideologically based upon reforming education.

Analysis of the authorship of the 39 selected measures used in this study leaves no doubt that the Democrats had taken control of the political

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system in Sacramento; of the 32 selected measures, 29 were carried by the Democrats. Five of the Senate bills were authored by Republicans, but only five of the 25 Assembly bills were carried by Republicans.

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During this four-year period, the Assemblymen assumed a new leadership role and vied with the Senators in an attempt to make an indelible imprint upon educational policy. In 1959-60, the Assembly had 70 percent of its 25 educational bills signed into law, while the Senate had only 20 percent. In 1961-62 the Democratic Assembly compiled an even more impressive record by having 100 percent of its 18 selected bills signed by the Governor. During this term the Democrats in the Senate were equally anxious to make their mark on the State's educational policy by having 60 percent of its selected bills signed into law. Included among these was the controversial Fisher Bill (SB 57). This bill made significant reforms in the credentialing of teachers and administrators over the opposition of all major educational interest groups except the California Federation of Teachers (CFT) and the California School Boards Association (CSBA).

The interest groups appeared to have a high degree of unanimity concerning the measures they supported and opposed. They were unusually active after being so thoroughly defeated on certification and mandatory foreign language bills in 1961. However, their legislative activities appeared to have little effect upon the legislature.

The Democrats' educational program was carried with moderate partisanship strategy which was quite consistent with the major objectives of the interest groups in the educational establishment.

A comparison of the Senate's roll call votes with the Assembly's votes indicates that the Senate was considerably more predictable upon educational measures in 1959-60 than was the Assembly, and more predictable than it had been in 1957-58. An examination of the educational bills selected for this study indicates that during this period of moderate partisanship, the suburban interests were better served than were the rural and urban interests.

Increased partisanship was demonstrated by the solid opposition of the Republicans to the Democratic proposals. Noticeable opposition emerged from the conservative wing of both parties creating a polarization on many educational issues. The rural element reasserted itself in the political fray, deepening the cleavage between the liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans.

Period III: Intense Partisanship (1963-1966)

The character of the California Legislature changed significantly during the period 1963-1966. Several factors are responsible for this change. Reapportionment of the Assembly was accomplished in 1962, while the Senate resisted this radical restructuring until 1966. Reapportionment provided the Democrats with an opportunity to use intensive partisan strategies to gain immediate domination of the Assembly with the 1962 election. The newly elected Speaker of the Assembly through his partisan committee assignments proclaimed an end to moderacy and a beginning of intense partisanship. He fortified this partisanship position by changing certain Assembly rules to insure the election of the Speaker by a caucus of the majority party. Since 1955 the Democrats had increased their membership in the Assembly in less than a decade by more than 50 percent and occupied almost two-thirds of the seats in the lower house.

While the Senate possessed a higher percentage of Democrats than did the Assembly, it failed to achieve as high a degree of cohesive partisanship while struggling under the stress of inevitable reapportionment, attempting to maintain leadership in the area of educational policy-making; much internal stress in the Senate resulted from emphasis by the governor upon urban programs while 60 percent of the Senators came from conservative rural constituencies.

The educational reforms of 1961 had often been achieved over the combined influence of the educational interest groups. The CTA had been dealt a devastating blow with the passage of the Certification Bill (SB 57). During the 1963-66 era, the interest groups seemed to confuse the legislature by speaking with so many, and often conflicting, voices. The interest groups were in almost complete disarray, and this could partially be attributed to the intensified partisanship within the legislature. During the first part of this period (1963-64), the CTA attempted to regroup its political forces as it had suffered a disastrous defeat with the Fisher Bill. This period also saw an increase in the intensity of conflict between management and labor. On the one hand, administrators more often joined forces with governing boards and were opposed by both of the larger teacher interest groups represented by the CTA and the CFT. Although it was unable to secure the cooperation of the administrative groups on all educational issues the CTA was able to keep the administrators from actively opposing the Winton Act which gave teachers the right to negotiate with the school boards. On this one measure the School Boards Association and the California Federation of Teachers joined forces to actively oppose this bill but were able to achieve only minor modifications in its final form.

The analysis of the roll call votes during this span of time (1963-66) indicates that the legislature employed political strategies to maintain the educational reforms which had been attained in 1961. In some instances the legislature was willing to make minor modifications in some of the reform legislation such as the credentialing bill and mandatory teaching of foreign language in the elementary schools. The legislature also considered it wise to utilize another political strategy of introducing controversial legislation on major issues which would occupy both the interest groups and the legislators so they would be unable to negate the reform legislation achieved earlier. This they did through the introduction of a school district reorganization plan which pitted the various interest groups and legislative factions against each other thus occupying their time and diverting their energies.

During the last half of this period the educational pressure groups throughout California had partially succeeded in harmonizing their forces and were able to generate considerable agreement on given issues. They were able to agree that the majority vote needed in bond elections should be reduced from 66 2/3 percent to 60 percent, also on a statewide testing program for each grade level, and on a number of other educational measures considered to be less significant than the reform bills passed in 1961. Although the interest groups were able to cooperate on a number of issues this seemed to have little effect upon legislative voting and the legislators increasingly demonstrated their loyalty to the party.

The roll call vote reveals major cleavages developed during this time over partisan issues and it is also apparent that partisanship took precedent over ideological considerations in educational legislation. Further analysis shows impartiality towards any interest group on the part of the legislators. On the other hand, the California Federation of Teachers (CFT) attempted to align itself with the more liberal elements of the Democratic Party while the California School Boards Association (CSBA) sought the support of the more conservative legislators.

During the early portion (1963-64) of this period the Republicans contained many subgroups while the Democrats were more solidly structured and able to exert a higher degree of cohesion and partisanship. Also during this early period partisanship developed a certain degree of discipline on the part of both the legislators and the interest groups towards educational legislation which had not been evidenced during the factional period of the late 1950's.

Partisanship was demonstrated throughout the four-year period of 1963-66. It was more clearly visible in the Assembly than in the Senate but the roll call votes reflect more division between the parties than between the legislators and the interest groups. The votes accentuate the struggle on the part of both houses to receive credit for initiating educational bills which might insure the re-election of the party sponsoring these bills. The analysis of the votes also reveals a high degree of centralization in both houses of the legislature. In the lower house the Speaker tenaciously guarded and controlled every aspect of the legislative process while a Democratic coalition under the leadership of Senator Miller was able to guide educational legislation in the Senate. The emphasis of the legislation during this period was largely upon urban issues to the consternation of a number of Senators who had been selected by the rural-north electorate prior to the Senate reapportionment in 1966. Analysis of the votes highlights the partisan behavior of the legislature as being more predictive than it was during the factional period of the 50's. Perhaps because it was more predictable it lent itself to a more systematic and programmatic approach to the solution of educational issues on the part of the legislature.

In twelve years a vital part of the state's political system, legislature, was dramatically changed in composition, structure, organization, and relationships. In the area of education the legislature's modus operandi changed radically from non-partisan to intensely partisan.

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The non-partisanship had often reflected itself during the middle 50's with the enactment of legislation that generally benefited the more rural areas and was espoused by the power CTA which had apparently succeeded in uniting nearly all of the educational pressure groups. The factionized legislature was not predictable because of geographical and ideological divisiveness and long range planning in the area of education was most difficult. The moderate period of partisanship of the late 50's and early 60's was marked by some of the most significant educational reforms. These reforms often seemed to benefit the suburban areas and middle income groups. The educational pressure groups were so decimated that they seemingly had little impact upon the legislative reform.

The intense partisanship period of the middle 60's revealed through its voting record its intense loyalty to party issues, benefiting the urban areas and helping the low income groups. The output of a partisan legislature was generally more consistent and predictable in the area of educational legislation. It tended to disregard the advice of the State Department of Education, and recognized educational pressure groups. It was prone to both originate and initiate much of the relevant information gained from the minorities and low income groups whose votes were predominately located within the urban areas.